FEMINIST DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION

Karen Celis
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Voor Sari

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Acknowledgments

This book has been a long time in the making. We first met at the first ECPR (European Consortium for Political Research) general conference in 2001, where we both presented papers on women's representation; at APSA (American Political Science Association) a year or so later, and over gin and tonic, we decided we should work together. We co-organized a ECPR workshop in Helsinki, where we also presented our first joint paper (also with Johanna Kantola and Mona Lena Krook). For twenty years we have not stopped working together, with one paper leading to the next. And now this book.

Feminist Democratic Representation is the culmination of both an academic and personal friendship. Without both this book would have been impossible to write. We took our project slowly and became more ambitious in our thinking over time. We have learned the true meaning of the word collaboration, thinking apart and together, but *always* writing together. We think this makes for a much better book than either of us could have written on our own. Our academic sympathies demonstrate all that is good about European political science, something that in 2020 Brexit Britain we can unfortunately no longer take for granted.

To write together as intensely and often as we have over the last three years required time and funds—we are enormously grateful to Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) Political Science Department for supporting the numerous Eurostar trips that were critical for discussing and writing, and re-discussing and re-writing, until we felt we had got it right. The University of Bristol provided Sarah with a sabbatical in Spring 2017, when the book preparation began. Birkbeck College, University of London, hosted and funded our "booklab" seminar in October 2019—neither of us had heard of such a thing, but it is a fantastic means by which to improve one's work. We thoroughly recommend it and are grateful to BBK for their support. We also want to thank audiences at the 2019 European Conference on Politics and

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To Hazel McCoubrey, we sincerely thank you for your stunning artwork. You captured precisely what we wanted, even as we struggled to define what it was precisely what we wanted. We are so happy with the yellow dress on the front cover, and the line drawings inside. Check out her illustrations on Instagram:

https://www.instagram.com/hazelmccoubreyillustration/?hl=en

Sheila and Dave (Sarah's "other parents"), thank you for putting us up for our first week of working, and sending Karen back to Brussels with a bag of Scottish goodies, including Haggis crisps; Laura and Carmen, Italian academic friends, for swapping their flat in Bergamo with us in summer 2019, and letting Sarah stay at Christmas 2019, which provided the perfect location for the final re-writes of the book. We must also thank Teddy and Fraser, partners who have not only put up with us spending so much time in each other's houses over the last three years but also enjoyed having the other to stay; they provided much home cooking and conversation when we were in need of such sustenance. Sarah apologizes to Teddy, for failing to pick up much—any—Flemish. Karen bedankt haar mama voor alweer een moedige strijd, en voor Teddy: *l'amour toujours*.

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An Essay on Women's Political Representation

Consider This*

Unrepresentable Women

August 2017. In my mailbox is a YouTube link from a colleague in Sweden.[1] *It's not my research area, but I know she only sends me stuff that's worth watching. I hit "play." A white woman on a TV panel speaks: "In response to you," she says, looking into the audience, a slight smile on her ruby lips, "the journalist [you are referring to] might soon realize that actually it wasn't really all that empowering." The camera zooms in on a woman of color in the audience, presumably the questioner.*

A tweet appears on-screen, the first of a series that pops up throughout the show:

SEX WORK IS STILL WORK. IT IS JUST DONE WITH DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE BODY

I notice the program's title: Incompatible with Equality.

The panelist continues: "and I also think, ahem, that is not representative of the people who are in prostitution. The majority . . . don't have

* Our vignettes are specifically heuristic; their function here is to introduce and illustrate moral/political dilemmas, highlighting what we term *women's poverty of representation*, and to invite explorations of positive ideals—what we term *women's political representation as it should be*. This Introductory Essay is deliberately written to be accessible, rather than seek to show "how much material" we have read or "how complicated" it all is (see Allen 2018, 16–17). Academic references for the observations and claims we discuss here are provided later in the book. We do, however, provide links to popular books and a couple of foundational gender and politics works that informed our analysis.

a background in journalism. Sorry." The questioner doesn't respond in the face of such confident, arguably condescending, tone and body language.

Another on screen tweet appears:

THE PROBLEM WITH PROSTITUTION IS THAT THE WOMEN WHO ENTER INTO IT FREELY, ARE A TINY, TINY MINORITY

The panelist drops a killer line: "My definition of prostitution, personally, is sex between two people, one person who wants it and another who doesn't want it . . . If you have two people who want to have sex, they don't pay, obviously." The audience laughs.

KAJSA EKIS EKMAN [THE PANELIST] IS DANGEROUSLY IMPRESSIVE. GREAT TO HAVE MY THINKING CHALLENGED IN A SUCH A WAY

I find myself agreeing.

"If you ask any person in prostitution, you can take the money now and leave, or you can stay for the sex, how many of these are going to stay for the sex? I mean, really?" The audience applauds enthusiastically.

The show's male host asks Lydia, another of the panelists and a researcher, for an international perspective on trafficking. She situates the journalist among the minority of the thousands of women she's interviewed.

"Let's say the other 80 percent . . . that have been exploited, have been abused, have no real choices, and come from poverty or other conditions in which they have normalized violence, for instance child abuse and pedophilia . . . What about these women? Then you really need public policies to give them a way out." In any case, she states, all prostitutes experience violence as part of what they do.

More tweets come thick and fast on screen:

THOSE CRAZY SCANDINAVIANS AND THEIR CRAZY SOCIAL POLICIES. WE COULD LEARN A LOT.

PROSTITUTION IS NOTHING MORE THAN THE MALE ELITE SEEKING TO REPRESS AND SUBJUGATE WOMEN.

Lydia recounts the experiences of a South African woman who "was given the choice to have a visa, to study, to bring her kids and get away from prostitution. She doesn't feel like she was forced out of prostitution. She feels like she had a chance for the first time in her entire life."

IF SEX WORK IS JUST ANOTHER TYPE OF WORK, SHOULD IT BE INCLUDED AS PART OF WORK FOR THE DOLE?

"It is a gender equality issue. I don't see that many women in advanced countries exposing themselves to prostitution as compared to countries in which it is actually the only choice they have."

While Lydia talks, the camera zooms in on a second woman of color in the audience and then moves to a group of white women. I can't help noticing that the woman of color is shown in close up, and the white women are in a group shot. Is it because the former is in a minority, while the latter, the majority of the audience?

HOW MANY MILLIONAIRES ARE PROSTITUTES?

The host now gives the floor to Elisa. Warned there is little time, she opens with a punchy one-liner: "I see society over and over again protecting men at the expense of women." She continues: "all of the social stigma of prostitution, legal or illegal, always goes to the women. In America when a prostitute is murdered, there is almost some kind of reluctance to investigate it. When a man is murdered, they don't say, 'hey let's wait, let's investigate if he ever visited a prostitute before we decide whether or not it is worth investigating.'"

An older, unhappy-looking panelist is invited to make the final contribution: "I'm always puzzled by why we are so focused on prostitution. I think that feminism is doing itself a disservice by focusing so much on something that affects so few women. I don't agree that prostitution affects all of us."

Kajsa cuts her off: "Yeah, but the number of men involved though." More applause. She continues in a firm voice: "If you look at Germany, where one in every four men pays for sex. He maybe has daughters, a wife . . . and it affects the way he thinks about women." The older woman starts to respond but is prevented by audience applause. Kajsa "won";

they both smile. I'm smiling, too—the exchange has had a ristretto-like effect on me.

A new tweet flashes up.

I AM A SEX WORKER. I DON'T SELL MY VAGINA. NOBODY OWNS IT BUT ME.

It pulls me up short.

Is this the only intervention by a sex worker?

I close my browser, uncomfortable and much less sure all over again.

Representational Silos

It had been one of those perfect swims. The ones where afterwards you feel like a completely different woman. Five minutes in the steam room to decompress and warm up, followed by 50 lengths front crawl in a refreshingly cold, blue-lit, pool.

I was back by my locker, toweling off my body. From behind, I heard a voice:

"Would you mind zipping me up, please?"

I turned around. I had not yet put on my glasses, but the figure was unmistakable even though she was across the changing room. This was something I had never seen before in real life: a woman in a burkini. I began to move toward her, only to see a blurry figure offering to help. As discreetly as possible, I went back to getting dressed. And yet I was intrigued. I couldn't help quickly donning my specs. I tried to take it all in.

The burkini was plain black leggings, a thigh-length top with long-sleeves, and a short, fluted skirt. The fabric looked silky. The head covering reminded me of the protective mask that racing car drivers wear under their helmets. I had expected that it would be more like a wetsuit, rubbery and thick. The burkini was little different from the Lululemon leggings that were all the rage for London's gym goers. Minus the head covering, my fellow swimmer could have walked around unnoticed among all the other women in their athleisure wear. Except of course, it would have marked her out.

All zipped up, she tucked the triangular back of the head covering into the neck of the top and headed to the pool. Neither the woman who had pulled up the zip nor any of the other women in the changing room said anything. We did not even exchange glances. Were we being terribly English? Perhaps. Or, maybe they had experienced this all before, and I was the only one new to such a situation.

Possibly we all just didn't dare to speak; did I want to risk hearing their views? No one in the changing room could have been unaware of the "burkini debate." The 2016 photograph of a turquoise, tunic-clad woman with a headscarf being forcefully disrobed by French police on the beach at Nice had become a lodestone for social media controversy on Muslim women's attire. Or maybe, the burkini had become normalized in the United Kingdom after Nigella Lawson, the "domestic goddess" celebrity chef, had introduced it to the British public some years before, when photographs of her wearing one on an Australian beach had been spread across the media.

As I dressed, I wondered if the swimmer had worried about our reaction before she asked for help. I'd heard what sounded like an everyday favor one might ask a friend before a party or from another woman in a shop fitting room. Did she consider her request straightforward, and free from any political overtones? Was she concerned or fearful? I also wanted to know what it felt like to swim in a burkini. Can she feel the water moving over her body in the same way that I do? Or does her costume drag and detract from the "joy" of swimming? And if so, why does she wear it—so that she can swim? I asked none of these questions.

I blow-dried my hair. As I sat in front of the mirror, I was confronted by the gym's wallpaper—image after image of women's shoes, all high-heeled, some strappy, peep-toed, and platform-soled. Some months previously when the gym was first renovated, I had complained to the manager and tweeted about how sexist I'd found the wallpaper. To no avail. Virgin Active did not see, or could not admit, the irony of their interior design; a place that aims to makes bodies fit and strong displaying representations of precisely the kind of shoes that stop women from running. On that day, the dissonance seemed to me ever more problematic.

The Wrong Representative

"Women of France—Proud of Our Liberties
Will French women be able to wear what they want tomorrow?"



"I am very worried about the silent attacks on women's rights.
I want to move things forward together with you.
I would like to hear what you think about this.
Send me your opinion at: femmeslibres@rassemblementnational.fr

I will read your message with the greatest interest and I will respond to you promptly."

"At the European elections, your choice will be one for your liberties and those of your daughters and granddaughters. Behind your vote lies a choice for civilization.

On May 26, 2019, women of France, vote for your liberties.

Vote for the list headed by Jordan Bardella."

Inside, the election pamphlet reads:

"Is it normal to force seven-year-old girls to wear a headscarf?

MP Taché thinks that this compulsory dress code, sometimes at a very young age, is comparable to a headband."

"Some mayors already give permission for separate swimming hours at the pool. Will they ban bikinis at beaches tomorrow?

"What do public authorities do with the explosion of sexual aggression and harassment? 'Free speech'[2] has shed light on the magnitude of the problem of sexual aggression: 53 percent more victims. Faced with this plague observed in all European countries, we have to move from denunciation to action."

"Can we accept that in France, in 2019, under Islamic pressure, in certain neighborhoods or schools, women are advised not to wear a dress or are obliged to wear a headscarf?

Since the 2009 movie 'The Day of the Dress,' which denounced the problem, the situation has not improved. Many women experience pressure concerning their choice about what to wear."

"Are French Islamic women going to lose their inheritance rights due to the application of Sharia law?

*The European Court of Human Rights has opened up the possibility for the application of Islamic heritage rights (*Molla Sali vs. Greece*). Some French Muslims can be disinherited following Islamic law where both parties choose to do so. But will the choice of the disinherited woman genuinely be a free one?"*

"Is a female medical doctor unable to treat a male patient?

In French hospitals men refuse to be treated by a woman and refuse their wives treatment by male doctors! Are we going to continue to comply with such demands from a past era?"

"Is it normal that a man refuses to shake hands with a woman?

It happens today that men refuse to shake hands with a woman because she is a woman: there is no condemnation foreseen, legal nor moral, for this sign of discrimination that offends women."

"Is it still acceptable that a woman is paid less in the same position as a man?

This question has been pending for ages and nobody dares to really tackle it."

"Is it acceptable that single mothers do not earn a decent living?

It is essential that the difficulties mothers experience are finally and fully taken into account: special social aid, better access to child care, increases in housing subsidies."

"Isn't it worrying that a Minister in France has to launch a 'plan against genital mutilation' and against 'forced marriages'?

These phenomena say a lot about the evolution of women's rights in our country. Who could have predicted this a few years back? The subject is taboo."

Not Meriting Representation

Following Twitter in the run-up to the Irish Referendum in 2018, it was impossible not to have been moved. Only by voting to repeal the 8th Amendment to the Constitution would Irish voters enable their TDs (members of parliament) to legislate for the provision of abortion in the Republic.

The 8th Amendment to the Irish Constitution passed in 1983 reads:

"The state acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to

respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right."

Women and men of all ages traveled home for the referendum, but an overwhelming number of tweets documented the real-time stories of thousands of young women returning to Ireland to cast their vote. Many included photographs of young women—often wearing black REPEAL sweatshirts—on airplanes, at ferry ports, coming through customs, and exiting Irish airports. Many had traveled hundreds of miles and spent hundreds of pounds to get home. For those who wanted to return to Ireland but did not have the funds, gifts from friends and family or crowdfunding paid for their tickets.

Discussions took place in the media, among friends, in workplaces, and unprecedentedly within families and across generations—with "abortion stories" often being recounted for the very first time. The streets of Dublin were littered with pro—and anti—posters, some highly professional and others seemingly handmade. Amid the anti-abortion posters, one stood out. It read, "women can't be trusted."

Why can we not trust women? You cannot trust the "social abortionist," the party-going, unthinking young woman who treats abortion as a form of contraception, and is likely a repeat offender; you cannot trust "unfortunate" young girls with chaotic lifestyles incapable of taking such serious decisions; you cannot trust "the wanton," wicked girls who must repent before God for the (d)evil they have embraced; you cannot trust the women who will discriminate against the disabled foetus; you cannot trust the culturally or religiously-chauvinist women willing to abort the female foetus; and you cannot trust women because the exploitative "abortion industry's" interests lie in maximizing profit.

The untrustworthy woman of the Irish referendum poster is all *women; individual women seeking an abortion and all those other women who support legal and safe access to abortion. The untrustworthy woman is, thus, rendered a political minor—shackled all over again. Politically subjected, men must take decisions for her. Is this why so many young Irish women came home?*

With nearly two-thirds of the vote, the 8th Amendment was repealed on May 25, 2018.

The Poverty of Women's Political Representation

A political claim that you cannot trust women strikes at the heart of questions about democracy—about who is, and who is not, part of the people. It seeks to deny women their political equality, undermines their right to participate in politics, and pushes women back to an earlier disenfranchised state when it was agreed among men that we were to be represented first by our fathers and then by our husbands.[3] Such an attack on women's political status in the 21st century, just when many established democracies are celebrating centenaries of women's suffrage, leaves us in a heightened state of concern. It is a good reason for writing this in the first person; for us, it is personal. Moreover, to witness the claim that you cannot trust women is a stark reminder that today women cannot trust democracy to do good by us. In the very

act of Ireland's young women returning to vote—and overwhelmingly to vote "yes" in the referendum on the 8th Amendment to the constitution—we see the very embodiment of the second claim (that women cannot trust politics) and a refutation of the first (that politics does not trust women).[4]

Electoral politics can both grant and take away women's rights, and in the face of the democratic erosion that we see around us across much of Europe, we very much fear their removal. The Irish case notwithstanding, we are undoubtedly witnessing something of an anti-abortion moment. Women's access to legal and safe abortion is under very real threat in many countries. Long considered a fundamental feminist demand, the reality that women would once again be "on the defensive"[5]—having to re-make demands of their political institutions—is indicative of a political landscape skewed against women. The idea that male-dominated political parties and male politicians' voices are privileged in decision-making on abortion seems to us the epitome of the poverty of women's political representation.[6] Critics might well counter that in stating this we deny the fact that some women hold anti-abortion views. Not so. Our point is distinct: those who seek to restrict access to abortion do so in spite of the fact that a significant minority of women will undergo an abortion in their lifetimes, with those financially less able and without papers having unsafe ones. Women inevitably die. We ask: where is democratic politics' responsiveness to these women?

Against the backdrop of a perceptible shift toward a more populist politics in much of Europe, the ascendant women's issue in electoral politics is undoubtedly gender and Islam. Across the spectrum political parties are animated by its perceived threat to women's rights. The threat for Muslim women is said to include free choice in their dress, a hyper-vulnerability to family violence, and harmful inheritance, marriage, and divorce rights. The wider threat is presented as a fundamental incompatibility between gender equality and Islam. We are troubled not so much here because many politicians are eager to share their opinions over gender (in)equality, but because women are often misrepresented in contexts of male-dominated politics. First, politicians are keen to speak about—and, indeed, legislate on—Muslim women's dress, even as some Muslim women ask us to stop talking

about the burqa.[7] With elected representatives' attention focused on clothing, other issues are neglected. Contemporary representations of Islam and Muslim women's interests in formal politics frequently contradict how some women, particularly those most affected, conceive of their political interests. Second, the debate about Muslim women's interests is too often led and dominated by men. As Humaira, a young Muslim British woman claims:

> . . . with 71 percent of UK MPs being male, the idea of Parliament passing any law restricting women's bodily autonomy is patriarchal and oppressive.[8]

Our concern over women's political misrepresentation is not limited to the very obvious case of the populist politician, such as France's Marine Le Pen, whose rhetoric of women's rights coexists alongside, and is wrapped up with, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim agendas. In competitive party systems, there may be rational reasons for traditional political parties adapting, if not accommodating, representative claims about women made by populists of both the left and right. To assume that traditional political parties have, to date, addressed women's issues would also be mistaken, however. Most political parties are in the game of winning votes. The issues they prioritize are those that appeal to, or at least do not harm or repel, their established constituencies. Over the last 20 years or so, political parties in many established democracies have become more responsive to women often in a (liberal) feminist direction, but in the current climate these parties might just see more votes to be won in a shift away from gender equality.

The greater presence of women in our parliaments and in government might be presumed to have improved the political representation of women. The widespread expectation is that they will speak up for women and in so doing constrain male politicians, thereby offering a corrective. There is obviously something in this, but the political misrepresentation of women and the backsliding on gender equality is taking place despite an increasing presence of women in formal politics in many countries. Optimism that their presence will bring about positive change has to be tempered: we must be careful of rushing to assume that any woman politician will do.[9] Not all women agree

about what is in the interests of women. Essentialism should not be the ground upon which we stand. Equally, given the diversity of views among women and (even) among feminists, feminism should not be our standard either: we need to accept that the presence of only some women or some feminists in our parliaments is not sufficient to represent all women.[10] With the Le Pen vignette in mind again, we might reflect on whether the "right" women representatives are those currently vocal in formal political debate and/or present in our political institutions.[11] We should acknowledge, too, that women politicians are often constrained in what they can say and do; it is not always easy, or cost free, for them to stand and act for women even when they want to.

To suggest that those who sit in our legislatures—male and female—do not always reflect the priorities of women begs consideration of whether there are meaningful representative relationships between the political class and women. In the absence of these, and where traditional parties and views dominate the political agenda, this risks a deleterious effect not only on political outcomes in policy and legislative terms, but also regarding how women feel about democracy. When women's perspectives, issues, and interests are experienced as marginal to the main business of electoral politics, perceptions among women that politics is not for them are made real. Moreover, politics is experienced as something that is done *to* and not *with* them. This creates a sense of being ruled over and risks delegitimizing representative democracy. The dangers here are particularly high for different women. In the words of another young Muslim woman:

> I would like to know *how they would feel* if I had the upper hand and law-making at my fingertips and decided that English women had to cover up and could no longer wear tight-fitting clothing (emphasis added).[12]

If we contrast the prominence given to gender and Islam in contemporary politics with the political attention given to prostitution, we illuminate a further way in which women are poorly represented in politics. Despite some women politicians seeking to elevate this issue up the formal political agenda, prostitution remains an issue with limited traction; it usually has little appeal for traditional political parties

competing in the electoral marketplace. Politicians from populist and more established parties of the right have recently highlighted the issue, but this has tended to be embedded within their wider anti-immigration rhetoric and conservative morality, rather than signaling a concern for women per se. For the most part, prostitution is framed as: marginal to most women's experiences; predominantly affecting marginalized and minority women; and characterized by strongly opposing views, including among feminists. It is also commonly framed as a universal phenomenon—the "oldest" and "natural" profession—the latter frame implying a male right to sex, paid for when necessary. Recall Elisa's intervention: "I see society over and over again protecting men at the expense of women." If we push the logic here, criminalizing, proscribing, or heavily regulating prostitution would seem to make little sense for our disproportionately male politicians and masculinized political parties.

We should further consider the quality of political debate over women's issues and interests. This speaks to another way of conceiving of women's poor representation: querying whether politicians are well-positioned to speak about what is in the interests of women. At its baldest this is about the foundations upon which politicians make representative claims for women. It makes sense to start from the assumption that their views will be influenced by their overarching political ideology, with policies considered in terms of partisan advantage. Most are party politicians, after all. If we take all three of our substantive vignettes—abortion, prostitution, and Muslim women's dress—liberals and libertarians will likely favor non-criminalization for reasons of freedom and choice, whereas conservatives, leftists, and populists would most likely favor criminalization for reasons variously of morality, protection, and exploitation, and/or on the grounds of culture, race, and immigration. Yet it is still not quite that simple. Parties do not always follow ideological logic when they turn their attention to women's issues.

It is necessary to ask what evidence our politicians draw upon when they decide their stance on a particular women's issue. To whom do they meet and speak? In posing these questions it is not unreasonable to assume that representatives will listen to the most vocal, organized, and well resourced. In the prostitution vignette, Kajsa was confident

and articulate, professional-looking and sounding, and someone with whom the audience identified. But one tweet drew the viewer's attention to who was mostly absent: prostitutes themselves. Even when those directly affected are party to political debate, it is pertinent to further examine which voices are included and which are thereafter privileged. Former and current prostitutes are frequently found in both the pro- and anti-criminalization camps and are often heard in political debates. Should we not also be concerned to ensure that the most vulnerable—the very young, the trafficked, and those without papers—are not marginalized or excluded, to limit the risk of women's political misrepresentation? First-hand experience, expertise, and data are, in any case, rarely uncontested, and arguably never more so in these "post-truth" times. Who is considered an expert and what counts as expertise are, moreover, highly gendered, class based, and racialized. So, who is rendered an expert, and what evidence is designated authentic, authoritative, and instructive? In reflecting on Belgian debates on prostitution, we suspect that the long-standing, extensive, but internally divided feminist voices would not be perceived as the "best" kind. In contrast, the views of the male historian who presents himself as objective would likely play very well.[13] Explicitly rejecting the "abolitionist-feminist lobby's ideology," "giving voice to his interviewees" "without judging or praising," it is easy to imagine politicians being persuaded by what he has to say.

Even when our elected representatives have heard from those directly affected by an issue or from those with relevant expertise, we should not be surprised if they remain unsure about what should be done. As already noted, their ideological predispositions will not always easily transfer to questions of gender inequality, and, as we also readily admit, there is rarely an indisputable "women's position" for politicians to adopt. How then should elected representatives make a just decision between seemingly incompatible demands among women, especially when all claim the authority of feminism? Watching the Swedish YouTube clip, our sympathies ebbed and flowed between the various contributors, leaving an unhelpful ambiguity about what is in the best interests of the women involved, and whether those interests are at odds with a commitment to a more gender-equal society. To make this more real, albeit rather crudely, we ask: is it okay for

politicians to privilege the interests of highly educated white feminists, powerful religious groups, or middle-class parents living in gentrified areas close to a red-light district—those on the privileged side of society—over marginalized women for whom prostitution might be at that time their only means of economic survival?

The core features of this brief reconsideration of prostitution also hold for Muslim women's dress. The Nice incident showed in a very powerful way how a legal ban on the headscarf can rudely affect those who dress in ways deemed illegal. The public disrobing sparked outrage in some feminists even as others felt the police action wholly justified. The latter regard the veil as oppressive to the individual woman who wears the headscarf and to women as a group, who through this apparel are constituted as distinct from, and inferior to, men. Irrespective of why any individual women choose to wear the veil, gender equality in this reading requires that it be banned. In the extreme, if that stops our swimmer from entering the pool, so be it. The former consider a woman's right to wear whatever she chooses a fundamental right, regardless of whether this choice is influenced by religion, cultural norms, or one's individual fashion choices—the burkini is, thus, regarded as no different from a tight-fitting top or a bright yellow dress. On this reading, women are oppressed and rendered unequal when politicians make decisions about woman's attire and when the law takes on a prescriptive form.[14] That said, if we return to the commentary on the U.K. celebrity chef, the simplicity of the idea of free choice is itself rendered suspect. It was first assumed that it was Lawson's *choice* to wear a burkini in a way that is rarely assumed for Muslim women. Lawson was a curvaceous woman holidaying in the strong, Australian sun. So, her choice was deemed free and, thus, okay. Later, she made it clear that hers was very much a constrained choice. Her then partner, the one pictured with his hands around her neck outside a luxury Mayfair restaurant, "liked his women pale." Her choice was now considered no longer okay either.[15]

We are not so much interested in which of the two views readers *personally* hold regarding prostitution or the burkini or, for that matter, abortion. Rather, we are concerned with how to ensure that good political decisions are made by elected politicians, in contexts where conflicting and incompatible views are held between women over what

is in their interests. We might think at first that it is best to privilege those for whom the decision has direct impact—the young woman without papers seeking an abortion who is prepared to undergo an illegal termination, the woman for whom prostitution enables her to pay the rent and feed her children, or the burkini-clad swimmer who seeks nothing more than to participate in an ordinary leisure activity. Nevertheless, might the non-burkini swimmer, or those of us walking past sex shops explaining to our granddaughter why women are sitting on stools in their underwear, feel—and be—considered directly affected, too? Map onto this differences of class, ethnicity, immigration, and religion, and working out how best to represent women's interests in each of these cases becomes harder still. Once again, we might find ourselves wanting to take especial care to ensure that the voices of the most marginalized women or those who are few in number are heard. We should be attentive, too, to the political and other conditions in which these women voice their interests and, thus, whether what they say is acknowledged and listened to. Our point here is simple but absolutely critical: how women's interests should be represented in politics cannot easily be "read off" from what some women say is in women's interests, or from societal, academic, or expert debates on women's issues, or worse, from whatever Internet site political actors stumble over or are directed to by algorithms. To put it bluntly, we are not persuaded that our politicians are either in a position to inform themselves of the diversity of women's issues and interests, or to recognize that some groups of women and some interests (read: the most marginalized) are easily ignored.[16]

Critics might counter at this point that it is not so much that our politicians do not make enough effort, nor that they willfully misrepresent women, but that women are not easy to represent in politics. In short, if women cannot agree what it is that they want, politically speaking, they make themselves unrepresentable. This critique renders suspect much of what we have said thus far—it takes the blame away from the political institutions of representative democracy and from its key actors, our elected politicians and political parties. We have already conceded, as our abortion vignette showed, that even on a fundamental women's issue women disagree. We, furthermore, accepted that even on this issue, overwhelmingly regarded as the "red line"

that distinguishes the feminist from the non-feminist, there are some women who oppose abortion, whether for religious or other reasons, and yet still self-identify as feminist. Fortunately, forcing women to agree in order to redress women's poverty of representation is not an option we advocate. On the contrary, instead of trying to erase women's different conceptions of what is in their interests, we hold that these should be centrally addressed via representative political processes.

Expecting women to speak with one voice in politics would be to hold women to a different democratic standard than we hold men. According to widely accepted understandings, representative democracy is designed to peacefully settle fundamental conflicts about "who gets what, when and how" in large and complex societies where there is no agreement about political ends, and where resources are finite. In this traditional reading, politicians debate citizens' competing political interests and take decisions about what is best.[17] Male citizens' views are not homogeneous, and yet we (citizens and political parties) do not think of them as politically unrepresentable because they conceive of their political interests in different ways. Political parties purposively seek to represent different groups of men. Why should women be expected to behave and be treated any differently? As we see it, the problem said to arise from different conceptions of what is in the interests of women is more a failure of our party systems, institutions, and politicians to *make* women representable. Put more strongly still, the representational deficiency lies not with women but with the organizational basis of our formal political life.[18]

Women's inability to hold their politicians and political parties properly to account adds to their poverty of political representation. In party democracies, whether one finds politician A better than politician B is strongly influenced by one's ideological predispositions, values, and socioeconomic positionality. Gendered political interests frequently sit uncomfortably on top of all this. In the first instance, it is very difficult to hold elected representatives to account on gendered grounds when women's issues and interests are absent from or marginal to formal politics. In other words, and as already mentioned, when party politics mostly avoids the terrain of women's issues and interests there is likely to be little practical meaning in talking about electoral mandates from women to parties and/or from women to

individual politicians. It is also the case, as already stated, that even when party politics attends to women's issues, gender does not map neatly, or completely, onto left–right politics. This "lack of fit" leaves women having to decide whether to withhold one's vote from a party that says or does little in respect to women's interests, even as it may address other political interests they also hold. We should also be aware of less honorable parties and politicians who make offers that *appear* explicitly aimed at women and in their interests, but that are intended to fulfill different political goals. Finally, it is important to restate that poor representation in policy terms can reinforce the feeling that women's issues and interests—indeed, women—are marginal to or even outside of democratic politics.

For all these reasons, it matters that women are able to distinguish between the "good, bad, and the ugly" representative.[19] Inevitably perhaps, we return to Le Pen. Her critics will conclude that whatever she says to the contrary, Le Pen is most definitely not seeking to redress the unequal situations that women find themselves in, relative to men. Rather, she seeks to advance a particular depiction of France, understood as a specific ethnic and secular nation, and with a traditional gender order. Claims by Le Pen to be representing women are accordingly about something other than realizing what is in the interests of women; her rhetorical accommodation to liberal feminism is nothing more than the strategic deployment of pseudo-feminism masking racist ends. Women who vote for Le Pen are, thus, regarded as having been manipulated, and in such circumstances, the idea of accountability between women and politicians becomes meaningless.[20]

As currently practiced, electoral politics offers too few incentives for women to make gendered demands on our formal political institutions and politicians. This renders women more "unrepresentable" still, or as we would put it, it engenders their political misrepresentation. It thereby reduces the chances of women mobilizing as women in civil society in ways that would enhance their participation and representation in formal politics. This is especially true once again for marginalized women whose participation in, and expectations of, representative politics will likely be still lower. Let us return to our prostitution and burkini vignettes. In both cases, women are seemingly deeply entrenched in their respective silos, frequently speaking

past each other. In contexts of Islamophobia, anti-immigration, and racism, combined with a poverty of women's political representation in electoral politics, the tendency for women neither to come together and mobilize *as* women in civil society nor make demands of formal politics is reinforced. It is asking a lot—probably too much—for women to distinguish between those who voice concerns about gender equality through choice and de-criminalization, and who distance themselves from populist parties and racists, and those who are happily subscribed to such views.

The Representation of Women *as It Should Be*

In moments when we despair of formal politics—at political rhetoric, policies, and legislation that either ignore or are harmful to women—we fantasize about a feminist future in which *all* political decisions are good for women. In this we may feel tempted, like others disappointed with democracy, to put our trust in the hands of an enlightened feminist despot or guardian, whose superior knowledge and virtue will rule by laws that end gender inequality and injustice.[21] Unfortunately, she is, and must remain, a mythical figure. A feminist guardian embodies and reproduces political inequality by dint of her very status. We are her political minors, and whether she does what we want or not, she cannot be held to account. More than this, we are compelled to ask what her superior knowledge and virtue consists in. If it is the technical skill of governing, then such skills might be obtained by any other (woman) citizen. It cannot be moral. We find the idea of an absolute feminist truth untenable. Given that feminists frequently disagree, how could a feminist public good, so to speak, be revealed? Herein lies the paradox: to rule "well" our feminist guardian would have to consult with the women she governs, in other words, to engage in democratic practices.[22] What looks at first glance a "quick and easy" feminist alternative way to govern turns out to be something that we cannot defend. Short-lived, killed off in a single paragraph by the democratic critique, it is, nevertheless, much too soon to give up on what we wanted from our feminist guardian. Previously we asked you to consider women's poverty of

representation. Now we return to our vignettes and ask you to explicitly imagine political representation *as it should be*.

In representation as it should be, it would not have taken an Indian woman—Savita Halappanavar—to die in hospital from septicemia following a miscarriage, having been denied a termination,[23] before the touchstone women's issue of abortion was taken seriously by Irish politicians. There was no medical reason for her death, only a constitutional one. Denied the termination Halappanavar asked for, her very public passing in 2012 was critical to the successful referendum campaign some five years later.[24] A Dublin mural read: "*Sorry we were too late*. But we are here now. We didn't forget you" (emphasis added).[25] The campaign that Halappanavar's death reignited forced Ireland's politicians—and, for that matter, many of its citizens—to attend to what women were saying; they could no longer get away with ignoring women's interests, interests hitherto denied and resisted by the state.[26] In her death, Halappanavar held Ireland's political class to account for deciding that women's suffering and lives were a price worth paying for the satisfaction of others' interests. In contradistinction, had women been well represented, the issue of abortion would have been addressed earlier, for different political reasons and in a different manner, because, fundamentally, abortion is a necessary procedure that women undergo, whether, as already stated, they are legal and safe, or illegal and risky. Women's medical, social, and economic interests would, furthermore, be at the center, not the margins, of the debate inside and outside of formal politics; the Church and parties' masculinized interests would not have predominated.

In representation as it should be, new political conversations and new conversationalists are brought forth, with different kinds of political "talk" publicly legitimized. During the Irish referendum campaign many women recounted their abortion "stories" for the very first time. Their discourse introduced new ways of speaking about women's bodies and fertility. Women spoke about "the financial, emotional and personal suffering" and the "harm and the hardship" of seeking abortions.[27] Of what it feels like to secretly fly to England.[28] The public and private sharing of women's lived experiences proved critical in getting the political interests of Irish women across to those who held different views, including, importantly, to those who held

political power.[29] Women's "evidence" was persuasive, with substantive effects on Irish citizens and politicians' views of the 8th Amendment. In a handmade-looking poster, women shackled by chains represented by the number eight graphically presented abortion as a question of women's right to bodily autonomy; in the absence this right, it asserts, women are in an enslaved state. The repeal campaign created new linkages between women, and between women and men, which had been lost through the silencing of women, too afraid to speak of their abortion experiences. It also connected women and their political institutions, which could no longer turn their backs on women's demand for abortion reform.

Achieving the realization of a shared women's interest in Ireland—with abortion publicly recognized as a legitimate political issue that should be legislated for—did not require any pretense that all women agree that abortion is a "good thing" or even that all agreed to a specific abortion provision. Differences among women over what is the interests of women remain evident. Another referendum poster had a pointed gendered message: sex-selective abortion goes against the interests of women. We might personally dislike or disagree with its claim that feminists should be against abortion because, as they highlight, sex-selective abortions target the female fetus; we might as individuals have preferred that such posters had not been produced. We hold, nonetheless, that on this women's issue, as with others, women's good political representation requires that all who are affected by the issue, and the diversity of views, contribute to the public political conversation.

The inclusion of competing conceptions of what is in the interests of women is not to be read here as an equalization of different views on abortion—a false equivalence. What matters is that these different conceptions are publicly aired; otherwise we are treating women as if they were homogeneous and, thus, differently from how politics treats men. *All* must be heard: we do not make a priori claims over which voices should be privileged, as it is the voicing of these interests as part of the public political debate, among and between women in society and politicians, that matters.[30] It is the latter's subsequent acts of listening, deliberation, and decision-making that deliver good processes of representation and good outcomes. This is the representational

effect of greater and better interpersonal and public conversations, greater connections between citizens and their political institutions, and more informed elected representatives making decisions that they seek to be "for" the represented.

In representation as it should be women learn from and about other women's experiences through new political debates. The burkini episode was our personal wake-up call. The myriad questions that went unasked of our fellow swimmer epitomized a political problem that was, however, not just about us as individuals. It said something bigger about the quality of our public political conversations and of our political institutions. It revealed to us, in a stark way, the necessity of learning what issues look like from other women's perspectives. Neither knowing how to ask, nor having undertaken the necessary work to learn about Muslim women's dress, and yet conscious of how politically fraught the issue is, we carried on getting dressed and, ignorant and mute, exited the changing room.[31] *In representation as it should be*, political learning—hearing from the perspectives of those who are directly affected—is neither accidental nor individualized. It was only a year on from the burkini episode that serendipitously our "re-education" began. In reading a copy of *It's Not about the Burqa* given to one of us in the BBC's "Woman's Hour" studio,[32] we gained access to a group of Muslim women's experiences. We can only speculate as to whether we would have otherwise come across this book. We are more certain, however, that had we read it before coming across our burkini-clad swimmer, our reaction would have been different.

New political conversations among women in civil society are both a good in itself and critical to a re-gendered public political debate in the formal realm of politics. "I am a sex worker. I don't sell my vagina. Nobody owns it but me": this was seemingly the only intervention from a prostitute in the Swedish YouTube clip; it was at the very end of the discussion. Its effect was to make us "much less sure all over again" over what should be done about prostitution. We worried that the debate had been skewed to privileged women—the high-class sex worker, the academic critic—and skewed in ways that silenced the most marginalized—the trafficked, pimped, or drug-dependent prostitute. We do not need to suspect Kajsa, Lydia, or Elise's motives; we can assume that what they said reflected their experiences

and expertise. What concerned us was that other perspectives and interests were absent, or rendered marginal because only some were invited or participated. In the case of a TV show it might not matter who speaks—although we think it does—but it most definitely does matter who speaks on prostitution in civil society and inside our political institutions.

In ideal political conversations among women, and among women and their political representatives, disagreements over fundamentals may remain. We do not *need* the prostitution camps to necessarily change their interests, but they will share a commitment to speaking and listening to each other, to making their discussions inclusive of different women who may bring new experiences and perspectives to the debate, and to being open to preference transformation. Deliberations on these may, in turn, give rise to new policy ideas, or old policy ideas hitherto not prioritized may gain greater support. Women's disagreement is considered constructive; women's interests are identified through debate. Some agreements may arise, and new coalitions of support might be built: for example, agreement that the stigma surrounding prostitution should be removed, that the safety of prostitutes must be uppermost, or that the economic drivers of prostitution should be minimized. Where gender-unequal contexts continue to exist, where women are exploited, abused, and at risk, there may be agreement to actively reduce demand. In the absence of any such temporary or tactical agreement, there is, nonetheless, a shared commitment to act and hold to account formal politics for its failure to deal with the issue of prostitution.

In political representation as it should be, politicians are party to these new conversations, neither passive recipients of women's interests, nor disconnected from the women they claim to represent. Politicians hear from an inclusive range of those engaged in and affected, for instance, by prostitution; it might well be the first time that most are in the same room as prostitutes. They listen and learn, inter alia, what drives women into and out of prostitution, free choice, economics, and trafficking; how the experiences of prostitution varies by economic, social, racial, and citizenship status; and what the effects are on sellers and users, whether it reproduces sexist or misogynist views on women and gender equality, a point that Kajsa made in the YouTube clip,

or how it meets men's sexual needs that otherwise would go unmet. When women are in receipt of good political representation, men's interests are revealed. Oppositional interests between women and men are not always marked or drawn out in political debate: men's interests frequently pass as neutral, non-gendered political interests. New, more nuanced deliberations will follow. Hearing about the quotidian violence prostitutes risk, or the societal stigma and economic insecurity prostitutes face—learning that the 1990 movie *Pretty Woman* narrative is not typical—encourages politicians to rethink what might be done even as, or if, they maintain a commitment to their primary position on criminalization or legalization. Detailed descriptions of the daily struggles some women face putting "food on the table" might come to matter alongside more abstract notions of morality, religion, individual freedom, exploitation, or alienation.

In political representation as it should be, elected representatives fully recognize their role in representing women and are accountable to them about their actions and decisions. The political agenda is overhauled. Newly informed, having been exposed to women who are affected by the decisions they make, politicians care more and know that they will need to persuade women that they have met their interests. Marine Le Pen's 2019 European election pitch to women was forthright. Those who claim to represent women, she contends, have failed to protect Muslim girls' innocence and freedom; they have not stopped the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) or forced marriage. French culture, symbolized by its sunbathing practices, is under threat. Feminists have failed, alongside political parties and the state, to close the gender pay gap. Against this, Le Pen offers herself as the politician who will protect future generations of women from Islam and multiculturalism, and who will bring about gender equality.

With Le Pen's representative claims part of public debate over what constitutes women's issues and interests, her voice—one not to everyone's (feminist) taste—may very well be amplified. Speaking as a divorcee and single mother, some of her claims may well be confirmed by some women: the charge that French politics and French feminism is elitist, her claim that abortion rights are settled in France, and her claim that women's interests are under threat from Islam might well resonate. Some of the grande dames of French feminism have publicly

agreed with Le Pen's latter claim, for example. While such observations may discombobulate, the open and visible contestation over what is in the interests of women contributes to the quality of women's political representation. It makes deliberations and decision-making more inclusive, transparent, and accountable to women, even if that includes Le Pen.[33] Le Pen may assert that she "gets" ordinary women and has lived-experience as a woman, but if she wants to argue that her politics is what is best for women, she must now do so knowing that she will need to substantiate and defend her claims. She will surely find her political agenda directly challenged.

In this imagined feminist future, we look forward to a politics in which diverse women participate and contribute to the conversations of civil society, and with women participating in and represented in and by a formal politics that reciprocally seeks out their participation and representation. Learning among women, and between women and the politicians who ultimately make political decisions, is maximized. The formal political agenda reflects women's issues and women's interests; these are a routine and not a marginal feature of formal politics. Political institutions are sites of contestation over what constitutes women's issues and interests, and where the diversity of these are discussed, deliberated, and decided upon. Bringing about *political representation as it should be* demands a significant change in our democratic politics and of its political institutions, political representatives, political parties, and parliaments. Our elected representatives would be institutionally and systemically required to represent women. This role is designed into the political institutions of our representative democracy. This future is one we call *Feminist Democratic Representation*.

1

Introduction

Reclaiming Representative Democracy for Women

This is a book about redressing the poverty of women's political representation, about making representative democracy feminist. With this comes a central focus on its political institutions—national parliaments, other legislatures and elected assemblies,[1] and elected political representatives. Long concerned with who our elected

representatives are, we attend here specifically to the processes and practices of political representation. We readily admit that this puts us in a rather unfashionable place. The base accusation from a generation of feminist critics has remained constant: while it promises much for women, representative democracy underdelivers. This charge is for us bookended by Anne Phillips's 1991 *Engendering Democracy* and by Joni Lovenduski's 2019 "Feminist Reflections on Representative Democracy." In Phillips's words (1991, 149), "democracy cannot stand above sexual difference, but has to be reconceptualized with difference firmly in mind." She continues: "democracy must deal with us not just as individuals but as groups" (149). Nearly thirty years on, the evidence marshaled by Lovenduski (2019) against representative democracy is pretty damning: women are rarely equally present in our parliaments nor do they enter political institutions of their own making. Our political institutions privilege a masculinized political agenda and reproduce gendered norms of behavior. Often, in the face of stiff resistance, re-gendering efforts have thus far proven inadequate. Lovenduski's reconsideration of women's political accountability is a must read (2019, 29): elected representatives, "tend not to have a clear mandate about how to act concerning women's issues and interests"; women are "not explicitly considered to be a group to whom decision makers should be accountable."

Yet, as we wrote *Feminist Democratic Representation* we found sustenance in the "standard answer" as to why feminists should not walk away from representative democracy: whatever else its failings, and these are many, it "permits access to some of the resources needed to mobilise for change" (Lovenduski 2019, 34). The decades-old feminist claim that women need chairs at the political table (Jónasdóttir 1989) resonates still, and arguably ever more loudly in the face of persistent gender inequality and democratic backsliding. We were reminded, too, of Iris Marion Young's declaration nearly twenty years ago (2002, 8) that "those who wish to undermine injustice cannot turn their backs on state institutions as tools for that end" (see also Williams 1998, 118; Lovenduski 2019). For those women most disadvantageously affected by the decisions made in our parliaments, giving up on electoral politics is, in our view, an unaffordable luxury. Their (non)decisions affect women's lives, directly and indirectly, day after

day, even if they are not the only institutions to do so (Williams 1998; Young 2002; Evans 2015).

Conscious that we will inevitably face ongoing criticism from some feminists as well as other non-gendered critics who would advocate burning down the House,[2] we hope to persuade readers that our parliaments can—and should—be a political home for women. That they must first be refashioned is indisputable, but refashioned with explicitly feminist tools, not those of the master (Lorde 1984). Like Georgian houses whose facades are retained while other exterior walls and internal spaces are radically reconceptualized and reconstructed to redefined ends, we envisage the building of feminist political institutions, supporting new representative processes and practices. *Feminist Democratic Representation* undertakes the necessary theoretical work, restating the case for women's group representation in politics and undertaking democratic design thinking. While we provide neither a universal blueprint nor bespoke blueprints for individual political institutions, we do identify principles and practices to underpin feminist institutional design that will transform the institutions of representative democracy.[3]

The recent representational and institutional "turn" among contemporary democratic theorists bolsters our confidence that representative democracy can do better by women, and that what are frequently felt to be more fashionable possibilities are better conceived as complementary to, rather than necessarily undermining of, representative democracy. Thus, even as we ultimately find them less than promising alternatives because of our particular focus on the inequality in women's and men's representation in politics, we reconsider what we might take from participatory, deliberative, and post-representative democratic models. To these literatures, a feminist corrective must be added, however, without which their attendant processes and practices can only be considered limited. The representational effects we seek go beyond changes to the formal elected institutions and their elected representatives, despite these remaining our central focus. While we seek substantial transformation in the attitudes and behaviors of formal political actors, we also wish to fundamentally change women's political attitudes and behaviors toward electoral politics, and, in so doing, to connect women citizens more strongly to representative

democracy. This requires us to take gender inequality in politics and in wider society much more seriously. The representative effects on the represented and representatives we seek constitute the substance of Chapter 6; we address changes to existing electoral dynamics, including political parties' goals and strategies later in this chapter.

Failing to acknowledge that the parlous state of elected political institutions is central to grasping the wider problems of contemporary democratic politics would be a major omission here. That there is much contemporary democratic dissatisfaction and disaffection is widely accepted.[4] In providing for the public discussion of citizens' interests, representative institutions connect citizens with those that govern them (Urbinati 2008). Etymologically, the word *parliament* has its roots in the French verb *parler*, to speak.[5] In our less deferential, populist, and social media–saturated times, elected representatives are more visible than ever before and frequently found wanting (Leston-Badeira 2013; Norton 2017). Dissonance between citizens and the institutions of representative democracy, between the represented and their representatives, have been further exacerbated by political participation that is of an extra-parliamentary, direct, and/or deliberative mode. Yet, like others who see value in and seek to defend representative democracy, we hold that elected representatives and our elected political institutions can and should be part of the solution not only to the current failings identified in the global, largely non-gendered literature, but also to the poverty of women's representation that feminist political scientists have been speaking about for more than thirty years.

A Problem-based Approach[6]

We are not seeking in *Feminist Democratic Representation* to present a new model of democracy (Phillips 1991; Held 2006; Warren 2017). Our approach is a problem-based one, by which we mean to ask: what kind of problems do our existing political systems need to solve (Warren 2017), and what principles of design are best placed to bring into being women's good political representation (Saward forthcoming 2020)? Until recently such a role—to offer solutions—was not one for the political scientist (Stoker 2013). Aping the natural sciences,

political science was the site of *objective* research; it sought explanation and was indifferent to outcomes. Political theorists could be normative; it was their job to think about how things *should* be. Feminist political scientists apparently never got the message about the normative–empirical divide—about what we could and should be doing. First, most spent quite a lot of their research effort and professional capital pointing out the underlying (and conspicuously denied) normative foundations of so much seemingly non-gendered political science (Lovenduski 2003, 2015; Galligan 2014, Randall 2014). Second, many feminist political scientists routinely acted to transform the political world, even as they were frequently denigrated and marginalized for being "partial" because of their feminism (Campbell and Childs 2013; Childs and Dahlerup 2018; see also Kunz and Prügl 2019). Now that a solution-focused political science is deemed acceptable, feminist political scientists who want to change as well as study politics can look to intervene in the design of our democracies without formally risking the ire of our profession, albeit with their reminder that we act "with care" (Stoker 2013, 180; see also Saward 2016). We are very keen do so. Like many of the feminist political scientists who came before us, we never accepted the constraints placed upon us by a masculinized discipline in the first place.

We have termed the democratic problem to be solved as *women's poverty of representation*. In our Introductory Essay we used vignettes to introduce and illustrate how this plays out in real-world cases, and we contrasted what we consider the current, unacceptable state of play with *political representation as it should be*. In respect to the latter, we suggested: when women are well represented in representative democracies, the formal political agenda is recalibrated away from the political representation of men and their interests. Elected representatives' understanding of what is in the interests of women is reconstituted, with politicians' attitudes and behaviors changed. Because they know and care more about women and their interests, there are more gender-just outcomes. For when elected politicians take decisions, they do so with the knowledge that women in their diversity are positioned to challenge them, calling out any misrepresentation. All women now see their interests and issues reflected in what those who engage in public political debate and who sit in our parliaments

say and do; women's differences are publicly acknowledged. The way formal politics is now done, and experienced, is such, then, that women previously marginalized or excluded by elite, masculinized politics are no longer observers but active participants in politics. Political registers, frames, and tone are transformed; women are more interested in and have higher expectations of formal politics, making greater demands of politicians and exploiting new opportunities for collective mobilization in civil society. In this way they become true participants in electoral politics. At the systemic level there is formal and substantive recognition of women's legitimate political interests meriting representation.

To further specify what political representation can and should do for women and how the practices and processes of representative democracy can be designed to this end—and thus make the case for our ongoing focus on representative democracy and its institutions—we contend here with what at first blush can look like very much more attractive alternatives.[7] When reflecting on how these various extra-parliamentary models "work" for women, we find ourselves insufficiently persuaded that they offer a substantially better democratic future. Common to all is the failure to fully acknowledge how they are frequently premised upon, and reproduce, gender inequality. Unsurprisingly, it is much harder for women, and especially the most marginalized of women, to participate as each prescribes. All require substantial time and forms of participation from citizens that deny (or more accurately, presume and depend upon) the sexual division of labor. Notwithstanding this criticism, we remain very much interested in some of their particular democratic ideals and practices that we might choose from (Warren 2017, 39; Saward forthcoming 2020; Della Porta 2013) and that, together, can address representative democracy's woman-shaped problem.

Contemporary advocates of *direct democracy* seek a revival of democracy's original form where "the people" meet collectively and take decisions.[8] Whereas it was once considered impractical due to the size and complexity of our polities, new forms of communications technology are argued to make it once again possible. Yet, we have doubts about any wholesale return to direct democracy, even if, and unlike Athens, it would today surely have to have a more expansive

definition of the "people." Technological possibilities can easily be overstated (Hamilton 2014, 198): sitting in front of screens doing politics every day is not compatible with the fulfilment of other necessary societal functions without myriad difficulties. In the absence of a revolution in the sexual division of labor that reconciles paid *and* caring work, direct democracy likely renders only a few, elite women able to participate in politics (Lovenduski 2019; Phillips 1991, 74–75, 144). Just as women and slaves freed up time for (male) citizens' political participation in Greece (Weale 2019), so, too, will poorer, ethnic minority and immigrant women free up privileged women and men for politics today.

To these concerns we add an additional substantive, gendered critique of direct democracy. Direct democrats pointedly take issue with the "representation part of representative democracy" (Allen 2018, 6), favoring non-mediated politics, and direct mechanisms (devices, in Saward's terminology) such as referenda. Defenders of representative democracy counter, however, with the claim that the idea of the people's unmediated "will" is but a distracting myth, and its associated devices are populist trump cards (Weale 2019; Hamilton 2014; Chong et al. 2017, 10; Allen 2018).[9] As we discuss in Chapter 4, political representation is doing much more than simply managing the presumed impossibility of direct participation in large, complex polities (Urbinati 2006). Moreover, in societies structured by gender inequalities, "the people" are not a gender-undifferentiated mass with a gender-free will (Young 1990a) to be, for example, straightforwardly registered in a public poll. In any case, and as we discuss in Chapter 2, differences among women complicate any notion of a "women's will" yet further (Phillips 1995).

What of *post-representative politics,* direct democracy's (post-) modern form? What citizens today seek is a "proximity" with those who govern them: presence, attention, empathy, and compassion (Rosanvallon 2011, 172). Resistant to others speaking for them and "no longer content merely to cast their votes" (Rosanvallon 2011, 209–10), citizens are said to be engaged in permanent processes of political expression, namely, direct action, flash protests, Twitter-led mobilizations, and "swarms" (Tormey 2015). When such participatory acts create "resonance," "clamour," and "turbulence," governments

respond or risk their legitimacy and viability (Tormey 2015, 91, 135), in the face of "counter-democratic" participatory modes of surveillance, veto and judgment (Rosanvallon and Goldhammer 2008). Before we accept that non-mediated, post-representative politics works better for women, we require much greater certainty about the nature of the relationships between what Tormey (2015) calls "parties of governance" and "parties of protest"— and more detailed understanding of its institutional forms. Gendered questions of *who* participates and represents do not disappear when we shift from electoral to informal representatives (Saward 2010; Montanaro 2012, 2019; see also Phillips 1991, 137). Thus, we find ourselves asking, who gets to act in and lead flash protests and direct action? Questions of which (gendered) interests "resonate" and create "turbulence," such that they bring about responses from governments, must be considered, too. Will causes that invite a response be skewed in ways that are advantageous to the already powerful or even the relatively powerful? Finally, what of the most marginalized women and their interests—will post-modern politics see effective mobilizations for their interests?

Very much of the moment, *deliberative democracy* is often presented as a veritable panacea for the democratic deficits produced by contemporary representative democracy.[10] Feminist criticism of the gendered premises of deliberative democracy are, it should be noted, long-standing, not least in assumptions of a universal common good and of communication modes (rationality) that privilege the male (Young 2002, 1990a/b; Phillips 1995).[11] While very much interested in its potential to "diminish" the effects of inequality (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014, 24; see also Kantola and Lombardo 2017), we retain some skepticism. New systematic research paints gender as the Achilles heel of deliberation (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014). One concern refers again to time, noting its unequal distribution between women and men (see Phillips 1993, 74). Another queries which women are included and excluded in deliberative forums (Wojciechowska 2019). Yet another focuses on how gender plays out during deliberation. In what has quickly become a landmark study, Karpowitz and Mendelberg demonstrate how, because of their low authority, women are silenced in deliberation (2014, 24).[12] To these we add a further concern: it is far from clear that whatever else extra-parliamentary

deliberative devices may do, the absence of additional changes to the procedures and norms of representation within our legislatures raises serious questions about their ability to sufficiently transform what our elected representatives do, and how they do it.[13]

Another solution gaining academic and (some) popular support is *random lot* (Allen 2018). This is not an alternative model as such but, rather, a refinement of representative democracy. Accordingly, it importantly claims to hold onto the idea of representation, as well as the institutions of representative democracy. Random lot is arguably the point where feminist criticism of women's poverty of representation meets mainstream political science's attention to the perceived problems of a homogeneous political class. Formal political equality is ensured by each individual's equal chance of being selected as a participant in the political institution (Phillips 1991). This outcome should provide greater diversity of experiences and perspectives, in turn giving rise to decisions that better match the interests and needs of the represented (Allen 2018). Yet, it cannot be assumed that women are equally willing and able take up their roles when chosen, much like in direct and deliberative democratic models. Minority women may well find themselves effectively excluded by their small number. The supposed benefits (formal and consequential) championed by advocates of lottery become considerably less compelling when only some women participate, or when intra-institutional dynamics are not reformed in ways that transform gender relations (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014); the same is true for ideas of creating connections between marginalized women and their political institutions (Allen 2018, 118).

Perhaps even more importantly, random lot speaks to participation and political equality for individuals and so fails to engage with what is specific and special about representation and, especially, group representation. It also designs out ideas and practices of accountability (Allen 2018, 117; Phillips 1995; Lovenduski 2019). If the aim is to better represent women, we must ask of random lot: where are the spaces and mechanisms for the identification of women's issues and interests?[14] While it might be that different women are made present over time, can we be sure that the voices of minority and marginalized women are heard, listened to, and responded to by other representatives? Nor

does random lot—because it is a mechanism designed to change the means of institutional *composition*—consider feminist criticisms of masculinized political institutions, contexts that privilege the ways in which men do politics and prioritize political interests historically deemed as important by men.

Our concerns regarding possible alternative models to representative democracy, and, indeed, the compensatory device of random lot, are wider still. Who sets the political agenda requires further reflection than currently given: which issues are put before citizens in referenda, deliberative forums, on the streets, or in political institutions constituted by lot? (Saward 2010; Montanaro 2012; Phillips 1991, 137) There are no guarantees that this is not skewed in ways advantageous to the already, or even relatively, powerful in more bottom-up direct or post-representative politics. Moreover, if one rejects, as we do, the idea of a single, gender-free concept of the "will of the people" (Young 1990a/b), we must follow up once again by asking: what spaces and means exist for the identification of women's issues and the creation of women's interests? For example, without attention to gender, the expansion of deliberative forums, while looking inclusive and responsive, risks multiplying sites where women's political inequality is reproduced,[15] with its attendant effects of entrenching gendered exclusion and women's disconnect from politics (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014).[16]

If we resist thinking in terms of models and instead reconsider direct, participatory, and deliberative practices (Saward forthcoming 2020), their potential to contribute to the redress of women's poverty of political representation is much more promising. Some of these compellingly speak to how political representation might be designed better for women.[17] We can start by taking seriously the direct, participatory, and deliberative democrat's claims that citizens desire something more from their politics than the right to vote and to have someone speak for them (Rosanvallon 2011, 209–10). We happily accept that this more active role for citizens should also extend to representative democracy (Norton 2017, 192); we are, indeed, looking for new political debate over what is in women's interests within and without our elected institutions. In the absence of women's greater engagement in civil society, the poverty of women's representation will

most likely fail to be redressed (Young 1990a/b). Women's political participation must be expansive and connected to the institutions of representative democracy precisely so that elected representatives can determine the better argument regarding women's interests and so that women can adjudge the quality of the decision-making that takes place within our elected political institutions. In other words, women must be positioned to make greater demands of elected representatives and have effective opportunities to re-gender the formal political agenda (Severs 2010). Specifically, the value of deliberation to representative democracy lies not so much in regarding it as a practice that happens outside and/or in competition with formal political institutions but as undertaken therein (Allen 2018, 82; Young 1990a/b; Chapters 4–6). Within our parliaments, we want elected representatives "to examine their presuppositions and their assumptions, their values and beliefs, and revisit them, and reconstruct them, and come to a better understanding of what to do with them" (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014, 24). To achieve this, any new deliberative devices introduced within our elected political institutions must be designed to negate the ways in which deliberation currently works against women (Allen 2018, 83; Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014, 358–59). Greater deliberation within our parliaments fosters connections between women and formal politics. Such a connection is necessary, in part, because when some women "lose," as they must when there is competition over what is in the interests of women, seeing one's interests included in deliberation ensures that one still feels part of the polity. It also holds out the possibility that their political interests will be met at some time in the future.

Remaking the Case for Women's Group Representation

If there is nowhere better to go than representative democracy, the ongoing representational failures experienced by women warrant something more than what has been provided for in theory and practice thus far. The first step in making women's political representation in democratic systems more gender equal entailed securing women's

formal political equality (Phillips 1991, 1992; Saward 2003; Celis and Mügge 2018; Dahl 2006). Frequently defined in terms of suffrage, representative democracy only belatedly instituted "one *person,* one vote."[18] Today it should be unthinkable for a polity to be classified as a democracy were women ever again formally denied the vote (Teele 2018). Surely, no one could mistake Atwood's (1985) Gilead for a democracy?[19] Canonical democratic theory tells us, however, that political equality in representative politics is about something more than universal suffrage: it is also manifest in citizens' rights to political association. Like other potential interest groups, women, or subgroups of women, must be free and able to organize around their interests (Williams 1998, 10). If they fail to do so, or if women's interests remain a minority view and fail to be responded to, this does not, in traditional readings at least, detract from their political equality.[20] Being well-represented here is not about outcomes, but about fair opportunities to participate politically.[21]

In their criteria for establishing women's political equality, 1990s "politics of presence" theories went beyond the formal right to vote and to associate. Without sharing political power *as* elected representatives, this literature claims that women cannot reasonably be considered the political equals of men (Phillips 1995; 2012, 517; Williams 1998; Allen 2018).[22] The descriptive underrepresentation of women relative to their presence in the population was henceforth designated a democratic failing in and of itself; rule by elected men could only ever be paternalistic and patriarchal (Williams 1998, 137; 130; Phillips 1995; 2012, 513). Presence theorists often, furthermore, query men's ability to acquire knowledge of and the will and ability to act in women's interests (Phillips 1995, 13; Williams 1998; Mansbridge 1999; Allen 2018, 15).[23] This claim is captured by Phillips's classic "shot in the dark" thesis—that women representatives are more likely than men representatives to "hit the target" of representing women.[24]

The shift from women's *individual* to women's *group* representation central to 1990s presence theories required an additional theoretical step (Phillips 1991, 150). Summarizing classic theories, women constitute a group meriting representation because they: (i) "find" themselves a member of the group "woman"—importantly, in an ascriptive and not essentialist fashion; (ii) recognize a mutual identity and have

an affinity with other women; (iii) have a broad, shared history of exclusion from politics and society that is both empirically demonstrable and frequently subjectively claimed;[25] and (iv) as a consequence of that exclusion, experience laws and institutions biased against them (see Williams 1998; Phillips 1995; Young 1990a/b, 2002; Mansbridge 2003).[26] These claims about women were advanced despite the concurrent acknowledgment that women are neither a homogenous group nor share an exclusive set of interests (Williams 1998; Phillips 1995; Young 1990a/b, 2002). Phillips, for example (1995, 83) spoke of "the shared experience of women" figuring "as a *promise* of shared concerns."

The claim for women's group representation has been profoundly influential within both the academy and in wider society, not least as part of the rallying cry for greater numbers of women in electoral politics. Unfortunately, it has only got us so far. Enhanced descriptive representation has hitherto proven to be insufficient (Dahlerup 2018; see Chapter 2). Things might be, and in many cases are, significantly better compared with the past, but that does not equate to women being politically well represented (Lovenduski 2005). Only in a handful of cases are women equally present in the world's legislatures, and even when present, women elected representatives frequently find themselves internally excluded in masculinized institutions—ignored, dismissed, and patronized (Young 2002, 55–56; Lovenduski 2005; Childs 2016).[27] As the pioneering generation of women and politics scholars made clear, counting women is not our only concern when we judge whether or not women are in receipt of good political representation.

In our view, the normative claim for women's group representation in politics remains as persuasive now as when it was first articulated (see also Chapters 2 and 4). Yet in re-making the case, indeed, in having to re-make the case, we must contend with what can look to be a rather powerful, if not overwhelming, contemporary critique: namely, that the case for women's group representation in politics has simply unraveled now that women's heterogeneity is widely recognized and frequently problematized. This charge starts with the "facts" of women's diversity and holds that if women are no longer (or no longer perceived to be) the same, they do not merit group representation.[28] Countering such a charge lies as it did in the 1990s with

first acknowledging that not all women are the same. A contemporary feminist defense of women's group representation in politics need not deny the reality that women have both diverse experiences and different political attitudes. It is self-evidently the case that women are heterogeneous and are differently positioned in society, and that there are left- and right-wing, and feminist and anti-feminist women (as we discuss further in Chapter 2). For the avoidance of any doubt about the bases for women's group identity, we restate at length Young's definition of a structural, social group:

> . . . is a collection of persons who are similarly positioned in interactive and institutional relations that *condition* their opportunities and life prospects. This conditioning occurs because of the way that actions and interactions conditioning that position in one situation reinforce the rules and resources available for other actions and interactions involving people in the structural positions. The unintended consequences of the confluence of many actions often produce and reinforce such opportunities and constraints, and these often make their mark on the physical conditions of future actions, as well as on the habits and expectations of actors. This mutually reinforcing process means that the positional relations and the way they condition individual lives are difficult to change (Young 2002, 97–98, emphasis added; see also Williams 1998, 6; Hamilton 2014, 17).[29]

Instead of interpreting observations of women's intersectional and ideological diversity as undermining the possibility of women's group representation in politics, we hold that these differences between women should become central to its successful realization. Whatever else our design thinking does, if we wish to make the political institutions of representative democracy better for all women, it must be intersectional. Bluntly, political institutions in a representative democracy are going to need to provide for and enable not only the presence of different women, but also the identification of women's diverse interests, and to recognize that at times some women's interests will be prioritized over others in the democratic move from the plural to the singular. In other words, the insights of intersectionality theory should be made

fundamental to feminist conceptions and practices of women's political representation. As Wendy Smooth (2006, 2011) so presciently put it, intersectional feminism makes for a messier representative politics, but it foretells a better one. With its roots in American black feminism, intersectionality theory holds that intersecting structures of power—gender/patriarchy, racism, classism, and heteronormativity, among others—are together implicated in determining different women's positionality and experiences.[30] The effects of these structures go beyond "mere simultaneity" (Severs et al. 2016; Celis and Mügge 2018); women's experiences cannot be reduced to the additive effect of discrete identities, such as gender, race, or class.

A second observation that has become central to our re-making of the case for women's group representation in politics is one that is more specific to the academic study of the concept of political representation. Gender and politics scholars, us included, have in the past been rather too quick to disaggregate the concept of representation in line with traditional conceptions, notably Hanna Pitkin's (1967). Women's representation in politics is usually taken to refer to (i) descriptive representation (how many women representatives participate in our parliaments and assemblies?); (ii) substantive representation (are women's interests "acted" upon in our political institutions?); (iii) and, albeit to a lesser extent, symbolic representation (how are women and gender symbolized in and through politics, and how do women feel about their representation?).[31] Here we explicitly resist this tendency. To treat representation in a disaggregated fashion offers only partial accounts of women's representation as it is experienced by and affects women (see also Lombardo and Meier 2018; Disch 2011). Hence, we do not separate descriptive from other dimensions of representation in politics. For us, political representation is better understood as indivisible: a mélange of its many, overlapping, and connected dimensions.

Feminist Democratic Representation—A Preview

Remaking the principled case for women's group representation and thinking anew about how representative democracy might be better

designed, we build on both 1990s presence theories and more recent engagements with democratic theory. From earlier feminist interventions we hold onto the importance of women's political presence, albeit defined and operationalized in an innovative way. From democratic theory we take inspiration from the emphasis on passionate and partial advocacy, reasonable and fair deliberation, and strong accountability and systemic reflexivity, which we outline in Chapter 4. To make these latter democratic ideals feminist—and to do so in an intersectional fashion—we add to them three feminist principles (inclusiveness, egalitarianism, and responsiveness) and focus on bringing about feminist processes of representation, which we discuss at length in Chapter 3. On this basis, and as we argue in Chapters 5 and 6, *Feminist Democratic Representation* depends upon the political presence within our parliaments of a new set of political actors, whom we term the *affected representatives of women*. These political representatives stand, and act, for differently affected groups of women when our political institutions address issues and interests that affect women. A multiplication and diversification of representational actors is not, we fully acknowledge, a new clarion call (Dovi 2007; Saward 2010), although these representatives have hitherto been largely regarded as operating outside of the formal political institutions of representative democracy. For the avoidance of any doubt about their role, and as we explicate fully in Chapter 5, the affected representatives of women are not made present in our parliaments in order to undertake the same representational work as elected representatives—they are not additional decision-makers.

The affected representatives of women play specific representative roles in two new institutional practices: (i) group advocacy and (ii) account giving. These twin augmentations are designed to transform how formal politics is done within our elected political institutions, assemblies, and parliaments, re-gendering the representational contexts within which elected representatives, descriptive or otherwise, deliberate and take decisions. More specifically, what our first augmentation, group advocacy, adds is the meaningful inclusion of the affected representatives of diverse women within our political institutions voicing their interests in front of elected representatives as part of the everyday, formal representational process. In this way, a

broader range of issues and interests are brought to, and articulated in front of, elected representatives. Account giving complements group advocacy by providing for a second institutionalized moment, whereby elected representatives provide explanations and justifications for the decisions they have taken in the light of perspectives voiced during group advocacy and following deliberations among themselves. The elected representatives' account is given directly back to the affected representatives within the legislature and in this way—through them—to the women they represent outside of the institution.

Like Phillips (1995, 83) in her original exposition of the politics of presence, we cannot guarantee particular outcomes. We, too, are looking to establish enabling conditions. The presence of new types of representative within our parliaments will ensure that the nature and quality of the information elected representatives have access to regarding the interests of women will be fundamentally different, and better than now; the representational relationships that guide elected representatives' decision-making will be changed in ways that have the potential to positively affect how the represented feel about the representation provided by their political institutions and processes. For these reasons, elected representatives' deliberations should be more attuned to the diverse representational interests of women (Phillips 1995, 176). The quality of the political representation undertaken by elected representatives is more easily and effectively judged by women; what is said during the two new institutional moments, now part of the public political sphere, enables a highly visible, public assessment of elected representatives regarding their individual and collective representation of women. Assessments are communicated back not only via the affected representatives of women but also by the media. When positively judged for delivering fair and just decisions for women, elected representatives will feel good and might gain the votes of the directly affected women and/or other citizens who value such representational qualities. Altogether, a representational circle should be created, with gender-just decisions forthcoming.

This précis of our core design ideas—a new set of political actors and twin parliamentary augmentations—and of their intended effects on the attitudes and behavior of elected representatives will, no doubt, invite immediate queries from scholars of established democracies.

Why focus on elected representatives and parliaments rather than, in established democracies such as our own, the key actors in representative democracies: political parties (Deschouwer 2019)? The focus on representative institutions is not naivety on our part. The role of political parties in producing and maintaining the poverty of women's political representation has been extensively shown by gender and politics scholars over the last few decades (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; L. Young 2000; Kittilson 2006). Without this body of work, we suspect that our "non-gendered" colleagues might not notice anything wrong with women's political representation. We fully subscribe, and have both contributed to, the feminist critique that holds political parties responsible for characteristically marginalizing and misrepresenting women's political concerns. Once again, we defer to Lovenduski (2019), who pointedly notes that women are best considered "afterthoughts to political parties" in their understanding of whom and what they represent. While we could have written a book on making political parties feminist—and there is much to be said and done at the level of the party (L. Young 2000; Childs and Webb 2012)—our focus is more systemically tuned (see Saward forthcoming 2020; Chapter 4), to reforming the ideas, processes, and practices of representative democracy. In seeking to transform the attitudes and behavior of elected representatives, we confidently expect our democratic design ideas to have the attendant effect of transforming political parties as organizations, and more importantly, the dynamics of inter-party relations that characterize specific party systems in ways that will support the good representation of women in the future.

Political parties have long privileged male interests, even if they rarely regarded them as such. Male-dominated from the beginning, political parties have historically represented cleavages and constituencies that reflect (apparently) non-gendered political and social divisions of earlier centuries, usually class, religion, ethnicity, and region. In essence, however, men's political interests were systemically woven into what was instituted as the shared interests of the ideological group or territory. Contemporary parties' vote-seeking strategies direct them toward issues that speak to these established constituencies and away from addressing issues that bring no obvious gain or potentially threaten their long-standing support. Women's issues frequently

belong in the second category, treated as a minority or "special" concern by traditional parties, only making it onto a party's platform when there is an alignment with their broader vote-seeking strategy. Outside of "women's parties," which have not proven terribly successful given the established party systems they compete within, women's issues or interests where included will usually complement, or at least not trouble, a party's ideological identity too much, nor disturb their position vis-à-vis other parties or their core representational constituency. In more everyday language, when considering which women's issues and interests "fly" in electoral politics, the dynamic lies much more in party instrumentalism and not primarily for women's representation, although we are not suggesting that the latter is never in play.

Parties' tendencies to represent other political interests and serve other constituencies mean that even elected representatives who are gender conscious or feminist will not necessarily have the freedom to represent women. Given the nature of dominant inter-, and intra-, party competition, there are few incentives for elected representatives, female or male, to address women's issues and interests. The costs for the woman representative seeking to represent women may be especially high. In the first instance, our institutional design will transform who inhabits elected political institutions. Parties are overwhelmingly responsible for the low numbers of women in our elected political institutions. They are the gatekeepers of parliaments (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Kittilson 2006, 2013). Institutional design that brings in additional and, critically, a new set of political representatives of women has the significant potential to re-educate political parties about the importance and value of diverse representation in principle that neither political parties nor the institutions of representative democracy can any longer ignore or marginalize the political interests of women.

Over and above representational effects linked to group advocacy and account giving, the presence of the affected representatives of women should also challenge political parties' views of who acts in politics. Doing the "job" of political representation, affected representatives of women query long-standing notions of elected representatives being exceptional and beg questions about traditional hierarchies of representative claims-makers, about who knows best what interests

should be privileged in legislative settings. These political actors, importantly, come out of civil society and not via political parties, as we detail in Chapter 4. The presence of affected representatives has the potential, then, to have a positive impact on party leaders and party selectorates' perceptions of women's credentials and capacities as candidates for elected office. With time, this should open up women's access to elected political office to greater numbers of and more diverse women. Were this to happen, then, we would witness a profound change in the demand side of political recruitment (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). It would, moreover, fundamentally transform ideas about gender and merit, something that has, to date, proven seemingly and singularly impossible to achieve (Murray 2014; Annesley et al. 2019).

First- and Second-Generation Feminist Design

To formally acknowledge that earlier gender and politics scholars and feminist activists have been engaged in institutional design, even if their efforts have been rarely and only belatedly considered in these terms, we label our efforts *second generation*. This designation also signals that we build on and value their interventions. There are important continuities, of course, even as we differ in important ways from them. In the first instance, we share our foremothers' focus on representative democracy's elected political institutions. Like them, we consider these institutions the key democratic site for the realization of women's political representation even if they are neither the only ones, nor representational "islands" disconnected from wider society. Parliaments can limit and take women's rights away, something about which we inhabit a heightened state of anxiety at the time of writing. Our ongoing focus on representative democracy's elected political institutions reaffirms the potential for these to act as enablers and protectors of women's rights as recognized by the first generation.

First-generation feminist designers saw women's descriptive representation as fundamental to making democracies' political institutions feminist. We, too, hold onto the absolute importance of women's presence in our parliaments, even as our design thinking centers on

achieving feminist processes of political representation. The inclusion of a new set of political actors—the affected representatives of women—*strengthens* the principle and *supplements* the practice of women's political presence previously brought about through election. Women's presence will always be critical to any representative institution worthy of the designation *democratic; an sich* it publicly recognizes women's formal political equality. Acting as elected representatives realizes women's political participation and representation on the ground, and not just in an abstract fashion via the principle of the right to vote and the right to stand for office. In sum, parliaments found to be homogenous in composition are simply indefensible on democratic grounds. They should be recognized to be the elite, masculinized institutions that they have always been.

We continue to vocally support parity of political representation among elected representatives on the well-rehearsed grounds of equality and justice. Nonetheless, we draw attention to the limits of descriptive representation in meeting the intersectional demands of women's political representation (Phillips 1995; Lovenduski 2005; Dahlerup 2018). The number of women elected to our parliaments is subject to the vagaries of political parties' selection processes, the effects of electoral systems, political will, and/or the impact of a sex quota; we know that many of the women who successfully negotiate these barriers are both few in number and atypical of women in the wider population. Under our design, the inclusion of the affected representatives of women responds to women's heterogeneity in ways that descriptive representation of women among members of parliament will always struggle to capture, not least because of their finite number. Because they stand and act for different women, the inclusion of a new set of political representatives is a critical and innovative intervention and one that rejects claims that women are politically unrepresentable because of their diversity in favor of arguments that foreground this diversity.

While we continue to speak to women's descriptive representation in *Feminist Democratic Representation,* women's inclusion is only one among multiple representational effects. The historic tendency among gender and politics scholars, and feminist activists, to focus on descriptive representation and to conceive of women's good representation in

terms of their substantive representation is something we have become more critical of over the years. If it is mostly privileged women who are made present in our parliaments with their political interests met, to the detriment of oppressed and marginalized groups of women, the poverty of women's representation can hardly be claimed to be rectified. Taking women's differences seriously, and, furthermore, conceiving of representation as a mélange, raises yet more questions of this dominant conception. We are happy to agree that theories of women's group representation have been more focused on women's inclusion in politics than on their representation; "more about what it means to be recognized as a full member of one's society than how one can effect policy change" (Phillips 2012, 517). Conceiving of representation as indivisible queries any such opposition between recognition and representation in politics (Phillips 2012).

We purposively sidestep the "problem" of women's substantive representation as traditionally defined. Our approach to women's group representation in politics is feminist not because it brings into our parliaments feminist women who deliver on a feminist program, as in first-generation design. Through new parliamentary practices, affected representatives of women will directly engage with elected representatives in a manner that paints parliaments less as receptacles for fixed views of women's interests, and more as places for women's interest formation. In addition to an expanded role for advocacy, attention to the "representation" part of women's group representation points to the heightened importance of dialogic engagement between affected and elected representatives. This is a significant development on previous feminist institutional designs that, even as they sought to change the composition of our parliaments, worked within and largely accepted the norms of adversarial and aggregative politics. Our twin augmentations are designed to institutionalize a more deliberative practice within our parliaments, incentivizing elected representatives to rethink and, indeed, change their attitudes and behavior.

The responsibility to represent women has become institutional and collective rather than lying with individual women representatives who, as already noted, are frequently few in numbers, unrepresentative, and sometimes lacking the desire or actively constrained in their capacity to represent women. We acknowledge, of course, that

first-generation designs were effectively constrained by resistance. Our design takes institutional power explicitly into account. Through our twin augmentations, we design "in" incentives to transform women's good representation from a personal preference of individual women representatives into the collective self-interest of elected representatives and designate it a responsibility of the institution. The feminist standard has become about the quality of the representational process. Not only are parliaments formally required to include the affected representatives of women, but critically they are also made to listen to them. Women's good representation lies, then, in the shared representational work of elected representatives and the affected representatives of women, undertaken during the twin parliamentary moments of group advocacy and account giving, as well as during the deliberation and decision-making moments that remain the responsibility of elected representatives only.

The affected representatives of women are put in a powerful institutional position to represent women who are differently affected by a political issue or event; they are included *as representatives*, not merely as parliamentary guests. This institutional status as "equals of sorts" is designed to ensure that women's political presence goes beyond formal inclusion. Our approach also encourages a more deliberative politics beyond parliament, which connects the represented, civil society and the formal institutions of representative democracy. Judgment of the overall quality of the processes of political representation, including of the decisions taken, is the subject of a formal, routinized, and highly visible assessment by the affected representatives of women within the institution, and by the represented outside of it. Our design features—again emphasizing process—allow for the possibility that women who fail to have their interests (as they define them) met by their elected representatives can, nevertheless, judge the overall representative process fair and just. Being well-represented includes consideration of how women feel about the workings of the representative processes and attendant relationships, as well as how those who stand and act for them in their parliaments decide. The absence of favorable, substantive outcomes does not automatically rule out a positive assessment where women feel themselves to be in receipt of formal recognition and meaningful inclusion, and that their interests were subject to serious

parliamentary consideration. Women, admittedly, must be able to determine the "the good, the bad, and ugly" representative, as we argued in the Introductory Essay, and be in a position to judge the overall quality of their political institutions. As we show in Chapters 5 and 6, our augmentations provide for precisely this. This is an important improvement compared with first-generation interventions, which were focused on women's political presence without being able to ensure women elected representatives had sufficient institutional power to represent women.

Book Overview

The first step in persuading the reader of our remaking the case for women's group representation, and of the potential to design for feminist democratic representation, is to more fully substantiate the claim about the poverty of women's representation today. Our re-reading of classic and newer research on women's political representation in Chapter 2 is not designed to provide the reader with a comprehensive, global account of what has been said and found by multiple generations of scholars. Rather, by using more select work, we show through a critical reading that the dominant "dimensional approach" to political representation limits both conceptual understanding and empirical evaluation of the quality of women's political representation. This tendency toward individual dimensions of representation—oftentimes discrete analysis of descriptive, substantive, symbolic, and affective representation—not only presumes that women's good representation is somehow a simple question of adding up and taking away scores for each dimension, but it also makes it particularly hard to conceive, theoretically and empirically, given women's ideological and intersectional differences, when women are well represented. Hence, our claim to redress intersectionally women's poverty of representation demands that we conceive of representation as a mélange.

Chapter 3 marks a key step in the development of our design thinking, contending that electoral politics should institutionalize new representative processes. In so doing, it visualizes new relationships between elected representatives and those they represent in ways that

are attendant to debates over what is in the interests of women, all the time conceiving of the political representation of women in the round. Critically, the "feminism" of *Feminist Democratic Representation* refers not to a definition rooted in one or other type of feminism, or one or other set of feminist policies, but to processes characterized by three principles: inclusiveness, responsiveness, and egalitarianism. Derived from empirical gender and politics research and feminist theory, these principles reflect a different way of thinking about the current marginalization and differential consideration of some women and some women's interests in electoral politics, which have concomitant differential substantive effects and affect how well represented different women are and feel.

Chapter 3 is also where we engage head on with some of our critics. When writing previously of women's good representation in respect to one of its dimensions—substantive representation—we had been in receipt of some sharp criticism from fellow gender and politics scholars. We argued in favor of a shift away from a "content" approach to one that looked at the quality of the "process" of women's substantive representation. We also suggested that conservative women's claims to act for women should be taken seriously. Using Suzanne Dovi's metaphor of the "good sausage," we felt strongly that our approach was the better way to recognize that women do not always agree as to which is the most flavorsome. Chapter 3 is, in part, written for those who are concerned that we had effectively permitted "anything" to count as women's substantive representation. We disagreed then—we were not about to let poor representatives of women, nor harmful acts, count as women's substantive representation—and here we extend our commitment to feminist processes of political representation.

The second part of *Feminist Democratic Representation* begins with Chapter 4. It first offers a discussion of the recent institutional and representational turn in democratic theory. Four ideals are identified that speak to our concerns with women's political representation: (i) democratic representation connects the institutional and the societal; (ii) democratic representation is creative and educative; (iii) democratic representation is deliberative; and (iv) democratic representation unifies and builds trust. These normative ideals are very promising but on their own only go so far. We add to them our feminist principles of

inclusiveness, responsiveness, and egalitarianism. Together these produce the feminist democratic effects that we seek. Chapter 4 provides an introduction to our design thinking and the specificities of the design practices we envisage. Chapter 4 is, therefore, where we situate our approach within the emerging literature on democratic design.

Chapter 5 discusses the key features of our twin institutional augmentations, group advocacy and account giving. The affected representatives of women are at the heart of these institutional devices. Their representation work connects women to the formal representation process, establishes new representative relations, and, importantly, generates a new context for deliberation by elected representatives on women's issues. Affected representatives advocate for differently affected groups of women and hold elected representatives to account for their parliamentary deliberations and decisions. The standard according to which elected representatives will be publicly judged is reaching just and fair decisions for all women. Designed in this way, women's group representation is better able to address women's ideological and intersectional differences and tackle women's inequality vis-à-vis men and within-group processes of privileging and marginalization. It is a much more solid answer to women's failing representation compared with an overreliance on women's descriptive representation and gender quota, the key first-generation design.

Chapter 6 fully elaborates the promise of our parliamentary design. Ideal representational effects go beyond bringing more women in—through the inclusion of the affected representatives of women—and generating just and fair laws and policies for women. Although we do not downplay these representational "goods," Chapter 6 focuses on the broader effects on both the elected representatives and the represented women—this is what our shift from discrete dimensions of representation to conceiving it as a mélange implies. In short, elected representatives become more knowledgeable, care more about women, and are better connected to women and their experiences. Our twin augmentations provide both the means and the incentives for a transformation in elected representatives' attitudes and behavior. In turn, women finally feel recognized as legitimate members of the polity, are more knowledgeable about their own and others' interests, are positioned to judge their representatives and are thus empowered, and

they participate more in a democratic politics now that it is belatedly interested in them.

The Conclusion recaps the transformative potential of *Feminist Democratic Representation*, before reflecting a final time on the vignettes introduced in the introductory essay. We explore how the representational problematics experienced by women might fare were our feminist democratic process of representation in place.

2

When Are Women Well Represented?

The Dimensional Approach

Groups of schoolchildren are visiting their national legislatures to see democracy "in action." They are seated in a gallery overlooking the chamber. As they peer over the top of a wooden barrier or through a glass screen, in most of the world's parliaments they will be faced with far fewer women than men sitting behind legislators' desks or on the parliamentary benches: the average percentage of women in legislatures globally is less than one-quarter. Only in 3 countries, Rwanda, Bolivia, and Cuba, would our schoolchildren observe more women than men; and in just 13 countries would women legislators constitute more than 40 percent.[1] Many, if not most, legislators in national parliaments also come from the dominant ethnic group of the country in question (Morales and Saalfeld forthcoming; Ruedin 2013). The world's legislatures are *everywhere* overrepresentative of elite, ethnic-majority men (Hughes 2016; Childs and Hughes 2018).

What is needed for these schoolchildren to be considered politically well represented? We cannot assume that all the schoolchildren notice the differential numbers of women and men. However, we might expect the girls to "see" women's descriptive underrepresentation, and maybe less so, or not at all, for the boys, and perhaps children from minority ethnic backgrounds would notice how few representatives look like them. We might also assume that for these children to feel represented they will want to hear their dreams and worries being discussed in their parliament by their elected representatives. The "we" in all of these statements could be gender and politics scholars or feminists, but it could easily extend to the public. Counting the

numerical presence of traditionally underrepresented groups has become increasingly accepted as one way to assess the representativeness of our political institutions. Descriptive representation on the basis of sex—or more precisely, the relative absence of women in legislatures—is routinely commented upon in domestic and international political circles as an indicator of persisting political inequality between women and men. The Inter-Parliamentary Union regularly publishes a league table (www.ipu.org). This data is used to illustrate gender inequality in politics in individual countries and comparatively, to document changes in women and men's representation over time, and as a surrogate measure of the health of democratic systems more generally (Phillips forthcoming 2020; Celis and Erzeel forthcoming 2020; Celis and Mügge 2018). The question of race, ethnicity, and political representation may not as yet have the same international standing (Ruedin 2013), but in some countries it will be more prominent. Political institutions dominated by the majority ethnic population when compared against their multiethnic societies will today likely incur criticism for lacking representativeness.

Admittedly, in both the world of politics and in academia, some continue to resist a focus on the sex and other identities of elected representatives. Criticism of identity politics provides dinosaurs, as Joni Lovenduski (2012) calls them, young and old, with a populist and popular argument to level against what they depict as feminists' and others' obsession with identity, polluting contemporary democratic politics. In this reasoning, both the represented and representative should be the abstract individual of liberal theory, conveniently ignoring feminist criticism of him (Phillips 1991; Pateman 1988). Neither should the substance of politics bear any relationship to any other characteristics associated with contemporary identity politics, notably race/ethnicity, sexuality, and disability.[2] They might also suggest that because the public does not (always) desire greater representativeness—for example, it does not necessarily prioritize gender when asked directly to rank their priorities for representation—neither should we (Campbell and Cowley 2014; Campbell and Childs 2018). To see such descriptive measures as indicators of the well-functioning of democracies would leave them, we would suggest, aghast.

We find ourselves in good company with most politics and gender scholars, and many activists and democrats, in maintaining that the numbers of women and other underrepresented groups elected to the world's legislatures and governments matter. The same is true for those, who like us, are concerned that parliaments address issues that disproportionately impact upon, and/or are the concern of hitherto underrepresented groups. We are also persuaded that women and minority groups should engage more with formal politics, and we consider how they feel about the quality of their representation as important, too; in part, at least this is determined by who sits in our parliaments and what they do.

In re-reading what the existing literature says about when and how women might be considered well represented in established democracies, we bring to the fore the two guiding commitments of *Feminist Democratic Representation* laid out in the preceding chapter.[3] Our approach is to ask: (i) how well equipped are the established measures of women's political representation to address women's ideological and intersectional differences; and (ii) to what extent do they contribute to an understanding of representation not as a series of disaggregated dimensions, but as a mélange of these? To this end, this "state-of-the-art" chapter, while necessarily selective, critically re-reads existing gender and politics accounts of the three central dimensions of representation that have dominated political science since the late 1960s: the descriptive, substantive, and symbolic (for overviews, see Childs and Lovenduski 2013; Galligan 2014). To this we add reflections on the emergent literature on gender and affective political representation.

Knowing When Women Are Descriptively Well Represented

The concept of descriptive representation is premised upon correspondence between the representative and the represented; hence, it is sometimes referred to as *microcosmic* or *mirror representation* (Pitkin 1967). Which characteristics are regarded as bases for correspondence between the legislature and the country at large reflect the saliency of

particular identities in specific places and times. Identities such as race, ethnicity, class, religion, region, and caste will likely be recognized in polities where these identities are in play, politically, socially, culturally, and/or economically. While it was once ignored, evaluations of women's descriptive representation are today regarded as axiomatic. Although we consider it rather misleading even on its own terms, the concept of descriptive representation appears to offer a straightforward and easily quantifiable measure of when women are well represented. Sex captures one identity—biological femaleness—for sure, but when women are acknowledged to have more than one identity, and when sex as a category is itself queried as it is in some feminist theory, then it can only ever be an incomplete measure of descriptive representation (Celis and Mügge 2018). Acknowledging evident differences between women (Phillips 1995; Williams 1998) leaves us begging the question as to which "women" are present (Celis and Mügge 2018).

Women's Ideological Diversity

Simply counting women's bodies notably misses the political identity of women representatives; looking at overall national figures for women's descriptive representation effaces ideological and party differences. This is flabbergasting. In most established democracies, the study of parties is *the* central feature of research on political representation. Failing to acknowledge or downplaying party tells us something rather unfortunate about the seriousness with which traditional political science conceives of gender and politics. Two negative substantive consequences follow. First, the asymmetrical presence of women from different political parties is hidden. In the last few decades—as the number of women MPs (Members of Parliament) have increased in many established democracies—women parliamentarians came disproportionately from leftist parties. Only more recently have rightist parties begun returning more women in notably higher numbers, and even now they are not closing the inter-party gender gap (O'Brien 2018; Childs and Webb 2012; Och and Shames 2018). By failing to note this asymmetry, a partial picture of women's descriptive representation is created, one that critically does not admit that principled support

for gender equality in politics logically extends to their equal presence in all parties, even those one might not personally approve of. It also hides the fragility of women's descriptive representation when women representatives are concentrated in one or only a few parties. When the pendulum swings against these parties, a parliament will inevitably return to a state of male dominance once more.

The differential representation of women by leftist and rightist parties gives rise to a second and largely unnoticed effect: rightist women voters are being represented in most cases not by rightist women but by rightist men. This further depresses the quality of their representation, taking into account what we know about ideology and the behavior of women and men in political parties. Studies that compare elite and mass attitudes suggest that rightist women would be better represented—in terms of attitudinal congruence—by rightist women legislators than by the rightist men who dominate these parties in parliament (Campbell and Erzeel 2018; Campbell and Childs 2015c). Nor is support for the populist radical right a phenomenon only of men, even if it is often thought to be so (Coffé 2019; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015; Spierings and Andrej Zaslove 2015). These parties often have the worse rates of women's descriptive representation (but see Chiva 2019).[4] We might ask: should these women voters not have women representatives, too?

Women's Intersectional Diversity

Against this backdrop, which attends to our concern about women's ideological diversity, let us revisit the concept of descriptive representation as it has been and might be studied by gender and politics scholars, and do so anew, committed to acknowledging women's intersectional differences. This is by no means easy given the numerous points of identity that any one woman or group of women might possess (Evans 2015, 2016). The traditional approach as outlined previously counts the numbers of women elected representatives and, where there is a deviance from parity, categorizes a legislature as descriptively unrepresentative. As stated, this approach usually employs biological sex as the marker of descriptive representation, an inevitably

essentializing move and one that does not note differences between women, or the determinants of those differences.

A better approach to measure descriptive representation, one that avoids the essentialist charge, might be to understand gender as socially constructed. If gender is defined along a masculinities and femininities spectrum, this approach would fully break away from a focus on sexed bodies. In turn, this would provide for the inclusion of women-born-women and transwomen, and, indeed, some men as descriptive representatives of women. That said, deploying gender in existing research usually offers only a marginal improvement on sex. While not binary or essentialist, it is still a "single-axis" approach and, thus, inadequate to the intersectional challenge of women's intra-group differences. Moreover, something important might be lost with a move to gender in its more expansive conceptualization. There will be some academics and activists very much concerned about the "disappearance" of women-born-women when gender is the basis for descriptive representation. Here representatives who self-identify as women will "count" as descriptive representatives of women.[5] Some will find this highly problematic, especially so in contexts where feminist and trans-politics are conflictual or when the political presence of women-born-women is far from parity.

A third approach to descriptive representation might map women's intra-group differences among elected women representatives to assess how well different women fare. This usually occurs along two axes.[6] Such an approach meets the critique that the presence of only certain types of women—usually elite, ethnic-majority women—constitutes a democratic deficit also (Phillips 2012, 516). It has the advantage, too, of permitting the identification of the relative success of sub-groups of women in accessing elected political office. Hence, it permits conclusions about the representativeness of particular political institutions relative to the major social characteristics of the society they represent. This approach also allows for a better understanding of how gender produces privileged and marginalized groups in specific political contexts. In some places, sex and ethnicity constitute an extreme deviation from the norm, generating a "double barrier" for ethnic or racial minority women's political recruitment (Black 2000; Darcy et al. 1993). Yet in other contexts they fare better compared with

ethnic-minority men because women's multiple identities constitute a "complementarity advantage."[7] As Celis and Mügge (2018, 202) note:

> If we score women and men's bodily presence without attention to variety within the group . . . we will not measure the extent to which *gender* in its interaction with other meaningful discriminatory mechanisms generates positions of underrepresentation or over-representation.

The third approach displays a tendency to count two identities, as if women can have two but no more than two identities: black women, Muslim women, disabled women, or gay women. Or, we might find statements that say, "of all the black and ethnic-minority legislators, X percent are women," or "of all the gay members, Y percent are women."[8] In principle, more than two identities could be counted: a welcome discussion of the 2017 general election in the United Kingdom documented the presence of a black, disabled woman MP for the Labour Party (Kenny 2017). One unintended consequence of dual- or even tri-axes descriptive representation lies in the risk of essentializing women once more, albeit within subgroups of women. Just because some women representatives share more than one ascriptive identity does not mean that they are not differentiated in as yet other unacknowledged ways. This might be because other politically salient characteristics—sexuality or class, for example—are not being counted, or because descriptive representation on the basis of sex and/or gender only captures ascriptive similarities, and thereby, as before, miss women's ideological diversity. In respect of the latter, we almost certainly want to know the party identity of our representatives who are, for example, working class and lesbian. We cannot presume at the outset that a representative sharing these identities yet representing a specific party will be considered a descriptive representative of any particular working-class lesbian woman.

Another possibility for conceptualizing descriptive representation in an era of intersectionality takes a different track. It no longer aims to map individual bodies as if they correspond straightforwardly with particular identities, whether single or multiple. Instead, it seeks to identify the overall prevalence of particular identities within a political

institution. Operationalization involves first mapping each individual representative's various identities followed by the production of a "full" account of a political institution's makeup according to the range of identities selected for documentation. In light of such disaggregated data, the represented could evaluate the relative prevalence of a particular aspect or aspects of their own "identity" across the legislature. It may not be an easy task to collate data like this, but neither should it be impossible. Consider for example, Young's (1990b, 88) image of marble cake mixture,[9] where particular combinations are lifted up to the surface when stirred. The analogy applied to descriptive representation: sometimes a woman will be descriptively represented by women, whereas at other times she will be represented by one who is not of the same sex/gender, but who shares another aspect or aspects of her identity. In other words, the correspondence between the represented and the representatives is constituted in different ways at different moments, and when particular aspects of the former's identity are highlighted (or brought to the surface in the cake mixture analogy). To render this as a meaningful example, consider the ethnic-minority schoolgirl introduced in the opening of this chapter, she *may* sometimes see a correspondence with a woman or women representatives, yet at other times, she *may* see correspondence with men from her ethnic group.

One advantage of this fourth approach is that it is less essentializing than previous approaches: it does not define individual representatives as embodying or reduced to "this" or "that" or count how many "ethnic-majority, middle class, women" compared with "ethnic-minority, working class women" are present in a legislature. It works through identifying the presence of a range of identities that will be variously shared across different representatives depending upon the identities considered salient and "in play" in that polity at that time. Despite its clear advantages, two lingering concerns remain. First, while better attuned to intersectionality, it still relies upon a notion of discrete identities (Evans 2016; Yuval-Davies 2006). The tendency to separate off and prioritize one aspect of an identity, in our example sex/gender and ethnicity, must only be a limitation given that intersectionality is a theory that conceives of identities as intertwined. Second, this approach might again undercut claims for

parity of descriptive representation for women and men, which many feminists hold as fundamental. Justice arguments for women's political presence contend that where parliamentary composition is skewed in favor of men this is not to be regarded as a natural state; "something" is obstructing women's access to political office (Phillips 1995). Arguments suggesting that women can be represented by men when other aspects of women's identity, such as ethnicity or class or sexuality, are descriptively represented "in" these men, might undermine political support for establishing women's equality in politics. In such instances, a parliament might be adjudged descriptively representative when its women members are very few in number, or even non-existent.

A fifth, non-essentialist intersectional approach to assessing whether women are descriptively well represented gives agency to both the represented and representative. Who counts as a descriptive representative is not read off from "known" or "objectively observed" ascriptive identities but remains an empirical question. Correspondence is rendered active, determined by the interplay of representatives' presentation to the represented, alongside recognition on behalf of the represented. This mutual recognition is captured in Dovi's concept of "preferable descriptive representatives," one with whom one "shares aims" and has linked fates (Dovi 2002, 736). To illustrate: elected representatives might explicitly talk about issues related to their class, religion, and gender and by so doing depict themselves as sharing politically relevant features and goals with specific intersectional groups (Piscopo 2011; Hinojosa et al. 2018; Celis and Erzeel forthcoming 2020).[10] Here then, is an active role for the represented in descriptive representation: to see and to recognize. Such claims to descriptive representation might be passed through spoken and written words, or on elected representatives' websites or in their speeches, but might also play out through dress or other material markers. We might think of the first president of the democratic South Africa, Nelson Mandela, in his highly patterned "Madiba" shirts; the brightly colored turbans worn by Canada's NDP (New Democratic Party) leader Jagmeet Singh, or the pink *shalwar kameez* worn by the first South Asian British woman cabinet minister, Baroness Warsi.[11] Or, take our ethnic-minority schoolgirl once again. If we want to know whether

she is descriptively represented, we can ask whether she sees representatives "like herself" when she looks at the representative sitting on the parliamentary benches. Does she see a correspondence with the women present (correspondence on the basis of sex or gender, even when they are ethnic-majority women and perhaps also belonging to parties that she does not like), or with an ethnic-minority man (correspondence on the basis of ethnicity notwithstanding sex or gender)? Or does she only identify with a woman of her own ethnicity? Or, maybe, we are doing too much assuming here about the importance of gender and ethnicity; maybe she identifies with the younger representatives in the chamber.

Representation as Indivisible

We see huge worth in the latter approach to descriptive representation, empirically and theoretically, because it is better equipped to take ideological and intersectional diversity into account. It is also more sensitive to political reality because it connects descriptive representation with other dimensions of representation. It meets Dovi's notion of affinity—where similarity with one's representative is, in part, about "feeling" represented—a state of affairs that cannot be captured by the traditional, surface-level conception of descriptive representation (Dovi 2002). It might once again be a costly research approach, but that does not undermine its value.

Here we are reminded of Hanna Pitkin's (1967; see also Phillips 2012) warning over half a century ago, of the risk of focusing too much on who our representatives are when we privilege descriptive representation, and not on what they do. We do not take Pitkin's warning as a critique of descriptive representation per se. Reclaiming descriptive representation has been a critical intervention for feminists, and it remains one we support; for reasons of justice—to restate again this central feminist contention—women in their diversity should be included in our parliaments on an equal basis with men (Phillips 1995). Counting women elected representatives thus remains necessary for evaluating political equality (Trimble and Arscott 2008; Celis and Mügge 2018). We draw on Pitkin to support our commitment to

conceiving of representation as a mélange; that is, women's good representation must be determined not by discretely studying representation substantively, symbolically, and affectively. Oftentimes, we will be descriptively represented by someone who looks like us, but again, as Pitkin stated, and as emphasized by Urbinati (2006, 59), political representation does have something to do with people's irrational beliefs and affective responses, and it is important to ask when people are satisfied by their representatives and under what circumstances they feel that they are not being represented.

Knowing When Women Are Substantively Well Represented

The second way in which the quality of women's political representation has been assessed by gender and politics scholars is in terms of women's substantive representation. This is usually taken to mean the extent to which elected representatives have "acted for" women on issues that are regarded as predominantly affecting and/or of concern to women. The common assumption is that women are well represented when their perspectives, issues, and interests feed into law and public policy. As the numbers of women in many democracies began to increase in the 1990s (alongside increasing numbers of women political scientists who undertook the research), empirical assessments of women's substantive representation was very much tied to the acts of descriptive representatives, in other words, women parliamentarians. Did these representatives, many of whose recruitment reflected the hard-fought battles of party gender activists and civil society activists, pick up the mantle of acting for women once they were present as elected political representatives? Over time, as feminist theorizing became more sensitive to gender theory and the gendered political institutions in which women representatives act, tests of women's substantive representation became less tied to the actions of women representatives, asking more specifically who was acting for women, which issues were articulated and adopted, and when was women's substantive representation most likely.[12] This newer research agenda, which did not presume in advance either as to who acts for women or

what constituted good substantive representation, was better suited to exploring the ways in which differences among women mediate substantive representation, even as they remained attached to a conceptualization of substantive representation distinct from other dimensions of representation. But first back to the 1990s.

Politics of Presence

1990s "politics of presence" scholarship drew important links between who our representatives are and what they do and in so doing challenged the dominance of Pitkin's critique of descriptive representation.[13] This literature powerfully questioned the "politics of ideas" (left/right party politics) that, for too long, had taken little or no interest in the gendered identity of our representatives and accordingly had left gender out of the representational picture. Male-dominated political institutions were hereafter designated failures in the substantive representation of women, with male representatives regarded as lacking the will and/or the capacity to act for women. Many gender and politics scholars have little dispute with these general claims some twenty-five years on, or with the suggestion that women's substantive representation would be the likely, albeit unguaranteed, consequence of the changed composition of our elected institutions (Phillips 1995; Mansbridge 1999).[14] Indeed, many gender and politics scholars enthusiastically embraced Pitkin's (1967) preferred conception of substantive representation holding that women's interests would, more likely than not, be carried into our elected political institutions by women representatives.

A plethora of global empirical research has found much that is positive in the acclaimed relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation.[15] At the same time, research has also revealed how outcomes are more complex, contingent, and contested than oftentimes supposed (for an overview, see Childs and Lovenduski 2013). Feminizing legislative agendas and outputs in gender insensitive legislatures has been found to be by no means easy, even when women legislators seek and engage in acts in respect to women's issues.[16] Feminist institutionalist research over the last decade or so has

sought to capture the masculinized legislative contexts within which women legislators act and that frequently constrain their abilities to act effectively.[17]

Noting that the "politics of presence" scholarship confirms that women representatives are critical to the potential for women's better substantive representation, albeit with important qualifications, we turn our attention to reconsidering how extant conceptions of substantive representation are able to judge the quality of women's political representation in the face of women's diversity. We admit that it has always been harder to identify criteria for judging whether substantive representation has occurred compared with establishing whether descriptive representation is achieved. What counts as "acting for" women has been frequently interpreted in different ways: Is it when women MPs vote a certain way, put certain issues on the political agenda, raise particular questions, or talk about an issue in their speeches? Is it only parliamentary acts that are observable and measurable, or does it also include acts that happen behind the scenes? Do representative acts need always to be explicitly feminist and/or even gendered? Nor is it clear "how much" acting for women is needed for women to be considered well represented. The key question as to "what difference women make" can often hide a great deal more than it reveals.

Women's Diverse Issues and Interests

Gender and politics scholars frequently disagree over the nature of women's interests (Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson 2011): whether these are known and fixed, whether these are by very definition feminist, and on what basis representatives should be responsive to the represented (Severs 2010; Campbell and Childs 2015a; Campbell and Erzeel 2018). In many scholarly investigations and activist interventions, substantive representation was (and still is) elided with acting in line with leftist women's political movements. For some academics, this is explicitly made its defining criteria (Dovi 2015). We consider the frequent bias toward a feminist definition of what constitutes women's issues and interests one of the key limitations in

the scholarship on women's substantive representation. As we noted in our discussion of descriptive representation, empirical studies over the last decade have established that there are women elected representatives from across the political spectrum. Some of these representatives on the right claim—and with some justification and substantiation—to act in a feminist fashion.[18] Some may well subscribe to liberal feminist ideas of equal opportunity and anti-discrimination and hold more liberal and feminist views than the men in their parties.[19] In these instances, scholars may very well designate rightist women good substantive representatives of women. But we have also drawn attention to how the "leftist feminist" bias offers only a partial account because it misses acts by women representatives that are not in line with leftist feminists, or even their liberal-feminist conservative colleagues (Celis and Childs 2012, 2014; Schreiber 2014, 2008). Some rightist representatives subscribe to an individualism more consistent with neo-liberalism (Evans 2015, 58, and citing Kantola and Squires 2012), or even social conservatism, both of which sit uncomfortably with, if not in opposition to, what is usually accepted as feminism. From a leftist-feminist perspective, these women's representational acts will be called into question, not least for their failure to recognize structural accounts of gender inequality and for their, at best, limited concern for marginalized women (Evans 2015; Campbell and Childs 2015a, 2015b). As Evans (2015, 42–43) argues, neo-liberal discourse has "little room for gender or group identity." In their defense, rightist women representatives maintain that they are acting for groups of like-minded women: women who are socially conservative on gender issues, anti-feminist, or who are neo-liberal just like them (Schreiber 2014).

When faced with these representatives, some scholars argue that feminist academics should reject their status as representatives of women, and that women cannot be well represented by them (Celis and Childs 2012, 2018a). As we have said before, despite its considerable emotional and political appeal, we consider this to be a mistake. By ignoring these elected representatives and the claims they make to act for women, we fail to examine the question of the representational relationship between the representative and represented. This is something that Pitkin (1967), and more contemporary theorists, considers fundamental to good substantive representation (Williams

1998, 138; Severs 2010, 2012a, 2012b). If we were to simply and swiftly dismiss their claims to be substantive representatives of women, we would once again be giving privilege to only one of representation's interrelated dimensions.

If we want to better investigate the quality of women's substantive representation, that is, be attentive to women's ideological and intersectional diversity, we need to shift from a focus on "women representatives acting for women" as traditionally defined, to studying how the substantive representation of women occurs (Childs and Krook 2008), and *which* women's issues and interests are acted upon in our political institutions (Celis and Mügge 2018; Celis, Erzeel, et al. 2014; Mügge et al. 2019). This move requires letting go of a universal feminist understanding of what is in the interests of women.[20] A 2011 *Politics & Gender* symposium saw leading scholars voice some unease about an assumed universality of "women's interests," especially when premised upon a priori assumptions about women's shared group identity (Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson 2011). Tendencies in the literature to privilege top-down rather than bottom-up conceptions of women's interests were also raised; the same is true for concerns that formal, elected representatives of women get to determine women's political issues, rather than women on the ground identifying what counts as politically important (Celis, Childs, et al. 2014; Celis, Erzeel, et al. 2014).

Wendy Smooth's (2011) explicitly inductive and intersectional account directly challenges the notion that what constitutes women's issues is already "known" or shared. The political agenda articulated by her African American women interviewees would not have been included in a standard (read: elite, white American) list of women's issues. What her legislators considered women's issues—high rates of black men's imprisonment, for example (2011, 436),[21] would have been coded as "race" or "children's" issues. Smooth's point is clear: much of our extant framing of women's issues "obscures how issues affect women differently, particularly as it relates to the material consequences of race, class and sexual identities" (Smooth 2011, 437). Her challenge is unambiguous: "we must develop frameworks for understanding women's interests as *complex, fluid and varied*" (437, emphasis added). In the absence of such an approach, she

argues, there is little chance of accounting for the "coexistence of shared as well as divergent interests" among women (437). There is a further practical risk identified by Smooth: namely, that some representatives will be excused from representing those who are different from them. In such instances, privileged women representatives are assumed neither to have, nor be given, any representational responsibility for, and accountability to, women who are different from them on axes other than sex/gender. At the same time, the representation of ethnic-minority women becomes—is perceived as—the responsibility of "their" representatives; ethnic-minority representatives must do all the representational work. In working harder, they risk becoming overworked.

In line with Smooth's analysis, presuming or searching for agreement over the content of women's interests is something we consider both problematic and unlikely in theory and practice. In a specific location and time, it might be possible to establish a shared set of issues that women and women's representatives agree counts as "women's issues." But even where this is the case, it is much less likely that there is going to be agreement about what should be done about a particular issue or group of issues. Our comparative study of women's issues voiced by elected and unelected representatives of women in the United Kingdom, the United States, Belgium, and Finland (Celis, Childs, et al. 2014) duly revealed some commonalities, even though it established important differences in the topics identified as "women's issues" within and across the different countries. For example, in the United States equal access to sports very much constituted a women's issue. Any assessment of whether women are well represented in the U.S. case would, consequently, have to include evaluations of women's equal access to sports. This would not be true in the United Kingdom, Belgium, or Finland, where women and sport did not "count" as a women's issue, at least not at the time of our empirical research. Competing views over what should be done in respect of the women's issues identified in the four countries were also established within and across the cases. That is, there were ideological and partisan differences in how particular issues *should* be addressed in policy terms, and what, therefore, was regarded as in the interests of women. In drawing the conceptual distinction between women's issues and women's interests,

we very much sought to bring to the fore appreciation of differences among women, and of the importance of political ideas.

Claims-Making for Women

The loosening of the ties between descriptive and substantive representation, and the more complex, fluid, and varied understanding of women's issues and interests, fitted well with creative theories of representation advanced in the 2000s (Saward 2006, 2010; Squires 2008).[22] These have been warmly embraced by many gender and politics scholars to analyze instances of multiple representative claims made for, about, and to women, and to examine how gender and gender relations are constituted through representative claims-making by established as well as new, extra-institutional claims-makers.[23] There is a clear advantage in creative theories of representation not being dependent upon a fixed notion of women to "be" represented in politics, and in not assuming that what is in women's interests is already known or is easily determined. In sum, it avoids the error of talking about women and their interests in either a universal or essentialist fashion. The allusion to an economy of claims as advanced by Saward (2006, 2010) depicts multiple representations, while the inclusion of non-elected representatives is suggestive of the possibility of new claims-makers adding to those who have previously acted for women in politics. All of this is much more attuned to a commitment to recognizing women's heterogeneity in politics. In a new, gendered marketplace, diverse representatives should emerge to make claims and act for women in their diversity.

More significant still, the represented are regarded in creative theories of representation as capable of contesting "the representations offered to them" (Saward 2006, 2010; Severs et al. 2016, 351). This gives an active role to the represented and in so doing directly better meets the challenge of women's intra-group differences.[24] As already asserted, any desire to downplay different and competing claims about what constitutes women's interests runs the risk of making claims about the quality of women's representation based on the concerns and values of only some. Creative theories avoid wrongly concluding

that women are well represented when only certain (read: prototypical)[25] women's interests are met (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008; Celis and Mügge 2018; Mügge et al. 2019; Mügge 2016; Mügge and Damstra 2013). We already know that these kinds of women dominate our parliaments. In analyzing representational claims through this creative lens, scholars throw new light on the reproduction of women's intersectional inequalities. Following Severs et al. (2016, 351–52), we can ask how representatives do, or do not, define particular societal problems; what questions they do, or do not, raise; what solutions they do, or do not, consider; and what voices they do, or do not, listen to. In answering these questions, our scholarship will be better placed to evaluate how well different women are substantively represented.

Nevertheless, we have some reservations about creative theories of representation and whether they aid assessment of women's good substantive representation from the perspective of women's differences. The political marketplace is likely skewed in favor of resource-rich representative claims-makers, with the attendant risk that *their* representations become dominant, leaving resource-poor women unable to "read back" against those making claims in their name (Saward 2010). We are equally unpersuaded that creative theories fully appreciate that it is not just that there are different definitions of what is in the interests of women in circulation, but that these multiple representative claims are sometimes *in competition*. In representative democracies, there will be times when elected representatives will need to choose between representative claims for women. The economy of claims metaphor fails to capture the reality that not all claims-makers and claims start as equals. Feminist research on policy and framing has established that claims that fit with dominant ideas are likely to fare better, all other things being equal.[26] The implication is potentially profound for evaluating women's substantive representation: it will be far from easy to "satisfy" the representational demands of different women in such competitive scenarios, and marginalized subgroups of women are those most likely to be misrepresented or not represented at all. The creative approach to women's substantive representation has proven hugely useful in describing the gendered representational claims in play in particular cases, but its analytic reach is more circumscribed because of its lesser attention to the differential distribution of power

both among claims-makers and among the represented. Without this capacity, attempts to determine the quality of women's representation from an intersectional perspective will be flawed.

Representation as Indivisible

A final concern: by conceiving of substantive representation as a "stand-alone" activity, and by loosening the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation, gender and politics scholars risk missing crucial aspects of what else mediates the experience of good representation. Conceiving of representation as a mélange requires us to establish not only whether women agree with the claims and acts made in their name, or the extent to which they are able to engage in counter-claim-making, but also how they feel about their representation. It is entirely conceivable to feel badly represented not because of what representatives do but because of a perception that those doing the representation are not the "right representatives" at that moment in time and place (Celis 2008). Representatives making the "right" claims might still be judged to have the "wrong" ideological profile in the eyes of the represented or have made the "wrong" arguments. Claims-makers belonging to intersectionally privileged groups might, for example, be experienced as engaging in colonial or racist practices when claiming or acting for oppressed and marginalized groups.

Knowing When Women Are Symbolically Well Represented

Symbolic representation has been understood and studied in a number of quite disparate ways by gender and politics scholars. Rarely, however, does this scholarship explicitly address the question of when and how symbolic representation contributes to the quality of women's political representation—hence the more searching tone of what follows. We contend that symbolic representation holds greater potential to increase our understanding of when women are well represented. In

the classic Pitkinian definition (1967), symbols like flags or anthems "stand for" (represent) something else, like a nation or a people. These symbols often have little or no resemblance to the represented and are in that sense arbitrary. What matters is whether the represented feel affinity for, or believe in, the symbol. An example close to the focus of this chapter is the legislative chamber that stands for a nation's democracy. As long as the members of the polity believe in the symbol, they are represented. In such a reading, an all- (or majority-) male legislature that does little or nothing for women can still be considered to represent women as long as women feel represented. Of course, such scenarios were something that Pitkin criticized decades ago for being worryingly open to manipulation, although she did not frame it in the gendered way that we have. As discussed in the first part of this chapter, the presence of women in our parliaments is increasingly regarded as necessary to signal political equality between women and men. There is, or rather must be, in this reading a tangible relationship between the symbol and the represented. This was a point Phillips (1995, 40, 45) made, and one unlikely to be canceled out by the conclusion that women "feel" symbolically represented by an all-male institution. We agree with this even though we earlier suggested the importance of attending to the active role of the represented vis-à-vis descriptive representation. By taking ideological and intersectional diversity into account and improving understandings of how other dimensions of representation work together to generate *feelings of* and *beliefs about* being well, or poorly, represented, symbolic representation crucially calls attention to how representation is subjectively experienced by the represented, and it points to the possibility that women can be represented descriptively and substantively speaking, without feeling represented, and vice versa.

The Role Model

The role model argument is another focus of scholarship on symbolic representation. Once dismissed rather summarily on the grounds that this said little specific to questions of representation and democracy (Phillips 1995), research has since explored how the presence of

women in politics affects women's attitudes toward political participation and electoral politics. While the literature remains quite limited, role models have at times been found to positively influence attitudes toward politics, participation in politics more generally, and individual women's decisions to stand for political office.[27] In these instances we can consider this an indicator of women being better represented. Yet, Meier and Severs' recent intervention (2018, 36) reminds us of the potential for role models to promote exclusion; when descriptive representation is associated with a particular standard, we should be cautious of concluding that this equates with women's good representation. In their words, "too much weight" can be given to the role models' experience, effectively denying the diversity of women's experiences, issues, and interests (see also Dittmar 2020; Piscopo and Kenny 2020). We should also bring in here some of the findings from studies of the media representation of women politicians. The gendered mediation of women politicians may have negative role model effects, lowering rather than heightening women's ambition to run for office,[28] thereby damping down assessment that women are experiencing good representation.

Media Portrayals of Women Politicians

Analysis of the nature and prevalence of media representations of women politicians has been a core concern of scholars of symbolic representation.[29] Images and stories about men and women politicians demonstrate in the most direct ways assumptions about who acts, and should act, in politics, about who belongs and who does not belong inside political institutions. Sexist media representations reproduce the "male politician norm" and "female-politician-pretender" opposition (Childs 2004). At the same time, the changing nature of descriptive representation in electoral politics has in recent years been captured by images showing women "doing politics." Those that have gone viral include the pregnant Spanish defense minister inspecting the military in 2008 (Lombardo and Meier 2014); the Australian Senator breastfeeding her baby in the debating chamber in 2017;[30] and the pregnant New Zealand Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, wearing the

korowai, a traditional Māori cloak, to a reception held by the queen for Commonwealth leaders in 2018, and later that same year pictured with her baby daughter at the United Nations.[31]

Positive representations of the mother politician are particularly remarkable because they bring together motherhood and politics, categories that were traditionally considered mutually exclusive (Campbell and Childs 2017; Thomas and Bittner 2018). Pregnant and mothering politicians symbolize the inclusion of women in politics as biological females/women-born-women. We can hypothesize that such images contribute positively to (some) women's feelings of being well represented in politics. But we might further surmise that women's responses vary. Those who subscribe to ideas of sex differences (separate spheres) might resist these representations, although in the United States the idea of the "mama grizzly" may have reduced some right-wing women's antipathy to mothers' political participation. Women from communities where mothers have historically played key roles in politics might be unmoved and surprised by others' insistence that this is a new phenomenon. We very much await studies that explore these hypotheses. As with other gender and media research, whether women are symbolically well represented is not something that can be straightforwardly "read off" newspapers or the Web; much depends on the context, the political identity of the represented, and how they are positioned in society.

Visual and Discursive Symbolism

In a newer strand of research on symbolic representation, scholars have subjected visual and discursive political symbols to feminist analysis (Meier and Lombardo 2014, 2010): metaphors, stereotypes, frames, and the underlying norms and values in constitutions, laws, judicial decisions, treaties, administrative regulations, and public policies as well as more traditional symbols such as national flags, images, public buildings, public spaces, and statues. Attentive to women's differences, Lombardo and Meier ask who is, and who is not, symbolically represented, and how. Informed by creative theories of representation, they also examine what it is that symbols "evoke" and "do"

to the represented (Lombardo and Meier 2014, 8, 26). In this, as with Pitkin, an active role for symbolic representation is identified; how do the represented subsequently feel and act (Lombardo and Meier 2014, 7)?[32] This approach is very much in line with our contention that representation should not be treated in a disaggregated fashion. Specifically, Lombardo and Meier note overlaps between symbolic and descriptive representation: in both, representatives "stand for" the represented. Symbolic representation has a creative and performative dimension but shares with substantive representation the notion of "acting for" (Lombardo and Meier 2014, 183). Yet unlike substantive representation, responsiveness "to the interests and needs" of the represented is absent. Accordingly, the content of symbolic representation is determined by the symbol and its maker (Lombardo and Meier 2014, 28). Concerns such as these once again point to our contention that adding up the different dimensions of representation in order to determine the quality of women's political representation will no longer suffice. In all this, ideological preferences and intersectionally defined positions mediate the reception and perception of descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation, and how they interact.

In considering symbolic representation not as a passive but an active "standing-for" dimension of representation, we were reminded of media images of Democratic Congresswomen wearing white pantsuits when President Donald Trump addressed Congress in 2017. Democratic House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, using the hashtag #Womenwearwhite, encouraged her colleagues to don their finest.[33] This collective act received extensive media and political commentary. Not everyone was appreciative. The Republican Kevin Cramer offered criticism first on the fashion front, declaring the congresswomen "poorly dressed." On the political front he then criticized them for being "silly" in signaling their solidarity with losing presidential candidate, Hilary Clinton.[34] Much criticized for her penchant for the colored pantsuit, she had worn white at "the Democratic National Convention and the third Presidential debate." She did so again for Trump's inauguration.[35] *Glamour* magazine could not have been any more explicit in decoding her clothing that January: symbolizing the American suffrage movement,[36] white is a "not-so-subtle symbol for women everywhere that they should continue to fight."[37]

The study of such "symbolic" moments and the responses they incite are important for understanding when women are well represented even if we as yet know too little about the size, shape, and nature of their import. It begs questions about the response of American women, different subgroups of American women, and, given its international reach, responses of women worldwide. We might start by supposing that women identify with the congresswomen, seeing in their act a defiance of what many consider a misogynist, and a self-proclaimed harasser of women. Alternatively, we might posit that women would have experienced a sense of despair or disillusionment that in the modern era women politicians were having to resort to such tactics. With some confidence, we suggest that partisan identity mediated women's responses. While we know that women as a group are more likely to vote Democrat than Republican, we also know that it was white women and not black women who voted for Trump in 2016 (Tien 2017).

Legitimacy

The pantsuit protest also spoke to the legitimacy of political institutions in the eyes of women (Phillips 1995; Williams 1998). This approach to symbolic representation explores the interactive effects of descriptive and substantive representation and especially how they "swing together" in the eyes of the represented. Using experiments in a U.S. study, Amanda Clayton, Jennifer Piscopo, and Diana O'Brien (2018) tested the perceived legitimacy of all-male and 50–50 women/men committees. What they found is that the composition of political institutions matters for conferring legitimacy. Procedural legitimacy required "women's equal presence" for both women and men (Clayton et al. 2018, 114). For substantive legitimacy, defined as citizens' "immediate reaction to the content of the decision reached", women's presence "does not affect the perceived legitimacy of decisions that expand women's rights" but, troublingly, does affect decisions that rescind them (Clayton et al. 2018, 114). In other words, anti-feminist decisions regarding sexual harassment were "more legitimate" when women were present, and especially so among men, those with less crystalized views, and self-identified Republicans. This pioneering

research speaks once again to normative concerns regarding symbolic representation's ability to manipulate, marrying observations that anti-feminist groups and anti-abortionist groups actively deployed women to limit accusations that they are "anti-women" (see Schreiber 2008).[38] Most importantly for us, it reinforces our contention that the quality of women's representation cannot be assessed by studying only one dimension of representation.

Knowing When Women Are Affectively Well Represented

Studies explicitly dealing with women's representation, affect, and emotions are scarce in the gender and politics literature, although affect and emotion are not new in political science (Thompson and Hoggett 2012). We suspect it will soon become more prevalent (Kantola and Lombardo 2017; Kantola 2018), with significant potential to improve our knowledge of what makes for good representation of women. We look here to what we can take from conceptions of affect to throw new light on our question of how best to determine the quality of women's representation. Affect and emotions are frequently used as synonyms (Ahmed 2010, 2014; cf. Thompson and Hoggett 2012, 2–3).[39] According to affect theory they are not random, individual, or a psychological matter[40] but are structural and cultural—understood as "social and political *formations*" or "*organized* affective *economies*" (Hemmings 2005, 565, emphasis added; Ahmed 2004, emphasis added; Gregg and Seigworth 2010). Positive affect and emotions (like empathy, compassion, love, and sympathy) and negative ones (like fear, disgust, resentment, and hurt) are structurally linked with, and directed toward, specific sets of bodies and ideas.

In exploring affective representation and how it speaks to women's good representation, it is important to start by acknowledging that emotions have always been present in politics, even if historically and culturally politics is more commonly depicted as the actions of the rational Homo economicus (Thompson and Hoggett 2012, 6; Campbell and Childs 2015b). Thus, women do not experience feelings about political representation, about how they are descriptively, substantively,

or symbolically represented, in an affective void. On the contrary, they are positioned in the aforementioned "affective formations" and "structured economies," meaning their experiences are not reducible to individual psychologies (Hemmings 2005, 565; Ahmed 2004). With representation understood as performed with emotional gestures and acts, assessment of the quality of women's representation must be attuned to how this is mediated by these affects. Returning to the white-suited congresswomen, there might be positive affects in play (at least for some women): pride, passion, sisterhood, for example. At the same time and as Dovi's (2018) innovative work on political misogyny suggests, these women politicians' being and actions can, and in this particular case have, triggered anger and disgust, including among some women.

If the first contribution of affect theory to the study of women's political representation is that we should understand affective and emotional responses as always present and also as structural, Johanna Kantola reminds us that affect theory needs to "go intersectional" (2018, 5–6, citing Wetherell 2012, 218–219). Reading this challenge into our concern with gender, representation, and democracy implies that one's "intersectional affective position" mediates the assessment of the quality of elected representatives, and of the issues and interests they represent. We should, accordingly, pay attention to the role played by structural "intersectional affects and emotions" in the relationship between representatives and the represented. *Who* does the representation will be emotionally responded to by different groups in society (Skeggs and Wood 2012, 136; Lombardo and Kantola 2017). The same is true for the *what* of representation.

Kantola's (2018) pioneering study of Finnish debates surrounding the global economic crisis illustrated the gendered and intersectional work that affect does during representation. Affective knowledge about the effects and the causes of the crises—transmitted by appealing to emotions that move the speaker and the audience, for instance, through personal stories—made debates about gender equality "more vivid," "exciting," and "moving"; feminist struggles on gender equality were "brought to life" (Kantola 2018, 363, 377). This moved people to talk about gender equality and give it more concern in a context where economic and financial necessities and expert knowledge had

dominated. Yet the effects of affect were not only positive. Empathy and pity toward "the women in the other countries" pushed the gendered impact of crisis away from the national political sphere. In deploying empathy for non-Finnish women—the "suffering Greek women"—speakers and audiences constructed them as the "other," and Finland as a "model country for gender equality" (Kantola 2018, 378). Emotions also determined the way representatives were seen, in turn constraining the political space available to women representatives. Whereas the affective male speaker was perceived as more effective, with his account becoming "truer," the angry woman speaker risked reduced credibility (Kantola 2018, 375).

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It is one thing to conclude that women are in receipt of something that is less than good political representation. It is much harder, as more than two decades worth of gender and politics literature attests, to spell out criteria for when women are well represented. We consider this even more the case when "women" are understood as ideologically and intersectionally diverse, and when one conceives of representation not as a series of distinct dimensions. but as indivisible. We have not given up on the core feminist claim, one that is derived from the principle of justice, that women like men should be equally present in our parliaments. Like many of our peers, we wish to see diverse women present among our elected representatives. We have sought, too, when rethinking women's descriptive representation, to go beyond simple understandings of correspondence and to provide for a non-essentializing and dynamic account of descriptive representation, asking how representatives present themselves, which ideological and intersectional subgroups of women they claim to represent, how the represented women respond, and whether the represented experience affinity with their representatives.

This newer approach to descriptive representation is also preferable because it more explicitly links descriptive representatives with the second key approach to determining women's good representation, substantive representation. Rather than define this in a simple way as a feminist shopping list (as if we could agree what would be included), we contend that women can only be well represented when the

diversity of their perspectives, issues, and interests are made present in our parliaments. Determining what is in the interests of women is not a passive act; rather, it is a creative one produced through representative relationships inside and outside of formal electoral institutions. And in judging the quality of substantive representation, we have shown that this extends beyond any particular outcome; it is something that is also to be assessed in terms of how it is *experienced, believed in*, and *felt*, approaches that are currently captured in the symbolic and newer affective literature.

In re-reading studies of the traditional dimensions of representation, we confirmed our belief that to analyze them as distinct can only limit gender and politics scholarship. The quality of women's representation is for us defined by its descriptive, substantive, symbolic, and affective aspects taken together, and how these are given relative weight and meaning in the eyes of the represented. What we have also taken from spending time to critically re-consider how an acknowledgment of women's differences renders representation as a concept even more complex is to reinforce a decision we made a few years ago to move away from a *content* approach to the study of women's political representation in favor of consideration of the quality of *processes* of representation.

3

The Good Representation of Women

A Procedural Approach



One of us needs a new dress. It is for a special occasion only a few weeks away. However, being time poor with little opportunity for a shopping trip, the other offers her services: she will purchase the outfit. Readers will no doubt be intrigued about the moment when the other returns and unpacks the goods. Will this "show and tell" be well received? Our wardrobes most definitely have some overlap—plenty of black and

lots of fine-knit merino. Yet one of us is more conservatively styled, the other a little more edgy. Out of the tissue paper emerges a yellow dress. Will the wearer be persuaded that this item is the "right" one? Yellow is not "the new black" for either of us. Perhaps the wearer will not be convinced in the first instance. Indeed, she isn't and dispatches the shopper for a second time. On her return, there is no alternative outfit on offer, only the same yellow dress. Nor has the shopper's rationale changed: based on a judgment of what is available for purchase, this is the "best" dress. A decision has to be made—the other accepts the yellow dress. This was not, and never would be, the recipient's dress of choice. Substantively speaking, her individual interests were singularly not met, yet she accepted the other's decision. Acting "in the place of the other" by going shopping, the shopper had been aware of the preference for a black dress. Yet, ultimately there was agreement that she had, nonetheless, represented the other well, or at least satisfactorily so. On what grounds can we draw this conclusion? We do not live in places where all can have their individual interests satisfied—where all get the dress of their choice all of the time. This season there may be few black dresses on sale.

There might be readers who wonder about the appropriateness of our talk of shopping. If some are indifferent to fashion, others may be concerned that we risk undermining our academic credentials by speaking of personal and, some might argue, superficial, concerns. We disagree. Our first defense is that mainstream political science research regularly references sports to illustrate some political point or other (see Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 78). There is nothing intrinsically less academic about drawing clothing, or other examples, that speak to concerns commonly denoted as "women's." More than this, we found our dress discussions to be a useful thought experiment. The most important reason for thinking about when the yellow dress is regarded as the "best" outcome is that it helps illustrate a central claim in our work: that a shift to thinking about good processes for women's political representation is better than holding onto the more commonly advocated, content approach.[1] This is especially the case when gender and politics scholars want to improve, as we do, the institutions and outcomes of representative politics for women, against the backdrop of a real-world context of contemporary democratic

politics characterized by inequality and intra-group differences among women. In working through our yellow dress thought experiment, we began to think more expansively about the conditions under which, and the possible design features our parliaments would require, to redress the poverty of women's political representation. As we made clear in the previous chapter, contemporary democracies cannot easily substantively represent women because the interests of women often conflict. Hence, a content approach to women's substantive representation is hardly sufficient as *the* measure of good representation. Instead, we judged the process of representation or, rather, in our analogy, the quality of the other's shopping.

Explicitly conceiving of representation indivisibly, as a mélange, prompted additional questions. Had the representative taken all the stated preferences seriously? How had she judged these against what she might consider, either now and/or in the future, to be in the interests of the recipient? Had she surveyed all dress shops, just in case there was a better dress out there, missed on the first trip because she was not looking systematically enough or because a few shops were further out of town, and on that first occasion she had decided against venturing that far? Had she thought about how the other might feel about her decision to put the other in yellow, and what effects this might have for their wider feelings about their friendship (read: representative relationship)? In our final consideration, the dress was accepted because "in the round" the other's argument was compelling or, at the minimum, sufficiently so on this occasion. There are, no doubt, other questions readers might wish to ask before they would be persuaded to accept the purchased dress, but we trust that our reflections in the rest of this chapter provide an introductory illustration of the kinds of questions we are asking of representative politics and elected political institutions in the second part of *Feminist Democratic Representation*.

Good Processes of Women's Substantive Representation

A content approach has long been the dominant way of conceiving of and, moreover, testing the quality of women's substantive

representation in politics. Yet we argue in favor of a procedural approach. Electoral politics should look to institutionalize new feminist representative processes that engender new relationships between members of parliaments and those they represent, in ways attendant to debates over the content of women's interests, and all the time conceiving of the political representation of women indivisibly. We open our case by rehearsing a critique that we first made regarding conservatism and women's substantive representation (Celis and Childs 2012). In sum, and to reiterate one of the conclusions made in the previous chapter, we had become frustrated by evaluations of substantive representation that tended to judge the woman MP (Member of Parliament) overwhelmingly from the perspective of leftist-feminist women's movement interests, when there were so evidently others, including self-identifying conservative women, speaking and acting for women in contemporary politics and inside parliaments.

Our intervention attracted some critical engagement, not least in a reading that implies that we must have given up on determining when women are well represented. Nothing could be further from the truth. As we trust *Feminist Democratic Representation* will demonstrate, we are not ushering in, as one anonymous reviewer of our work put it, an Atwoodian future where "anything goes" (Dodson 2006) in the name of representing women. We also revisit the notable critical engagement from the political theorist Suzanne Dovi. We accept her charge that our approach to women's representation cannot *guarantee* feminist outcomes. Yet we maintain that our approach can, nevertheless, distinguish between good and bad representation and that it has a better chance of delivering better representation for women in the face of women's diversity than what currently passes. We also outline our response to a direct challenge that our approach would *by definition* have to find Popular Radical Right (PRR) representatives, good representatives of women. Again, we refute this charge. In the final section of this chapter, we must also make the case that our new approach to women's substantive representation is able to meet our dual commitments to treat representation indivisibly and to acknowledge women's ideological and intersectional differences.

In a simplified form, the stages in the development of our approach to women's substantive representation were: (i) a recognition that at

best the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation is probabilistic; (ii) acknowledgment that agreement over women's issues was not the same as concluding that what is in the interests of women is agreed (the content given to these issues by various actors); (iii) rejection of the tendency to elide feminist and women's substantive representation for assuming that all women are feminist, even if we could agree what feminism means; (iv) recognition that the substantive representation of women should not be conceived of as a linear process of women representatives articulating the agenda of the progressive women's movement within parliaments; (v) understanding that representation is better regarded as a more interactive process during which the content (women's interests) and subjects of representation (women in their diversity) are themselves constituted; and (vi) belief that for women's good substantive representation, especially of heterogeneous women's political interests, parliaments must be designed to accommodate debates about what is in the interests of women.

In querying a priori assumptions about what is in the interests of women, acknowledging that these are not always defined in a feminist fashion by some representatives and some women, and admitting the diversity of conceptions of women's interests,[2] we were challenging some of the foundational beliefs of the gender and representation scholarship. In not privileging at the outset leftist-feminist conceptions of women's interests, taking conservative claims to act for women seriously, and opening up feminism to other conceptions, we increased the numbers and types of potential actors who might be party to the good substantive representation of women and what that might mean in terms of outcomes. Concluding that a universal feminist set of women's issues and interests can only ever be a myth or a false promise, we felt ever more strongly that a content approach to women's substantive representation belied the range of actors making claims to represent women. Alternate feminist representative claims for women might be underpinned by notions of maternal feminism (Offen 2000); an emphasis on women's private roles (Carroll 1992); social (Schreiber 2008), liberal conservative views of "the individual," equality, and the market (Schreiber 2008; Celis and Erzeel 2015; Childs and Webb 2012); or Islamic feminism (Ahmed 1992; Badran 2009; Karam 1998).

To counter the accusation that our approach to women's substantive representation renders us unable to determine who the good representatives of women are, we developed evaluative criteria against which to judge them. These criteria would judge, first, political actors' representative claims for women[3] and, second, the totality of representative claims made for women. This is what we termed the *gendered economy of claims*, extending Saward's concept (2006). With regard to the quality of individual claims, we looked to see whether individual representative claims reflect, are responsive to, and resonate with women (Severs 2010, 2012a, 2012b; Saward 2006). Responsiveness importantly recalls Pitkin's (1967) claim that the represented are "logically prior," and that the representatives should routinely act in their interests. Crucially, in light of creative theories, judgments about responsiveness can also be a posteriori, that is, after the representative acts, as Eline Severs's (2012a, 2012b) work has emphasized.[4] At the individual level, we are interested not only in representational talk but also in the acts that follow through on what is claimed—that representatives' rhetoric matches their practice (Dodson 2006). We might ask: Are claims backed up by political acts? Was there sufficient political will in play, even and perhaps especially when times are tough? Or are claims for women trumped by other, competing, and more highly prioritized claims, rendering women's claims secondary, or effectively obsolete? Such questions enable the distinction between "cheap talk" and substantive representative acts.

In judging the gendered economy of claims, we are concerned about the extent to which those claiming and acting for women are constitutive of a feminist process of substantive representation. In other words, and more precisely, we wanted criteria that would enable us to identify and assess how well the totality of representative claims and acts meets the representational interests of women. To guide our judgment, we advanced three principles that reflected contemporary gender and politics, feminist theory, and empirical observations about gender relations and inequality between women and men, and among women. More specifically, our three principles spoke to women's heterogeneity, their intra-group inequalities, and the diversity of ideological attitudes held by women. The three "feminist" principles are: inclusiveness, responsiveness, and egalitarianism.[5]

Inclusiveness determines the extent to which women's heterogeneous interests are present among the claims "for women" that circulate in sites, or a particular site, of representation, including within elected political institutions by members of parliament. This first principle reminds us, too, of the importance of identifying representative claims "for women" that are marginalized or might even be absent. The inclusion of all relevant voices is necessary both to establish the meaning of what is in women's interests and to counter within-group inequalities (Weldon 2002; cf. Dovi 2015; and Chapters 5 and 6). In our view, inclusiveness is critical to ensure that women, and women's interests currently poorly represented in politics, are made present, while not presuming that these are necessarily more important or meritorious than other interests.

Responsiveness is met when the gendered economy of claims connects with women in society, defined as when women broadly agree with what is being claimed in their name. This is distinct from the traditional content approach to substantive representation in which political representatives are predominantly judged by the extent to which they act in respect of the stated aims of actors from the feminist movement. As already noted, this is often framed in terms of a congruence between what the feminist movement "wants" and what elected representatives deliver. In contrast, our second principle looks to the nature of representative relationships between representatives and women—responsiveness to their issues and interests—in their diversity. Critically, this broadens the potential "what" of women's substantive representation beyond the aims of a particular group of organized feminist women. Responsiveness can, as already noted, be established a priori and a posteriori (Severs 2010). Only in this way can responsiveness accommodate the creative nature of representation; what is in the interests of women is constituted during processes of representation.

Egalitarianism points to the relative status of diverse voices and different women's interests and asks whether some are privileged, and others marginalized (Severs 2012b). It demands more than the mere ability to articulate one's interests; voices should receive *equal* respect and consideration and *be able to generate an effect* (Severs 2012b). In other words, all voices must be part of, and not just party

to, the processes whereby representative claims are received, contested, amended, rejected, or accepted. Without the airing of these views and, crucially, without these interests being taken seriously as part of subsequent deliberations, what are constituted as women's interests can only be partial (Weldon 2002). Such a scenario will continue to render some women either poorly represented or misrepresented.

Having identified these three principles as important refinements to existing ways of conceiving women's substantive representation, we posited that more sophisticated and nuanced conclusions could be drawn about women's interests. More explicitly, this related to how they were included and constituted in representative processes, whether women's interests were influencing political debate, and how far they impacted upon decisions taken by elected political representatives (as one site of representation within a gendered economy of claims). Specifically, we argued that our approach would enable researchers to simultaneously reject claims that are "not for women," as well as explore the representative claims made "for women" by unusual representatives. This is what we meant when we talked of "taking seriously" the representative claims made by conservative representatives in contemporary politics (Celis and Childs 2012, 2018a).

Moreover, and critically, we held that scholars would be able to see *which* women's interests were being met during processes of representation, and *which* women were in receipt of good representation. This is because, once operationalized, our principles would enable scholars to study empirically the type, breadth, and diversity of women's interests that are articulated, heard, and responded to, in sites of substantive representation. It is also possible to see how these relate to representative claims being articulated elsewhere. In other words, our principles should help reveal whether political debate and decision-making is skewed toward particular women in and between different sites of representation. In many studies, judgment about the quality of the substantive representation of women is limited to whether elected representatives have acted in congruence with the organized feminist movement. Applying our framework of analysis, between and across individual and different women's issues, allows scholars to not only see representational outcomes, but also the basis upon which these were decided and agreed upon. Over time, such analysis would

reveal longer-term patterns of substantive representation, namely, whether all, some, or the same women's interests are included in the representative process (including the formal, electoral representative process), or whether all are included albeit with some privileged and others marginalized. Our expectations were, more likely than not, that formal representational processes would advantage privileged women, while marginalized and minority women would experience a bias that worked against the articulation and satisfaction of their interests; their interests would either be lacking presence within our parliaments or, when voiced, have considerably less, or negligible, influence on substantive outcomes.

To be clear: our intention was to make processes of women's substantive representation feminist in order to meet our overarching goal of redressing the poverty of women's political representation. This move, however, invited criticism that our ideas approximated to pure proceduralism, arguing specifically that this approach cannot judge the quality of the outcomes it produces (Allen 2018, 88). More pointedly still was the accusation that pure proceduralism fails to "erase [women's] structural inequality" (Williams 1998, 19–20, 195–96). This was rather disconcerting. However, pure proceduralism is not what we are advancing. In re-reading Melissa Williams, we came across Charles Beitz's defense of complex proceduralism. Complex proceduralism holds "institutions simultaneously to *substantive and procedural* conceptions of fairness" (emphasis added) with some substantive outcomes simply ruled out of bounds (Williams 1998, 21). Precisely because our approach to women's substantive representation has to meet our three feminist principles of inclusiveness, responsiveness, and egalitarianism, "anything doesn't go" (Dodson 2006; see also Allen 2018, 88; Williams 1998). As Saward (2016, 9) clarifies, procedure is not anti-substance:

> Proceduralism is always already procedure-with-substance (or procedure-because-substance). It is through procedures that principles are interpreted, debated, practiced and institutionalized.

This is how we conceive of our feminist process of women's substantive representation restated here and, in the second half of this book, our institutional design thinking.[6]

Conversations with Suzanne Dovi: The Good Sausage

Having made a decisive shift away from a content approach to women's substantive representation, we found ourselves in 2015 on a conference panel with the political theorist Suzanne Dovi, discussing the composition and form of sausages, and which type had more merit as a consequence. This was Dovi's initial thinking about non-presence in politics, the subject of her forthcoming book.[7] Toward the end of her paper, Dovi decried that good sausages do not result from "everyone" putting in all the ingredients "she finds tasty" (Dovi 2015, 29). Producing good sausages means knowing "which ingredients combine, which ones intensify each other's flavours, and which ones curdle" (Dovi 2015, 29). In this colorful, culinary analogy, Dovi was questioning our approach to substantive representation. In response, and informed by our empirical analysis of conservatism and women's representation and women's parliamentary bodies (Celis et al. 2016), and our more conceptual work on women's interests (Celis, Childs, et al. 2014); discussed in the previous chapter), we pointed out the very many varieties of sausage laid out on the butchers' counter: the "Toulouse" with garlic, nutmeg, and sugar, and sometimes also thyme; the "Cumberland," dominated by black pepper; the paprika-spiced "Merguez"; and for non-meat eaters (and in the frozen food cabinet), Linda McCartney's vegetarian ones.[8] There is, we argued, no single, tasty sausage.

As with sausages, so with politics. Given women's diverse political tastes, which "sausages" women prefer is very much up for political debate. In seeking to defend our approach to women's substantive representation (where more—and more diverse—women sit at the kitchen table), we argued that a representative process committed to including, and critically catering for, the preferences of hitherto excluded women (the diners previously absent from the table) would have a greater likelihood of satisfying today's multiple palates (in our terms, women in their diversity). Extending the analogy, we had, moreover, developed criteria to evaluate poor representative claims for women (e.g., Dovi's bad ingredients), and poor claims-makers (e.g., her bad chefs), rather than to establish these a priori, or to define them subjectively.

Dovi provocatively warns against "overly optimistic assumptions" linked to greater political inclusion, going so far as to declare that some elected representatives should be excluded from our political institutions or, more accurately, from some of the spaces and debates that take place within political institutions.[9] Dovi wants to include only those representatives who subscribe to democratic norms:

> At minimum, the democratic filter approach examines whether *those opinions* included and dominant in public policy making processes are committed to political equality, enable pluralism to survive and thrive, and marginalize those who advocate violence. (Dovi 2015, 12, emphasis added)

She seeks to exclude "those who threaten female voters or female politicians or condone its use through words or silence" (Dovi 2015, 13). Racists, sexists, anti-Semites, Islamophobes, and the Ku Klux Klan all get excluded, too (Dovi 2007, 49, 108). Beyond these interventions, Dovi makes the case that some representatives' behavior should be constrained, in order to make room for the interests, opinions, and perspectives of marginalized and oppressed groups (Dovi 2009, 1173). This move is underpinned by the assumption that inclusion can work for the already privileged and can give rise to "claims suppression" (2015, 14). Dominant groups can "co-opt" women's interests, for example, and sometimes the inclusion of women's interests in our parliaments takes place "under conditions of intimidation and coercion" (Dovi 2015, 12, 15).

Dovi's propositions about exclusion are intuitively attractive. In order to protect higher democratic values, who would not want to "limit and constrain the influence of those that exclude unjustly" or exclude those whose privileged status sustains oppression? Which feminist would not be tempted by the option of keeping sexist representatives and anti-women claims out of our parliaments? Yet, beyond the minimal democratic requirements set by constitutions and laws pertaining to sexism (and racism and discrimination for that matter),[10] it is much more difficult to decide who and what claims should be excluded,[11] even before we ask the critical question of who gets to decide. We are particularly concerned that those in positions

to exclude might refuse entry to precisely the representatives of marginalized groups who we think need to be made present within our political institutions. Let us assume, however, that we can identify the "right people" and ensure that they get to decide. We are still less certain than Dovi that it is always possible to determine what counts as "anti-women" and, hence, which representatives to exclude. The reader will not be surprised that we query the grounds upon which Dovi might distinguish between competing women's interests in cases where there is no uncontested hierarchy of "harm." Her example of the prosecution of women for adultery when they have been raped would, we agree, fall foul of any democratic and feminist standard, given that rape violates the concept of consent and notions of women's bodily integrity (Dovi 2015, 20). The same would be true of her second example, violent crimes against women dismissed for cultural reasons. These "violate equality before the law" as she maintains (Dovi 2015, 20). But beyond such examples, our confidence is less than secure. As our vignettes illustrate, the messy world of politics confronts us with various positions that can and are argued to be consistent with the interests of women and that would also fulfill basic ideas of democratic equality and women's self-determination.

Even Dovi's preference for a feminist conception of women's substantive representation would surely find itself challenged by the diversity of feminist views of what is in the interests of women. If women's harm is about socioeconomic (in)equality, then Dovi will rightly side with leftist feminists. Yet, and in the context of Western liberal democracies when options do not always fall on the left/right political spectrum, or when one is choosing between the political programs of parties close to each other, or where there is no broad consensus about the parameters of political options, is there always an obvious feminist "winner"? We suspect not. In the absence of agreed-upon and universal conceptions of "anti-women," we have to keep asking: who gets to decide what counts as being or not being "in the interests of women"? Even if one adopts a time- and location-specific definition of women's interests (and many gender and politics scholars do this in their empirical work), we would still in some instances have to decide between competing definitions. Does "good" feminist substantive representation equal liberal feminism? Or should we prefer a standard

derived from multicultural feminism or radical feminism? To return to the butcher's counter: one woman's tasty sausage is another's indigestible one. Fundamentally, then, excluding those who would choose the Merguez over the Cumberland takes us back to the place that we feel gender and politics scholars need to get away from: a subjective, a priori definition of women's interests that constitutes a content approach to evaluating women's substantive representation critiqued in Chapter 2.

Notwithstanding our counterdefense of a more inclusive process of women's substantive representation, there is something in Dovi's (2015) accusation about feminist outcomes that we need to rest upon a little longer. She is right to state that there can be no place for *privileging* feminist content in our approach; there can be no guarantee that our representative processes will deliver feminist outcomes. We are prepared to countenance that our approach might be too inclusive: some interests will be included that we will disagree with. Dovi is right in suggesting that the inclusion of more women in our parliaments does not necessarily equate with the inclusion of marginalized women (2015, 13), and that some women's inclusion comes at the price of excluding others. She is also correct to point out that women sometimes further the oppression of women. It is easy to think of women politicians who say and do things we will never accept as being good for women. We would suggest that much of this is inevitable in contemporary politics, and we have sought to moderate the risks of harm to women. As we maintained when we discussed pure and complex proceduralism, we most certainly are not agnostic about representational outcomes. Our approach remains situated within an account of representational politics that is characterized by foundational democratic principles (like Dovi) of political equality, pluralism, and a commitment to non-violent means, which should limit, even if they cannot rule out, anti-feminist outcomes. And our three feminist principles play a crucial role in engendering representative processes and outcomes that are good for women. But rarely in representative politics can there be outcome guarantees: recall Phillips's (1995) immensely powerful "shot in the dark" analogy that we noted in the previous chapter. Our approach offers a similar qualification; we, too, trust that our approach, as it was first outlined in respect to women's substantive

representation, is designed to engender good, and hinder poor, representation of women.

Can the Popular Radical Right Represent Women?

In suggesting that gender and politics scholars take more seriously the representative claims of conservative representatives, we were in receipt of some criticism even as other scholars took up the research agenda (Celis and Childs 2012, 2018a; Och 2019). With hindsight, we suspect that the latter might, in large part, have been because a "content" approach was read back into our analysis. That is, conservative women in established democracies such as Germany, for example, were mostly advancing positions that could in some (perhaps quite) loose way be interpreted as feminist. However, we then faced a searching accusation: what about PRR representatives? Were we really suggesting that PRR representatives could "count" as good representatives of women? Had we not "stretched" the concept of substantive representation in ways that would include the avowedly anti-feminist, those that reject the political equality of women? Would it not be better to simply agree that PRR representatives lie *outside of* our framework? With some trepidation, admittedly, we accepted the challenge to defend our approach to women's substantive representation in the face of PRR parties' claims to represent women. Feminist research had applied our ideas to PRR parties, mapping and analyzing their gendered claims (Spierings and Zaslove 2015; De Lange and Mügge 2015), but this had not assessed the quality of PRR claims for women, nor whether these contributed to the gendered economy of claims. It would be our task, then, to examine whether our "quality control" measures would identify when PRR claims-makers should or should not be thought of as good representatives of women.

On the basis of the gendered PRR scholarship, we concluded that our approach to women's substantive representation permits evaluation of representative claims and acts undertaken by PRR representatives. As we now illustrate, it is possible to distinguish between PRR claims that are framed "for women" but turn out not to further women's

well-being or rights and/or are wrapped up with anti-immigration or anti-Islam claims and harm women. In these cases, PRR representatives should not be considered good representatives of women. That said, there are circumstances when PRR representatives might be, namely, when their representative claims are "properly" for women, and what they do and say as participants in the gendered economy of claims fulfills our three feminist principles of inclusiveness, responsiveness, and egalitarianism.

We found a gendered PRR scholarship that describes a highly diverse landscape concerning PRR stances on women's issues and gender equality. From this we draw four points. First, and notwithstanding claims that gender is incidental to the PRR parties, gender issues and equality play a bigger role in their ideology and party platforms than conventional readings suggest.[12] Second, the PRR's gender ideology is context specific. The gender politics of populist actors are very much influenced by a combination of the national culture and accompanying party ideology (Mudde and Katwasser 2015, 17). In most cases PRR parties seem to accept existing relations in their own societies (Mudde and Katwasser 2015, 26–27), with conservative views of gender roles and the family.[13] However, some offer a more modern perspective on gender, even as women's opportunities to participate in paid employment do not overturn their responsibilities in the home.[14]

Third, the PRR's more recent liberal, gender equality ideology is regarded as a response to, or is reduced to, its central concern with immigration, integration, and, specifically, Islam. PRR parties use gender equality as a weapon against the alleged "Islamization" of Europe (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015, 28; Akkerman 2015, 38, 53). In this, "equality" between men and women is viewed as a national value to be defended against "foreign" influences.[15] In such depictions a traditional image of women as vulnerable and as potential victims, especially to the violence of "other men," is expressed (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015, 33; Spierings et al. 2015, 8–9). The intertwining of these concerns is where we see the gender and politics literature talk of PRR parties being "Janus-faced," combining conservative stances on gender issues that concern "natives," with progressive ones that concern "the other" (immigrants, foreigners, Muslims) (De Lange and Mügge 2015, 65, 80; Akkerman 2015, 40).

On the basis of our review of gendered PRR research, PRR parties present an intriguing combination of (i) advocacy of more traditional gender roles, especially regarding the private sphere, and (ii) (apparently) feminist notions of gender equality as central to national identity and in need of protection from an Islam that is itself anti-feminist and anti–gender equality (De Lange and Mügge 2015). Given that sometimes PRR parties advocate for what can easily be considered women's issues, and even at times feminist conceptions of women's interest, we contend, *contra* Dovi, that their representations of women are such that it would not be defensible to exclude them en bloc and a priori as somehow outside or beyond representative politics. The better option, in our view, is to subject their representative claims and acts for women to an assessment based on our feminist principles for women's good substantive representation. This is no different a "hoop" than what we put before conservative parties a few years ago, in which, at the time, we advocated for all claims-makers making representative claims for women.

The PRR's representative claims and acts are, then, to be evaluated in terms of whether they resonate and are responsive to women, or whether they are merely rhetorical statements trumped by claims that serve other goals or constituencies. The first point to make is that while feminists might well have found some comfort in the traditional literatures that suggested women are less likely to vote for the PRR than men, such optimism must now be tempered. Recent research suggests the possibility that observed gender gaps in PRR vote support will be reduced in the foreseeable future, and that presently some 40 percent of the PRR's vote comes from women (Spierings and Zaslove 2015, 147).[16] This is not an insignificant constituency of women. Whatever we might prefer, it is clear that there are women for whom PRR parties—for whatever reason—are their party of choice.

There is greater reason, however, to be suspicious of PRR parties in respect to delivering on their representative claims for women. Facing both ways, we can ask which they ultimately prioritize. The articulation of a gender agenda, rather than reflecting a wider commitment to either feminism or gender equality, is considered in many cases to be instrumental in, and is derivative of, the PRR's critique of (Islamic) immigration (Towns et al. 2014): the discovery of gender issues as important

(Akkerman 2015, 38) appears to have less to do with representing a constituency of women, and more to do with representing another constituency, i.e., the indigenous population or the (potential) PRR voter. It is said that such parties "*pose* as champions of women's rights" (Akkerman 2015, 39, 58; see also De Lange and Mügge 2015). For example, Towns et al. posit women's bodily protection as a secondary concern for the Swedish Democrats:

> Tellingly, neither the party's calls for a ban on the niqab nor the demands to forcefully combat gang rapes and other forms of sexual violence are articulated *in terms of addressing misogynous practices that abuse and subjugate women* . . . A rape of a Swedish woman by an immigrant man is plainly primarily viewed as a desecration of the Swedish nation, not a misogynist practice. (Towns et al. 2014, 243–44, emphasis added)

Feminist processes of substantive representation and, more precisely, the inclusiveness and responsiveness principles would require the presence of the PRR as part of its commitment to ensure that all those affected are included. It is undoubtedly the case, as noted previously, that some women in society see in the PRR elected representatives, folks who share their political views. Yet the same principles would also require other voices to be included, especially those voicing the interests of previously underrepresented groups, including Muslim women. As participants in the gendered economy of claims, PRR representatives will seek to defend their positions vis-à-vis representatives who hold alternate and likely opposing views. The PRR's traditional views of gender, even in the modern variant, would likely be fiercely contested by other representatives of women. Where PRR representatives make particular claims to act for Muslim women, we would expect there to be contestation from others who also claim to represent them. The principle of egalitarianism demands that all opinions receive *equal attention and consideration*; the PRR would, thus, need to be open to these and engage with, for instance, representatives of Muslim women on equal terms. Given that PRR parties attach only a little importance to women's issues and gender equality *outside* of issues of immigration/Islamization, we expect their representatives to be

less than willing to engage in extensive debate on women's issues and gender equality marked by our three principles. Indeed, they might for this if not other reasons exit such parliamentary discussions, although this is, of course, an empirical question.

The Good Substantive Representation of Women, When Representation Is Conceived as a Mélange

When we first outlined our approach to women's substantive representation, we suggested that scholars might explore how representative processes could be better designed to engender the "good" substantive representation of women. Our expectation, arguably not sufficiently highlighted in earlier work, was that the variety and contradictions present in competing views of what the interests of women are would facilitate more informed debate among elected representatives. In other words, and as defended previously, we expected a feminist process of substantive representation to deliver neither neutral outcomes nor any reductions in gender equality, but that women would be better represented substantively speaking. This is because our three feminist principles of inclusiveness, responsiveness, and egalitarianism would prompt more informed and accountable debate over what is "in the interests" of women, out of which better decisions would be forthcoming from elected representatives. This was because we had "designed in" feminist "quality control" measures. To put this differently, we were confident that we had designed some rules for the kitchen that would ensure that the chefs made the best possible sausages.

In forcing us think more deeply about representative institutions, representatives' characteristics, and representative relationships, our critical conversations with Dovi made us wonder whether our preferred approach to women's good substantive representation might depend not only on the processes—and, indeed, institutions—that embody them, but also on the type of representatives that populate and navigate them. What are the qualities we want in our chefs so that we can better guarantee that the sausages leaving our kitchen will be tasty?

Dovi's values of the good representative—fair-mindedness, critical trust building, and good gatekeeping—might well be prerequisites or at least beneficial for the good processes that we envisaged.[17]

The Virtue of Fair-mindedness

For Dovi, a fair-minded representative advances public policy that fosters civic equality: the equal political standing of citizens. Accordingly, such representatives not only advance the policy preferences of their constituents, but also advance the civic equality of all (Dovi 2007, 101). Only by increasing civic equality can the legitimacy of democratic institutions be safeguarded. Such legitimacy is necessary in order for citizens to resolve their conflicts through democratic institutions. Citizens consider democratic institutions to be fair when there is equality in public policymaking. All this implies that the fair-minded representative mediates and accommodates disagreements among citizens, rather than represents particular interests (Dovi 2007, 118–19).

For Dovi, while evidently about content, fair-mindedness is also about how outcomes are produced. Policies should seek to "reduce and compensate for inequalities of political resources" (Dovi 2007, 111). Citizens' capacities "to interact as equals" should be protected, and "shared political status and standing" secured (Dovi 2007, 105), not least by supplementing the political resources available to the "worst-off" citizens (Dovi 2007, 113). Concerned by citizens' access to decision-makers, the fair-minded representative reaches out to those who have been hitherto marginalized by political processes.

The Virtue of Critical Trust Building

Critical trust building refers to the representative's capacity to engage democratic citizens in representative processes in a way that increases their critical trust. How to foster this? Acknowledging that invitations to participate can be "manipulative" rather than a source of "self-governance," good representatives must be sufficiently informed of

the costs and benefits of particular policies; must be kept accountable by peer or horizontal accountability; and must constitute good role models (Dovi 2007, 130, 134, 140). When these conditions are fulfilled, citizens are enabled to assess when their active participation is needed and when, in contrast, they can rely on the democratic institutions for settling political conflicts (Dovi 2007, 134). However, even under optimal conditions, vulnerable groups of citizens might lack the capacity or the material resources to participate in the representative processes and might remain dependent on potentially abusive others to interpret their interests (Dovi 2007, 142).

The Virtue of Good Gatekeeping

The value of good gatekeeping lies in judging representatives by "the company they keep" (Dovi 2007, 145). The good democratic representative's main purpose is to promote the political inclusion of all democratic citizens (Dovi 2007, 147). To this end, she must expand her relations beyond her own political base and foster mutual relations with all democratic citizens (Dovi 2007, 161–62), both political opponents and the marginalized. In short, the good democratic representative needs to actively reach out and seek to obtain full insight in the various and conflicting interests at stake. She is neither delegate nor trustee (Dovi 2007, 149–50); rather, the relationship should to be characterized by *mutual* recognition and trust (Dovi 2007, 152–53). In all this, citizens should recognize that their fates are linked with those of fellow citizens (Dovi 2007, 147), and representatives have a role to play: helping citizens shape and consolidate their particular identities by identifying and articulating their interests; promoting their identification with the representative (thereby increasing ownership of, and responsibility for, the actions of the representative); and binding them to their democratic institution (through interaction with the representatives, citizens can better understand how democratic institutions safeguard their well-being) (Dovi 2007, 155–59).

In addition to acknowledging that Dovi's "qualities" of representatives were important, if not critical, to ensuring processes of women's good substantive representation, and in reinforcing our three feminist

principles, we also found ourselves confronting what was then a rather diffuse unease about the ways in which we had limited ourselves to a focus on only one dimension of women's representation, substantive representation. In Dovi's three qualities we saw emphases that prompted us to reconsider the ways in which other dimensions of representation, the symbolic, affective, and once again descriptive, were enmeshed with, and constitutive of, women's substantive representation. Her discussion of "identification," "mutual relations," connection, and "reaching out" reminded us of the ways in which the quality of relationships between representatives and the represented are not captured solely by thinking in terms of substantive representation. Her discussion of accountability, trust, and legitimacy prompted us to think more about the quality of the relationship between the represented and their political institutions, over and above their relationship with their individual representative, again in ways not always captured by a focus on substantive representation. More strongly still, we concluded that our efforts hitherto had been too restricted to improving women's substantive representation without attention to other dimensions of representation that are co-constitutive of women's good representation. In focusing only on substantive representation, we had effectively and, with hindsight, erroneously, "parked" other dimensions of representation as if they had no bearing on each other. We became concerned that we were perpetuating the theoretical and empirical analysis of women's political representation in a disaggregated fashion. This limitation begged to be addressed. *Feminist Democratic Representation* would be the occasion for us to explore a procedural approach to women's good representation and to do so while treating the concept of representation indivisibly.

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As we developed the normative case for women's good representation understood procedurally and with representation understood as a mélange, and as we began to consider institutional design ideas for political institutions, our three feminist principles of inclusion, egalitarianism, and responsiveness remained core to our thinking. As we explored democratic design more systematically, and the grounds upon which we would argue for our feminist designs, we took some

inspiration from an initial foray into empirical analysis of parliaments, which revealed that some were already doing better with regard to our three principles (Celis et al. 2016). We also undertook a rereading of first-generation group representation literature that was influenced by deliberative theories, as well as contemporary democratic theory that had intriguingly taken a representational and institutional turn, albeit influenced, too, by the prior deliberative moment. We soon realized that much of what they had to say helpfully reinforced our initial assumptions. As the next chapter shows, their emphasis on the ongoing importance of legislatures, the significance of indirect representation, and the role of advocacy, deliberation, and accountability matched many of our concerns. We felt confident that this focus could be made to speak more directly to the commitment to ensure that parliaments, as the formal institutions of representative democracy, are critical to the good political representation of women. When we brought our three principles to bear on what this literature has to say, we became even more convinced that seeking to design parliaments to ensure better (read: feminist) processes of political representation was the right way to go. Can we be confident that our inclusion approach is better than Dovi's exclusion? We trust that the second half of *Feminist Democratic Representation* is persuasive in its contention that inclusion is a good, feminist, and democratic route not only to deal with those representatives voicing interests, opinions, and voices that we do not like, or are vehemently opposed to, but also to ensure that women's poverty of representation is redressed.

4
Designing for Feminist Democratic Representation

2017 was the year of the Handmaids.[1] Across the United States, women dressed in scarlet cloaks and oversized white bonnets demonstrated outside state capitols, defying the Republican administration's efforts to roll back women's reproductive rights and health care; the U.S. Vice-President Mike Pence was confronted with a "wall of red" when he visited Philadelphia. British Handmaids took to the streets for President Trump's visit to London. But this was no U.S.-specific phenomenon. Handmaids protested in front of the Republic of Ireland's parliament and outside the Argentinian National Congress demanding abortion rights. In all these different places, the Handmaids' attire became *the* symbol of contemporary feminist resistance against patriarchal rule.[2] If Margaret Atwood regards their dress as epitomizing a slave state, one of the organizers of the Pence protest, Samantha Goldman, saw in the real-life handmaids a symbolic "throwing off of the cloaks of the white supremacy and patriarchy."[3] The British political commentator Helen Lewis regarded the aesthetic impact of Handmaids' attire as explicitly related to the political sites of their protests:

> I think the reason that the costumes work so well is because where the protests are happening is *places like courts, places dominated by men in black or navy suits, or parliament.* They are pretty drab places, where the slash of lipstick red stands out and gives a group identity in the same way the suffragettes did 100 years ago with their purple, white and green sashes.[4]

Lewis's reference to women's public protests to gain the right to vote is an important reminder of the long history of women demanding

inclusion in formal politics. At the turn of the twentieth century, women in many countries sought formal political equality in terms of universal and not just adult male suffrage. Lewis's comment also speaks to the second-wave feminist debate about whether, and how, the state might be put to work for gender equality (Kantola 2006). Today's protesters like those who went before them denounce the patriarchal nature of our democracies as they, too, turn to the very same institutions seeking gender justice. The Handmaids see in formal political institutions sites of gender inequality and backlash, where these are to be resisted and overturned (Verloo 2018). Their claims are both *against* and *of* our democratic institutions. Their protests align with Young's call to arms first introduced in Chapter 1 that those who seek the overturn of "injustice cannot turn their backs on state institutions as tools for that end" (Young 2002, 8).

Design Thinking and Design

We did not "know" when we started this book that we would end up considering ourselves feminist designers of democracy. We just felt that gender and politics researchers had to somehow "shake up" representative processes and institutions. Our confidence to think we should attempt to design representative institutions to improve women's representation came from our experiences as empirical political scientists, theory builders, and more recently as impactful feminist academics. Because we had always wanted to change things as well as study them, it is with hindsight that we recognized we had already undertaken feminist institutional design.[5] Our first effort, working with Jennifer Curtin, involved a U.K., Belgian, and New Zealand study of women's parliamentary bodies (Celis et al. 2016). We analyzed the extent to which these enabled women's inclusion and responsiveness, the first two of our three feminist principles. We found variation across the cases: both were enacted to greater or lesser degrees across the different parliaments. We took from this pilot empirical study the lesson that parliaments could be transformed, and when recalibrated through institutional design that enacts feminist principles, women's political representation would be better.

Some way into drafting *Feminist Democratic Representation*, when our ideas were quite well developed, we came across Lawrence Hamilton's *Freedom Is Power*. This encounter bolstered the idea that we are, and should explicitly be, democratic designers. No simple text of political theory, Hamilton focuses on institutional design to explore how citizens can gain the power to determine who governs them and how (Hamilton 2014, 2–3).[6] Starting from an appreciation of the structural inequalities that characterized South Africa two decades on from democratization, Hamilton sees society as made up of unequal groups. He, too, is critical of an abstract focus on the individual and sees equality as a design end goal (Hamilton 2014, 19). Like us again, he argues that to redress structural inequality you need strong political representation (Hamilton 2014, 196), and institutions designed to "enable sufficient participative and representative power and critique" (Hamilton 2014, 14, 19):

> . . . our individual freedom is determined to a significant degree by the material conditions and power of the groups or classes that we find ourselves (or in some cases choose) to be members, and that the power of each group is determined itself by the power of its representatives, which given the nature of power relations is itself heavily determined by the nature and relative access they have to their polity's formal political representatives.

Further into our work still, we engaged with Saward's *Democratic Design* (forthcoming 2020). In many ways, our approaches aligned. In the design thinking phase, democratic principles are to be foregrounded. The designer's work is to think through how democratic principles can be revised, revived—perhaps giving them new meaning—and enacted in existing institutions. Design is often *re*-designing: working with "pre-designed" principles and institutions, seeing old problems with new eyes, and enabling novel solutions in existing contexts and institutions (Saward forthcoming 2020, Chapter 2).[7] Saward speaks of developing *theory-for-practice*, by which he means determining democratic principles and values alongside plans "to make things better." Instead of choosing between fixed and seemingly alternative models of democracy, the better approach is to start "in a more experimental and

open-ended place," re-imagining what democracy "can be" (Saward forthcoming 2020, Chapter 1).

As feminist democratic designers, our design thinking is firmly rooted in and makes explicit the feminist and democratic principles we seek to enact: inclusiveness, responsiveness, and egalitarianism. We were taken with Saward's notion that the design thinking phase involves abduction—imagining or hypothesizing what *may* be (Saward forthcoming 2020, Chapter 1). In the discussion of women's poverty of representation in our Introductory Essay, we had begun to imagine representation *as it should be*. Existing feminist practices for women's political representation had failed to bring this about.[8] The emphasis on descriptive and substantive representation was, in our view, too limited. Rather than assume that women's political equality can be read off from "some" women's presence and "some" laws and policies being passed, we adopt a more open-ended position in favor of designing decision-making processes to produce good representation for all women. This was why the previous chapter restated our shift away from a content approach to women's substantive representation. Our aim in this book is to undertake design thinking that would underpin democratic design for women's political representation in the round. We think of this as initiating another cycle of what Mansbridge (2002) calls "practice–thought–practice."[9]

Our feminist design places elected political institutions at the center of what we are doing. In this way we are interested in identifying practices from the array of democratic ideals and practices that abound (Warren 2017, 39; Saward forthcoming 2020; Della Porta 2013), "mixing and matching" more participatory and deliberative practices with representative democracy. More specific still, we are focused on the central practices and processes constitutive of elected political institutions.[10] Our design efforts focus on parliaments, not on the entire political system. This is not because we disagree that representative democracy is an overarching political system or that parliaments are just but one political institution (Saward 2006, forthcoming 2020, Chapter 3). We agree that to make representative democracy feminist, both extra-parliamentary and parliamentary politics need to be transformed. As we attend to parliaments, legislatures, and elected assemblies, the design of new democratic practices makes certain

assumptions about the democratic quality of civil society.[11] Yet we trust that our institutional design has the potential to indirectly change what goes on beyond parliaments, even as we do not specifically design for non-institutionalized practices.[12]

Frustrating as it may be for our readers, we do not produce a universal blueprint or particular blueprints that folks anywhere can simply take down off the shelf and implement "ASAP" irrespective of parliamentary or presidential democracy, multi- or two-party systems, or in established or newer democracies.[13] The actual form of any democratic design must be reflective and responsive to context (Saward forthcoming 2020, Chapter 4; Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 172).[14] Thus, while we provide essential design thinking and design, any "translation"[15] to a specific context would have to involve a third stage— building. We refrain from this, staying with the first and second stages. As Saward clarifies, design is not the same thing as "building," nor, indeed, "engineering" or "testing"; rather, "it is the essential thinking and planning work that precedes and brings focus to (re)building, repairing, or transforming" (Saward forthcoming 2020, Chapter 2).

Democratic building requires democratic involvement: recognizing a democratic—and for us, feminist—building process (Saward 2017, 378). Each "place" where our principles for feminist institutional design might be implemented requires co-creation, sympathetic to that specific context, with "users' " perspectives integral to translation and implementation (Kimbell 2012, 143, in Saward forthcoming 2020, Chapter 2; Mansbridge 2002). Building rejects the idea of a universal, top-down, or single designer in favor of a participatory approach. For some this approach should be agonistic (Lowndes and Paxton 2018, 705–707),[16] while others speak of local "design coalitions" with "institutional entrepreneurs" who "persuade" what "one needs to do and ought to do" (Schmidt 2009, 533, cited by Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 176; Thelen 2009). Building is, in sum, "bricolage," "tinkering and patching-together institutional resources" (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 179–80).[17] It should sustain a "variety engine within institutional design," that "harness(es)" "local knowledge and creativity of multiple, dispersed institutional entrepreneurs."[18] The production of supportive discourses creates a sense of ownership over the design and the much

needed capacity for innovation and adaptation over time (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). All of this is indispensable to ensure the "stickability" of the new institutional design.

Feminist Democratic Principles and Practices

If democratic design is about democratizing democracy, then feminist democratic design has to be about *feminist-izing democracy*—admittedly an ugly term but one we use here for substantive effect. To bring this about requires the identification of practices through which our feminist principles can be enacted. Fully immersed in the feminism, democracy, and political representation literature, our design thinking begins with a feminist re-reading of contemporary democratic theory to explore its possibilities. There is a huge debt owed in this representational and institutional turn to the late Iris Marion Young, and it is why we weave her ideas into our discussion of the newer democratic literature. Young's ideas on public debate, difference, accountability, and political institutions explicitly pointed to the possibility that "injustices" of unequal societies could be redressed (Young 2002; Young 1990a/b). Her views on the links between the institutions of, and in, civil society and formal electoral politics emphasized how participation should not be opposed to representation, and that representative institutions are not "incompatible with deep democracy" (Young 2002, 8; 132–33). She was forward thinking, too, in critiquing aggregative democracy,[19] and maintaining that interests were neither exogenous to the political process, nor fixed (Young 2002, 20–21). In many ways Young's argument in *Inclusion and Democracy* predates contemporary considerations of symbolic and affective representation, that is, conceptions of representation that we regard as indivisible from longer established theoretical dimensions—and associated empirical practices of descriptive and substantive representation—and which are, in our view, central to women being and feeling politically well represented. Two decades ago, she also reminded us that "all existing representative democracies could be improved *by additional*

procedures and fora" (Young 2002, 132, emphasis added). Hers was a call for institutional design thinking; indeed, she engaged in institutional design herself, as we discuss in Chapter 5.

Very much informed by our re-reading of Young, we draw out four normative ideals from the recent representative and institutional turn in democratic theory, which are especially productive for developing practices for good democratic representation for women, envisaging how representative institutions can be designed to deliver feminist democratic representation. First, democratic representation connects the institutional and the societal. In this way democratic representation sustains and reinvigorates political engagement and participation in civil society and with regard to the institutions of formal politics. Second, democratic representation is a creative, educative, and agonistic process of interest formation and judgment. Third, in contexts of diverse and unequal societies and to deliver just outcomes, democratic representation is more deliberative. Finally, democratic representation unifies and builds trust, unifying people within a polity, and engendering trust and legitimacy in democratic institutions.

Democratic Representation Connects the Institutional and the Societal

For Urbinati (2006, 47) there are "two sources of action and opinions" in democracies: political institutions and society. In an elegant turn of phrase, she declares that in a democracy, society should not be "a quiet place" (Urbinati 2006, 767). The two sources of action and opinions are simultaneously separated and linked in a dynamic fashion by political representation; Young (2002, 8) spoke of "many avenues and institutions." Representative democracy designates a form of political process structured in terms of "circularity" between representative institutions and society over time (Urbinati 2006, 24). It is of a *longue durée*, spanning multiple decision-making moments (Urbinati 2006, 34). With its cycle of claims, acts, and judgment by both representatives and the represented, democratic representation encourages public engagement in politics. Those

who fail to realize their interests or feel poorly served at one time are encouraged to act to ensure that deliberations and decisions in the future might address their issues and interests. Political engagement is, moreover, high quality, rooted in a systematically improved understanding of one's own and other's interests, as well as renewed views on what constitutes fair and just politics (Urbinati 2006, 16; Mansbridge 2019, 307). Democracies self-improve as a consequence of the ongoing interaction between political participation and representation (Urbinati 2006, 16).

The quality of representative democracy and its institutions are judged in terms of their "recursiveness" (Mansbridge 2019) or "reflexivity" (Disch 2011; Hamilton 2014; Rosanvallon 2011; Warren 2019). Recursive representation embraces the aspiration for "iterative and interactive communication" between citizens and their representatives,[20] "as close to mutual deliberative persuasion as possible." Both the representatives and the represented learn from one another and incite each other to action (Mansbridge 2019, 312, 307). As Mansbridge states:

> In the full ideal the representative would hear what the constituent says, take it in, consider it, and respond accordingly, while in turn the constituent would hear what the representative says, take it in, consider it, and respond on the basis of that consideration. (Mansbridge 2019, 299)

A reflexive political system encourages contestation and dissent, and "mobilizes both expressed and implicit objections from the represented" (Disch 2011, 111). Reflexive political institutions "interlock" with other sites of contestation and establish "provision for a formal response that at least registers (if not necessarily incorporates) popular challenges" (Disch 2011, 111). Institutions must be designed to enable the represented to keep their representatives accountable for the latter's decisions (Hamilton 2014, 130; Warren 2019, 40, 45). Accountability here is much less the "one offs" of elections and more an ongoing "effort." Rosanvallon (2011, 214) talks about permanent exchange not only between government and society, but also within society itself. This relationship is defined in terms of openness, "the

ability to participate sincerely in the relationship of mutual revelation between government and society" (214). This suggests the necessity for strong mechanisms by which political institutions expose themselves to judgment by the represented. In other words, formal political institutions (alongside other actors including political parties, media, and interest groups) should by design, and in structured ways, take into account objections voiced in society.

The attention to recursiveness and reflexivity, importantly, do not collapse the distance between representatives and the people. The indirectness of representation, importantly, provides political representatives with sufficient autonomy to deliberate and decide (Urbinati 2006, 16, 47–48); while attached to the cause of the represented, they are not their delegates. Hamilton (2014, 115–16, emphasis in original) is clear that it is precisely this gap between the represented and the representative that empowers both and enhances responsiveness to the represented:

> . . . if we successfully escape two received opinions—that representation is either about completely independent judgement or the direct transmission of opinion *and* that in either case it rests on a response (or lack of response) to *preferences* alone—we enable new ways of thinking about the representation of individuals and groups that is not only more realistic but also grounded in inter-subjective determination of needs and thus more likely to enhance the judgement of rulers and ruled and thus the efficacy and responsiveness of representatives.

Political representatives use their autonomy to transform their preferences in light of new information, even as they act and make decisions knowing that they will be held accountable in the future (Young 2002, 25; Lovenduski 2019). Turning to the represented, they are also deemed sufficiently autonomous to reflect and judge political institutions, political leaders, and decisions (Urbinati 2006, 16, 47–48). They hold representatives to account in both a "backward" and "forward" fashion but in ways appreciative of how deliberation can alter representatives' positions (Young 2002, 131; Saward 2010, 146).

Democratic Representation as Creative, Educative, and Agonistic

Representatives in the newer democratic literature no longer play the role of the passive "transmission belt," moving interests that "magically appear in the mind of the voters" from society to formal political institutions (Urbinati 2006, 33). In contrast to the classic understanding of representation "the interests of a constituency have to be 'read in' more than 'read off' "; representation is an active, creative process (Saward 2006, 301; Disch 2011; Hamilton 2014) with political interests dynamically formed and reformed. As Saward (2006, 301) famously phrased it: "at the heart of representing is the depicting of a constituency *as* this or that, as having this or that set of interests." Representatives and the represented are thus engaged in processes of making, receiving, and reading back claims (Saward 2006). Representatives provide representative claims—an image of themselves—to the represented, and there is always "more than one version" of this for them to reflect upon (Hamilton 2014, 146, citing Ankersmit). Nevertheless, representatives' representations must in some way resonate as they cannot be magicians (Saward 2006).

That political interests are constituted during processes of representation need not render the interests held by the represented as any less authentic nor diminish their integrity (Disch 2011, 102–3). The line between information and persuasion on the one hand, and manipulation and deception on the other, is a thin one.[21] Of course, political elites can and will have undemocratic effects when their aim is to manipulate and deceive. As Disch (2011, 101) underscores, there is something uneasy, even dangerous, about the idea that people are left to the mercy of self-interested elites and depend on "crafted talk with political aims" to form their own ideas and learn about their own interests. Even so, this criticism is countered by the contention that representatives' claims can, when they include a plurality of different and conflicting perspectives and positions, uniquely *strengthen* democracies, and contribute to citizens' autonomous judgment:

> Through the process of public discussion with a *plurality of differently opinioned and situated others*, people often gain new information,

> learn of different experiences of their collective problems, or find that their own initial opinions are founded on prejudice or ignorance, or that they have misunderstood the relation of their own interests to others. (Young 2002, 26, emphasis added)

When representatives present diverse and competing claims, the represented are triggered to consider what it is that they *themselves* think, prefer, or find the most compelling and strongest argument (Disch 2011, 4; Hamilton 2014, 149; Warren 2019, 48). It prompts "perspective-taking"—viewing a situation, issue, or effect from the perspective of another—and "moral thinking" among the represented about what is good or bad, just or unfair (Warren 2019, 51–55). Dominant interests will in such circumstances no longer be regarded as the only ones worthy of consideration (Lowndes and Paxton 2018; Disch 2019). Exposure to how others are affected by particular issues, especially in respect to minority or marginalized groups, and learning about how others see their interests, enables greater and arguably better adjudication of both the quality of political debate and what ultimately constitutes a good decision (Dovi 2007; Warren 2019).

The airing and contestation of conflicting views enables citizens to learn about how their interests relate to others in their polity (Disch 2019; Lowndes and Paxton 2018). It sustains agonistic struggle over the definition of problems and possible solutions, and over the identity of participants in that struggle (Hayat 2013, 2).[22] Contestation allows citizens to identify and distinguish between "friends" (those who share values and how to implement them), "adversaries" (who share values but not how to implement them), and "enemies" (who hold non-democratic values) (Mouffe 2000, 13–20, in Lowndes and Paxton 2018, 697). Political debate should sustain "the plurality of the social," enabling group identities to emerge and defining the terms on which citizens might align or oppose (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, cited by Disch 2019, 166). Citizens must be able to answer the following questions: "What is the struggle to which I commit myself? Who are my opponents? Who might be an ally? And how might my struggle be transformed by choosing this alliance rather than that one?" (Disch 2019, 179).

Democratic Representation as Deliberative

The traditional view of decision-making in representative democracy posits that a decision is fair when it is made on the basis of which interest garners the most support (Williams 1998). In contexts of inequality, critics frequently find aggregative democracy wanting: numerical minorities and marginalized groups who lack the necessary means will struggle to be heard and influence outcomes. Put crudely, when politicians decide which position to support and trade off their preferences and goals to secure others, the less powerful, or too few in number, are likely to lose out and continue to do so over time (Young 2002; Williams 1998). Deliberative decision-making is offered as a more just way of making decisions in the light of these contemporary failings of representative democracy. Operating under rules of exchange characterized by non-coercion and premised on reasonableness (Mansbridge et al. 2010, based on Dryzek 2002), deliberation is conceived as a process of discovering the best argument and giving rise to decisions made on that basis (Young 2002, 23; Williams 1998). It holds out the possibility that minority and marginalized groups will be in receipt of fairer outcomes *because* deliberation breaks the "reinforcing cycle between social and economic inequality and political inequality that enables the powerful to . . . perpetuate injustice or preserve privilege" (Young 2002, 17). More precisely, deliberation allows for, if not expects, a transformation of preferences. It creates conditions in which dominant groups can come to recognize that their claims are partial and biased. In such contexts, the privileged might come to realize that their initial preferences are no longer tenable and different decisions might thereafter be made.

At its simplest, better decisions occur because our elected representatives will be situated in settings of greater information. As Phillips rather nicely put it, deliberative decision-making is an "exploratory politics," one that discovers "new areas of common interests facilitated by the possibility to formulate new positions in the course of the discussion with others" (Phillips 1995, 149). In more everyday terms, by being exposed to others' arguments we can come to appreciate that our initial stance was based on only limited information or, to put this more strongly, based on our own ignorance and at times implicit or

explicit prejudice. Through deliberation, the range of interests and, hence, potential solutions considered by decision-makers will be greater, and also more appropriate to the issue at hand because they reflect the interests and needs of all those affected (Mansbridge et al. 2010; Young 2002; Phillips 1991, 1995). Here political representatives reflect on their stated "preferences, values and interests" (Mansbridge et al. 2010; Young 2002; Phillips 1991, 1995) and are prepared to transform their preferences, and at times happily so (Phillips 1991, 1995; Young 2002, 26).

Deliberation not only enables interest and opinion transformation, but it also importantly incentivizes those party to the deliberation to do so; deliberating participants, to use Young's term, form a "public". With "a plurality of different individual and collective experiences, histories, commitments, ideals, interests, and goals," those engaged in the deliberation must speak "in ways accountable" to these "plural others" (Young 2002, 25). They must justify their position and seek to convince, or persuade, others of the transformed contexts that new information and new understandings mean for the issue at stake (Phillips 1995; Mansbridge et al. 2010; Young 2002, 131). This shift from "self-regard to appeals of justice," as Young (2002, 115) makes clear, is incentivized by "publicity":

> Because others are not likely to accept "I want this" or "this policy is in my interest" as reasons to accept a proposal, the requirement that discussion participants try to make their claims understandable and persuasive to others means they must frame the proposal in terms of justice.

While deliberation aims to reach consensus and agreement about what is most fair and just in a particular case, differences and conflicts are not swept away as unproductive (Young 2002). Nor are they to be transcended or regarded as antithetical to deliberation (Urbinati 2006, 133).[23] Indeed, they contribute to the legitimacy of decisions (Rosanvallon 2011, 186). The "structure of any conflict" is to be made very clear from the start (Young 2002; Mansbridge et al. 2010). To deliberate well, participants need to find common ground in their discussion of political issues while "attend[ing] to the particular

situation of others *and* be willing to work out just solutions to their conflicts and collective problems *from across their situated positions*" (Young 2002, 7, emphasis added). In the same vein, the exploration, clarification, identification, and articulation of self-interest contributes to the quality of the deliberation.[24] As Mansbridge puts it, voicing self-interests goes hand in hand with a willingness "to justify self-interests in terms of fairness, understand the arguments from fairness from the other side, and look for fair adjudications among competing understandings of fairness" (Mansbridge et al. 2010, 78; Mansbridge 2006).

Deliberation, therefore, not only consists of reasonable deliberators, but also advocates who plea for the partial interests of specific groups. Advocacy importantly reduces the risk of deliberation giving rise to a consensus that is misrepresented as "in the interest of all" (Young 2002, 83; Disch 2019). It ensures, particularly, that any decision is fair to minorities and the marginalized (Young 2002, 83; Disch 2019); these historically poorly represented, or misrepresented, groups need passionate advocates, closely tied to and acting for them. In the absence of such advocates the "tendencies of the ruling power to silence their claims and violate their considerations" will be unchallenged (Urbinati 2006, 46). Mansbridge et al. (2010, 73) elucidates:

> If members of the group can speak only as "we" and not as "I," neither they nor the other participants may be able to discover what is really at stake and forge integrated solutions.

The quality of the communication and the nature of argumentation is critical to the success of deliberation (Young 2002; Mansbridge 2002; Mansbridge et al. 2010; Urbinati 2006). Contemporary theories of deliberative democracy have largely accepted long-standing feminist criticism of the rational, unemotive, detached, objective deliberator.[25] To advocate well, deliberating parties need to be able to speak in their own voices, in a fashion that reflects particular lived experiences. To achieve good deliberation, communication must be inclusive; no interest should be excluded or marginalized because advocates fail to express themselves according to "culturally specific norms of tone, grammar, and diction" (Young 2002, 39) or use the "language of the

political professionals" (Hayat 2019b, 144). Passion and emotion are positive (Mansbridge 2019, 313); they "prevent democratic apathy, keep citizens engaged in democratic processes and prevent them from turning towards non-democratic conflict" (Lowndes and Paxton 2018, 695; Mansbridge 2002). Narration and storytelling are no longer inappropriate (Young 2002, 70–71). Inclusive communication is, moreover, not just about individual preference for speaking in a particular style or to ensure connection with those being advocated for and represented. While alternate modes of communication can be critical for voicing and identifying one's own needs and interests, they also play a role in persuading others of the political importance of taking a particular perspective or group interest into account (Goodin 2000, 95–96). Parties to the deliberation should "feel" the strength of others' arguments (Young 2002; Urbinati 2006; Mansbridge 2003, 2006, 2019). This might especially be the case when others lack connection to other groups' experiences because they are so differently situated (Young 2002, 71; Goodin 2000, 99).

As a mode of decision-making, deliberation in contemporary form is designed to reach an agreement for concrete, situation-specific issues. Its scope is not the abstract "common good" (Young 2002, 113). As Hamilton (2014, 153, emphasis added) writes:

> If something like the common good does exist it may be nothing more than a *contingent* compromise between otherwise irreconcilable interests, perspectives, groups and classes.

What is sought are "just solutions to particular problems in a particular social context" (Young 2002, 113; Rosanvallon 2011, 185; Lowndes and Paxton 2018, 695). Decisions are not predictive or binding for all similar issues that might arise in the future, nor are they a "permanent verdict" that would foreclose subsequent deliberation (Urbinati 2006), but provisional and renewable (Young 2002, 43–44). We should be clear, too, that when interests and conflict are found to be irreconcilable, deliberation ends not in a consensus but, instead, in a clarification of the structure of the conflict. If so, decisions might need to be made by other, non-deliberative means including voting (Mansbridge et al. 2010).

Democratic Representation Unifies and Builds Trust

Democratic representation generates a solid "social compact" among people and a firm relationship of trust between the represented and their representatives, which is a crucial prerequisite for wider trust in our political institutions (Williams 1998); representative institutions are here regarded as the trustworthy and legitimate sites for, and political representatives as the trustworthy and legitimate means of, resolving collective problems in a just and fair manner (Williams 1998; Dovi 2007). Not only does this enhance legitimacy of, identification with, and pride in democratic institutions, such perceptions engender self-esteem and worth (Rosanvallon 2011, 176). Rosanvallon (2011, 175) captures this in the following way:

> Dealing with attentive, fair, respectful authorities who listen to the arguments of the people they govern signals to citizens that the group accepts them as full members who "count" for something and are recognized by the authorities as having a certain "status."

When your interests, views, and opinions are included in the formal and public process of representation, you feel recognized as part of the polity, furthering feelings of belonging (Williams 1998; Urbinati 2006, 134; Brito Vieira and Runciman 2008). Through advocacy and deliberation, democratic representatives make manifest the shared fates among those in a polity, demonstrating that they are "in it together" (Dovi 2007), and that they "must work together to try to solve collective problems" (Young 2002, 112). In this way democratic political institutions are recognized as the guardians of one's well-being (Dovi 2007, 155–59). This limits alienation and exit from politics, not least for those who otherwise might "lose too often" and feel themselves with "little stake" in politics in particular and in the polity more broadly (Dovi 2007). Echoing an earlier point about the importance of recognizing the "structure of conflicts," this "togetherness" is more about a common future than a common point of departure (Urbinati 2006, 32): democratic representation is "the bond that holds together a society that has no visible center and becomes unified through action

and discourse" (Urbinati 2006, 32). It is "a process of unification, not an act of unity" (Urbinati 2006, 133) or, in more agonistic terms, of "weaving an entangled web of interdependent groups" (Connolly 1995, xxviii, cited by Lowndes and Paxton 2018, 696)

Making Democratic Representation Feminist

Newer conceptions of democratic representation suggest a promising picture for our politics: reaching just and fair decisions for all, meanwhile mobilizing and educating the public, connecting and unifying people, and building trust in our elected democratic institutions. All these qualities are very attractive outcomes for feminists—and the real-life protesting Handmaidens—who worry that representative politics and its attendant institutions and processes do not work well enough for women. Yet our concern with women's poverty of representation leaves us unpersuaded that democratic representation so defined is adequate to this task. We consider the inattention to women's poverty of representation in much of the newer democratic representation literature problematic, and liable in practice to reproduce women's political inequality. Central to our thesis is that if good democratic representation requires different kinds of representative processes and institutions, then different representative relationships must logically follow. Therefore, if processes of decision-making that are more inclusive and more deliberative are to deliver for women, they must embody our feminist principles of inclusiveness, egalitarianism, and responsiveness. In short, democratic representation needs *to be made feminist*.

As we made clear in Chapter 1, *Feminist Democratic Representation* should not be thought of as a new democratic model (Phillips 1991; Held 2006). It is about applying feminist principles to ideal representative processes identified by recent democratic theory, so that feminist representative democratic theory is embodied in democratic practice. Following Saward (2003, 164), we conceive of "feminist principles" as "primarily things we do." Hence, feminist democratic principles need to be enacted in the moments constitutive of democratic representative

processes. If the newer literature designates these moments as passionate and partial advocacy, reasonable and fair deliberation, and systemic recursiveness and reflexivity, democratic representation is pointedly made feminist to the extent to which the three feminist principles of inclusiveness, egalitarianism, and responsiveness are enacted during advocacy, deliberation, and accountability moments.[26]

The Advocacy Moment enacts:

Inclusiveness: when the interests, opinions, and perspectives of all relevant groups of women are voiced and heard, ensuring that women's partial and subjective views are forcefully articulated.

Responsiveness: when representatives of women can act as passionate and partial advocates, speaking in their voices and registers, and articulating the subjective conceptions of women's interests, of those experientially close to the issue.

Egalitarianism: when the representatives of women are treated, and are seen to be treated, with equal respect and consideration, and no a priori assumptions are made about which women and which interests should be privileged.

The Deliberation Moment enacts:

Inclusiveness: when all the interests, opinions, and perspectives articulated in the advocacy moment are taken and are seen to be taken into account as representatives debate and decide upon what is the fairest and most just decision.

Responsiveness: when representatives examine and take into account the relationship between the representation of subjective and partial interests and what constitutes just and fair decisions. Representatives must be open to transform their views on what is in the interests of women, rather than hold onto pre-existing positions that might very well be partial and gender unequal.

Egalitarianism: when all women's interests are considered and have the potential to affect the decision under consideration irrespective of political, socioeconomic, or cultural power hierarchies.

The Accountability Moment enacts:

Inclusiveness: when elected representatives' explanations and justifications are addressed to and are received by women in their diversity.

Responsiveness: when representatives engage with women's approval, contestation, and/or rejection of decisions. Only in this way will all women witness and experience reciprocity in the representative relationship and regard the institution as accountable to them.

Egalitarianism: when representatives give accounts in ways that give equal weight and consideration to the multiple and at times competing women's interests articulated during the earlier Advocacy Moment, as well as to the potential objections of various groups of women. Women in their diversity should see that their views and interests were taken seriously irrespective of the substantive outcome.

As we imagine political institutions in which newer democratic ideals are enacted in a feminist fashion, parliaments will look considerably different from the institutions of today. There is present an additional set of political representatives, the affected representatives of women. There are two new parliamentary practices—group advocacy and account giving—which occur at specified moments in the processes of formal political representation, sequenced to fundamentally transform representative processes, institutions, and relationships. As depicted in Figure 4.1, the twin practices are designed to transform how formal politics is done within our elected political institutions.

Anticipating the next two chapters, our new institutional practices provide for a representative process that is inclusive of the different and conflicting views and opinions among women. Together, group advocacy and account giving prompt elected representatives to behave in different ways. Democratic learning among the represented, and between the represented and the representatives, is fostered. Elected representatives are better positioned to discern what is fair and just for women; they engage with views and insights that are potentially new

and even strange to them and take these into account when they make decisions. Women's political participation in electoral politics would be reinvigorated, engendering feelings of recognition, belonging, and trust. This would be true across the diversity of women. Previously regarded as distant and mostly uninterested in women, our newly designed parliaments would become recognized by women as their "house," too.



Figure 4.1. The process of feminist democratic representation.

5

Affected Representatives, Group Advocacy, and Account Giving

The girl of five does not make any use of lateral space. She does not stretch her arm sideward; she does not twist her trunk; she does not move her legs, which remain side by side. All she does in preparation for throwing is to lift her right arm forward to the horizontal and to bend the forearm backward in a pronate position . . .

The ball is released without force, speed, or accurate aim . . .

A boy of the same age, when preparing to throw, stretches his right arm sideward and backward; supinates the forearm; twists, turns and bends his trunk; and moves his right foot backward. From this stance, he can support his throwing almost with the full strength of his total motorium . . .

The ball leaves the hand with considerable acceleration; it moves toward its goal in a long flat curve.

(Strauss 1966, cited in Young 1990b,141)

In *Feminist Democratic Representation* women take up much more space in our parliaments. It requires metaphorical room for maneuver, space for women to twist, turn, and bend; lift up their arms; pull back their shoulders; and harvest their collective power for a forceful throw.[1] We make this claim on parliamentary space by bringing in more representatives of women, and by adding new representative practices. Our design also reorients for its own ends existing representatives and existing representative moments, parliamentary deliberation, and decision-making. The target should be clear by now—the

good representation of women across all its dimensions and for all women: a political representation that is inclusive, egalitarian, and responsive to women in their ideological and intersectional diversity. We open with a defense of the affected representatives of women within our parliaments before describing how these representatives play particular roles within our two new institutional practices: group advocacy and account giving.

The Case for the Affected Representatives of Women

Key to our design is a new set of political actors, the affected representatives of women. We have said already a few things about who they are and what they do: they are the representatives of women in their diversity, they come from civil society, they do not replace or undermine the political presence of women elected representatives,[2] and they supplement rather than undertake the same representative work of elected representatives.[3] We have not as yet justified their designation as the *affected* representatives of women. We settled on this label after rejecting various alternatives: unelected, informal, self- and group-representatives. The first label risks overemphasizing the means by which the new representatives are chosen and seemingly rules out the possibility that some might very well be elected via women in civil society.[4] The second risks effacing the roles they might play that might be considered rather formal.[5] The third and fourth have the attraction of foregrounding women's experiences—and in so doing appeal to established gender and politics theory (Phillips 1995; Mansbridge 1999; Williams 1998; Young 2002). But they risked masking rather than recognizing women's diversity. Underpinned by the principle of the differently affected (an update of the all-affected principle, which we discuss further in this chapter), the designation *affected* draws attention to the heterogeneous experiences of women while not entirely losing the idea of self- and group representation: groups of women affected by the issue represent "themselves." By labeling these new representatives affected and linking this to the differently affected principle, the commitment to an intersectional approach to women's

representation is writ large. Moreover, through its association with emotions, *affected* speaks to the importance we attach to the affective and symbolic in politics.

Having explained the affected part of their title, we now turn to their designation as *representatives*. We could have been less radical in our design, merely expanding the role of women's civil society actors as spokespersons within our parliaments.[6] In our view, however, keeping them as spokespersons is highly problematic. Crudely, spokeswomen are rendered lesser political actors relative to elected representatives—less authoritative, impactful, and legitimate. It keeps paternal rule and political inequality in play, with attitudes about women's "helplessness and inferiority" (Williams 1998, 137) and equal ability to "do" politics unquestioned.[7] We have concerns, too, about what is specific about the concept of representation—that there is something special about the representative relationship. We are also, and fundamentally, concerned with questions of power.

Granting the affected representatives of women the status of representatives and giving them a formal, institutionalized role in the representative process makes them "equal of sorts" with elected representatives. If spokespersons are at the mercy of the goodwill of those sending out the invitations to our parliaments and who will have their own criteria for selection, the affected representatives of women are chosen by the women they represent. This critically undermines the gatekeeping role of the political elite—predominantly men—who tend to select those who are the least transformative and do so for reasons that may have nothing whatsoever to do with women's representation (Bjarnegård 2013; Celis and Erzeel 2017).[8] The right to decide who is made present under our design shifts power to women in society. Once present as representatives within parliaments, the affected representatives of women hold positional power—with institutional material, strategic, and symbolic resources—as well as active power—exercised *over* the elected representatives and *for* themselves, i.e., women's autonomy and self-determination (Celis and Lovenduski 2018, 153).[9] Affected representatives' active power over elected representatives is particularly important for mitigating the power imbalance in favor of elected representatives and anticipates institutional and individual resistance to any redistribution of power. As we will show, because they

publicly inform and judge elected representatives, affected representatives of women have greater power to change the behavior of elected representatives. In many ways, elected representatives are dependent upon, and vulnerable to, the views of the affected representatives, and the women in society they represent.

The introduction of affected representatives of women is fundamentally a response to contemporary considerations of women's heterogeneity and our commitment to an intersectional approach to political representation. It is a reply to the related claim of women's unrepresentable status: that women have different and, at times, competing interests, and that acknowledging this is to reject the very possibility of women's group representation in politics. As we stated in Chapter 3, rather than accepting the logic that women as a group must exit the representational stage because we cannot demonstrate a universal women's interest to be represented, women in their diversity must take up more, not less, political space. Furthermore, their presence is in line with the stance that differences and conflict between women need not be either imagined away or transcended but should become embedded in the parliamentary landscape of debate (Young 2002, 119; Urbinati 2006).

In this way, too, affected representatives address the creative turn in representation theory, which holds that a focus on our parliaments misses alternative, and sometimes more important, actors and sites of political representation. We challenge overly optimistic expectations that extra-parliamentary representative claims-makers will, usually without any specifying mechanism, generate an adequate or full response from elected representatives within our parliaments. There are simply insufficient incentives for the latter to do so. Nor do we accept that it does not matter if alternate representative claims for women remain outside of our legislative institutions as long as they are aired in civil society as part of the wider public political debate. Indeed, we think there are benefits to be gained through regular and formal representative relationships between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary actors. The formal institutions of representative democracy are "interdependent" representational sites characterized by a "division of labour" between types of representatives (Mansbridge et al. 2011): both have their own role to play. In providing for the presence of

affected representatives inside our legislatures, our institutional design is designed to create, following Saward (2010), a gendered economy of representative claims *within* our parliaments.

The Differently Affected Principle

The parliamentary presence of affected representatives is designed to fulfill what we term the *differently affected principle*. This is an intersectional update of the principle that the "all-affected" should participate in the decision-making processes of representative government made in both the gender and politics and democratic theory literature (Williams 1998, 242): "No policy can be judged fair if the process that produced it excluded a marginalized group that is affected by it" (Williams 1998, 172, 242; Montanaro 2012, 1099; Urbinati 2006, 2). In our incarnation, this is a claim for differently affected women representing themselves within our parliaments, albeit through a different medium, as affected representatives of women (Williams 1998). The differently affected principle, thus, revisits the link between political presence and representational outcomes. This is what prompted arguments for women's descriptive representation in the first place, or, more accurately, it was one of the reasons underpinning presence arguments that linked descriptive and substantive representation. In the early presence literature, the notion that elected male representatives could never act for women was never explicitly claimed. However, it was noted that in practice they mostly chose not to (Phillips 1995). This feminist critique was not only about men's reluctance to act for women, but it was also about their gendered experiences and gendered political interests, both of which differed from, and at times were in opposition to, women's. Where women's interests were not yet crystallized (Phillips 1995) and in situations of mistrust (Mansbridge 1999), men's willingness to substantively represent women well was considered to be lesser still. As Williams reminds us (1998, 193–94):

> . . . laws promulgated by male legislators, for example, are likely to affect the interests of men in a manner markedly different from the ways they affect the interests of women. . . . in an importance sense,

> legislators from dominant groups are *not* subject to the laws they pass . . . (emphasis in the original)

The inclusion of affected representatives of women addresses the inevitability that elected representatives, irrespective of their sex and gender, are at times experientially distanced from issues in ways that the affected representatives are not. Such a state of affairs is highly probable in situations of women's intra-group inequality. The risk of being misrepresented, or not represented at all when the interests of the representatives are not "affected by legislation in the same way" (Williams 1998, 167, 194), is not, it should be said, only about oppositional interests. The inclusion of affected representatives is warranted by much the same concerns regarding the ability of representatives who are not epistemologically and experientially close to issues to stand and act for women (Mansbridge 1999; Williams 1998, 132–33,142). Dovi (2002, 739–40), for instance, taking issue with Phillips, argues that theorists of self-representation insufficiently address elected representatives who are economically more privileged than those they represent. We would also remind the reader of Smooth's criticism of the "whiteness" of women's issues and interests, discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, we would draw attention once again to ideological differences among women.

When we state that group advocacy allows affected representatives to voice *their* situated knowledge, diversify existing conceptions of women's interests, and so have an effect on what is subsequently considered to be in the interests of women, critics might query that we have regressed into essentialist and deterministic understandings of links between the who and the what of representation. We are on record for querying simplistic claims about the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation (Childs and Krook 2006, 2008), and we continue to stand by this assertion; the same is true for any such conclusion that women's political presence guarantees any particular substantive outcomes (see Chapter 2). That said, we hold that women will only be better represented with a commitment to the public airing of differences among women, and that affected representatives are an important means of bringing alternate perspectives and views into our political institutions.

Identifying the Affected Representatives of Women

When should affected representatives of women be made present, and who should be represented in parliament by them? The first part of our answer has already been implied by our thoughts on women's misrepresentation: affected representatives of women are to be included in order to secure the presence of the poorly represented. Who should be included is, accordingly, something to be decided by politics, a point in line with previous conceptions of group representation. Young's earlier working guide remains instructive (1990b, 128, emphasis added):

> . . . whenever the group's history and social situation provide a *particular* perspective on the issues, when the interests of its members are *specifically affected*, and when its perceptions and interests are *not likely to receive expression* without that representation.

The second part of our answer draws more closely on theoretical considerations previously discussed in Chapter 4, that the inclusion of affected representatives of women is a flexible response to the changing political agenda of the day. They are made present to participate in the parliamentary representation of concrete political issues that affect particular (sub)groups in a polity at a specific moment in time and space. Accordingly, we do not specify how many affected representatives there should be. Affected representatives are to be identified anew for each issue, even if some may be included on more than one occasion if and when an issue they speak on returns to the legislative agenda. Affected representation in this way captures and brings into our parliaments the interests of differently affected women articulated in civil society, prompted by political and societal debate specific to a time and place.[10]

Claims for the inclusion of women's affected representatives, nevertheless, beg additional questions at the level of both the individual representatives and, as just noted, the particular sub-groups of women who merit this representation. We read Young's quote to more precisely identify *which women* should be made present. Such questions are to a great extent what we wish to see brought out into the open—to be part of political debate in civil society and within

our parliaments. At the general level and in practice, we would expect in particular locations that claims-makers for women, including those at the margins of civil society, will articulate their representational interests. Following creative theorists of representation, we have confidence in the abilities of women to become representable constituencies through political mobilization in civil society, even as we recognize substantial inequalities of political and other resources that mediate and constrain this. It may be the case that some demand inclusion as affected representatives of women. More frequently than is usually supposed, marginal groups do voice their concerns loudly. What are often thought of as "hard to reach groups" might be better labeled as "easy to ignore groups." These groups will often have strong ideas about what is in their interests and are, in fact, already speaking among themselves about these interests.[11] By their recognition and inclusion, extra-parliamentary claims-makers for women are no longer being positioned as the (seemingly) unknown or ignorable. Others may positively and pointedly eschew the parliamentary process or participate, but as avowedly "unrepresentative representatives," speaking only for themselves (Hayat 2019a).[12]

Under conditions of feminist democratic representation, it becomes the obligation of political institutions to engage in formal, regular, and multiple outreach activities to both capture the extra-parliamentary alternate—societal—site of women's political representation and connect it with the parliamentary (Urbinati 2006; Disch 2011; Young 2002; Mansbridge 2019). Elected representatives most definitely cannot just sit back and wait for affected representatives of women to knock on their door, bringing their political interests to the parliament. The burden of re-gendering formal politics is taken off women's shoulders and passed on to the institution. On the ground, parliaments' identification of affected representatives is messier than simply looking to "formal" civil society spokeswomen, given that they may not reflect women's diversity, and will likely reflect those women and women's organizations that are well resourced and powerful. Parliaments might seek support from those who already engage with and are aware of societal claims-makers for women, including, but not limited to, formal

and informal political party and women's organizations, gender experts such as femocrats, academics, public intellectuals, and journalists, and the variety of women's social media actors.

At the individual level, it is for those whom affected representatives claim to represent to determine who is best suited to stand and act for them at that specific moment, and to be made present in our parliaments. Whatever else, the identification of individual affected representatives lies with the represented. Indeed, their identification absolutely should not lie with formal political actors, whether these are elected representatives, political parties, or governments or civil servants; they must abstain from interfering. The "good" affected representatives of the differently affected will usually be descriptive representatives, fitting Dovi's category of preferable descriptive representatives, with "strong mutual relationships with dispossessed subgroups of historically disadvantaged groups" (Dovi 2002, 729).[13] The heightened attention to the quality of the representative relationship counters Williams' concerns regarding the rights of "internal minorities" (Williams 1998, 77). At other times the representatives might not be descriptive ones. Sometimes it might be an expert of some sort who is authorized to act and stand for the differently affected.[14]

Critics might yet query whether affected representatives of women can be considered democratic representatives (Montanaro 2012, 2019). Are we not risking creating a new class of political representatives who may not turn out to act in a representative fashion at all? As the now infamous examples of Bono or Bob Geldof "speaking for" Africa's poor suggests, there is something unnerving about those who make claims to speak for others in the absence of election (Severs 2010; Montanaro 2012, 2019). Upon what grounds are they authorized and, indeed, held to account (Urbinati and Warren 2008)? Our defense of the affected representatives of women is two-fold. First, we re-state our position that it is for women mobilizing around a particular issue, position, or perspective to determine who should represent them when parliament debates a law or topic that pertains to that group of women (see as noted previously, Young 2002); namely, it is a question of politics, and ultimately an empirical enquiry specific to a

time and place. The second and complementary answer we take from Dovi's (2002) discussion of the characteristics of the preferable representative that applies to both formal and informal representatives and from Montanaro's (2012) normative account of the democratic legitimacy of what she terms "self-appointed" representatives. We agree that all representatives must be recognized as such by those they seek to represent (Rehfeld 2005; Saward 2006; Dovi 2002) and that normative issues of transparency and accountability apply to all representatives, including the "informal" (Mansbridge 2002, 194). Sources of authority other than the ballot box, those residing in *inter alia*: institutional affiliation, the provision of intangible goods, social location, and formative experiences (Dovi 2007, 64–66), are justifiably acknowledged.[15] For Montanaro (2012, 1095), a self-appointed representative is:

> . . . "nondemocratic" if the constituency empowered to authorize and demand accountability is different from the constituency whose interests the representative claims affect . . . [and] democratically legitimate only to the degree that the affected [constituency] are empowered to authorize and hold accountable the self-appointed representative.

Given the formal role of the affected representatives in the representation process within democratic institutions, issues of recognition as representatives and transparency regarding their authorization and accountability are critical. What is necessary is that the affected constituency—those for whom our affected representative seeks representation—must be able to "accept or decline, and, or refine the [representative] claim that identifies it as an affected constituency, so exercising self-determination" (Montanaro 2012, 1099).[16] Montanaro's normative criteria admittedly beg empirical investigation in particular cases: the affected representatives of women brought into our parliaments as group advocates must, in other words, not (i) fail in their representation, i.e., neither provide political presence for, nor be authorized by, nor held accountable to, the affected constituency; (ii) offer skewed representation, i.e., provide presence and empowerment to the authorizing but not affected constituency;[17] or (iii) represent in a

surrogate fashion, i.e., provide presence but not empower the affected constituency.

The Case for Group Advocacy

Group advocacy is the first of our new parliamentary practices. Like its twin, it is designed to change the behavior of elected representatives in ways that redress the poverty of women's political representation. Group advocacy does this first, through correcting the underrepresentation of women's issues and interests that arise from the historical bias of political agendas that mirror the concerns and priorities of traditionally dominant groups in politics. Second, it attends to women's misrepresentation in politics: the tendency of political parties to focus on some and not all issues of concern to or that affect women, namely, those that bring electoral benefits because they marry parties' traditional constituencies and agendas and/or because they are responsive to the interests of the most powerful and resourced in society. The newly present affected representatives of women increase through their advocacy what Young calls "the store of social knowledge" available to elected representatives and specifically so vis-à-vis those most poorly represented at the moment (Young 2002, 83). Our first augmentation thereby changes the representational context and engenders a more comprehensive account of the political problems facing women in their diversity, as well as provides for a more extensive exploration of their possible solutions (Phillips 1995, 149). Indeed, it is characterized by competition over what is in the interests of women; it is an institutionalized moment for elected representatives to hear from the affected representatives of women. Group advocacy creates incentives[18] for elected representatives to behave in ways that better meet the representational needs of women in their diversity. Admittedly, it may not be sufficient on its own to transform elected representatives' subsequent deliberations and decisions—"hearing" may not be enough (Dobson 2014), but group advocacy is designed to work alongside account giving, our second augmentation, discussed subsequently.

Group Advocacy and Poverty of Women's Representation

To conclude that contemporary electoral politics fails to address the representational needs of women should not invite serious scholarly criticism; it is empirically verifiable. To restate: women's issues are frequently far down the political agenda, and those that are included in party programs and do find themselves at the center of political debate do not necessarily reflect the priorities of women, more specifically, the women most affected by them. Nor have first generation feminist institutional designs proved sufficient to either transform political institutions or their agendas. More equal descriptive representation, by sex quota or not, has rarely been achieved in numerical terms, and women elected representatives rarely reflect the diversity of women and women's experiences. Similarly, the establishment of gender machinery and women's policy agencies is frequently constrained by their political contexts and again has found it hard to feminize the political agenda (Ahrens 2018).

Group advocacy is neither a technocratic intervention to limit the tendencies of elected representatives to privilege other political concerns, nor does it rely upon imposing the representational responsibility onto women but not men representatives. Instead, it is designed to engender a greater attention to women's interests within our parliaments by elected representatives; it is about transforming the "what" of politics by ensuring that our political institutions and those who inhabit them make women's issues and interests core to the everyday deliberations of the institution. This is not about the goodwill of select elected representatives inviting a few more spokeswomen in when they deem it necessary or politically expedient, but about creating the formal, institutionalized inclusion of affected representatives of women within our parliaments. This practice is underpinned by a commitment to bring these affected representatives in—i.e., actively reach out and respond to them—because it is agreed that in their absence women will continue to be poorly represented, a state of play that is no longer deemed acceptable because it symbolizes a democratic failing. More strongly still, women's good representation is a necessary democratic good in itself, and there is, accordingly, an institutional imperative to do something about it.

The affected representatives of women are brought in to correct the political misrepresentation of women. They do this primarily by maximizing the gendered knowledge—formal and affective—available to elected representatives in advance of the latter deliberating among themselves and coming to decisions. Critically, group advocacy is about presenting elected representatives with the views of the differently affected, rather than assuming that there is either a single women's viewpoint on a particular issue, or that a few women's perspectives will suffice. Group advocacy is, then, the parliamentary moment in which elected representatives receive an exhaustive account of what is at stake for women. It unapologetically debunks any idea of there being a universal, common women's interest that our representatives simply need to act upon (see Chapter 1). It should also disabuse elected representatives of the notion that a singular reading of what is in women's interests as the interests of all women will suffice. The augmentation is not designed simply to bring in diversity for diversity's sake: difference and associated conflicts reveal the "structure of conflict" and are necessary for reaching good decisions (Young 2002; Urbinati 2006). Moreover, group advocacy explicitly recognizes, and seeks to overturn, women's intra-group differences that are structured by hierarchies of power. Committed as we are to an intersectional approach to political representation, any augmentation designed to improve women's representation must, at all times, be sensitive to the likelihood that the interests of the more privileged will predominate. Group advocacy ensures that elected representatives will be fully informed and cannot claim ignorance when they later deliberate and decide. As Williams (1998, 242) suggested nearly two decades ago, no policy can be judged fair if the process that produced it excluded a marginalized group that is affected by it, nor can it be considered fair when they systematically reproduce the inequality of historically marginalized groups.

The Importance of Advocacy

Bringing in affected representatives of women into our parliaments via our first augmentation serves a clear substantive purpose and takes a specific form: to *advocate* for those they represent, unashamedly

speaking for them. As such, they constitute a challenge to traditional understandings of how representatives should behave in representative democracies. The principled advocate is often viewed negatively by theorists and practitioners of democracy, especially by those of a more deliberative bent (Phillips 1995; Mansbridge et al. 2011; Dovi 2007). They are regarded as an obstacle to effective debate and decision-making because a principled advocate is unbending in her position and is unwilling to moderate or even change her view. There is much in these arguments vis-à-vis elected representatives and how they should behave when they engage in parliamentary debate—we, too, want our elected representatives to be good deliberators, as in recent representative and institutional turn in democratic theory. In order for this to happen, however, we contend that affected representatives of women first need to act as advocates in the group advocacy moment. To avoid misunderstanding, when we talk about the importance of advocacy we are talking about a different set of representatives—the affected representatives of women—and the mode of political engagement appropriate to them. In the first place, constraining the affected representatives of women when they put to elected representatives what it is that they see as women's interests risks perpetuating all over again women's misrepresentation. Disallowing strong advocacy in the parliamentary moment that critically precedes elected representatives' deliberation and decision-making will simply render elected representatives ignorant once again of the diversity, and at times competition, over what is in women's interests.

Having already agreed with Young (2002, 7, emphasis added) that advocacy is not "*nothing but* the assertion of self-regarding interest," we also agree that women, especially marginalized women whose representation has hitherto not been fully met, even in the face of (some) women's descriptive representation, would almost certainly benefit from representatives who exclusively advocate on their behalf (see Urbinati 2006, 42–44; Dovi 2007, 90–91). Our claims here echo contentions made in the first-generation politics and gender literature that while men could, in principle, advocate for women, they might not be the most forceful advocates (Phillips 1995; see also Urbinati 2006, 123). For us, the importance of advocacy goes beyond the content of the representative claim to include its form. How affected representatives

advocate matters for two key reasons: (i) because without speaking in their own voices, their ability to put forward what they want will be reduced; and (ii) because it risks limiting the potential to have an effect on elected representatives.[19] Our thinking here about the form of advocacy enacted by our affected representatives reflects earlier feminist critiques of deliberation, outlined in Chapter 1, which displaced the traditional rational deliberator in favor of an emotive, attached, partial, and subjective one, who speaks in their own voice and reflects their particular lived experiences.

Incentivizing Elected Representatives' Behavior

Affected representative's advocacy confronts elected representatives with new and diverse representative claims for and about women; they will "hear" what these advocates have to say because their presence is formalized and routine, that is, institutionalized. However, we also want to prompt something more from the elected representatives than good listening (Dobson 2014; Mansbridge 2019). We seek the *fostering* of interest and opinion transformation on behalf of the elected representatives when this is required to ensure that decisions are just and fair to women. Elected representatives are not always predisposed to act in this way, but our first augmentation offers some incentives to them.[20] To be sure, they are party politicians first and foremost, and where they have views on women's issues and interests, these are likely to reflect their ideological identities and other privileges. In some instances, men may well also be gender biased in men's favor because this protects their individual and/or group interests (even if they do not see it in this way). Yet, in drawing attention to the partiality of elected representatives' initial positions and goals, privileged, masculinized interests may become less secure. Furthermore, as alternative and competing voices interact with them, elected representatives may become less certain or at least recognize that theirs is no longer the only legitimate take on a particular issue, policy, or legislation.

By being exposed to the affected representatives' advocacy, elected representatives' knowledge will have objectively increased, irrespective of whether they are descriptive representatives; there is, however,

more to the group advocacy augmentation than even this. Much has to do with affected representatives advocating passionately, fervently, and in ways that are tangible to the elected representatives. For all these reasons, and operating in conjunction with its twin, group advocacy increases the chances that elected representatives will "feel" the strength of the differently affected argument, and that they will take this experience with them when they later deliberate and decide among themselves. The quality of affected representatives' arguments should be better recognized hereafter, even though the elected representatives may be very differently situated from the affected representatives, and the latter's experiences quite foreign to them.

The Case for Account Giving

Having already put women's interests to elected representatives, the affected representatives of women have another formal part to play in the parliamentary process once elected representatives have deliberated and decided. Designed like its twin, account giving is part of the normal representative process wherein elected representatives explain and justify their decisions as they relate to the concrete issue being debated and decided upon in the parliament. The affected representatives of women are formally positioned not simply to receive elected representatives' account, but in exchanges with the elected representatives to question, probe, seek justifications, and not only to be persuaded of the justness of decisions but also to be seen to do so by those outside of the institution. They give account and are in receipt of a judgment in conditions of publicity (following Young 2002). If our first augmentation, group advocacy, provides for self-advocacy, its twin, account giving, provides for its complement, self-judgment. It has a process and a content dimension. When one has moved away from eliding women being well represented with their substantive representation, judgment must include consideration of how decisions were made and not just of the decision or outcomes themselves. Account giving, moreover, requires that elected representatives justify their decisions attendant to women in their diversity; the affected

representatives of women in front of them are themselves reflective of the differently affected.

Accountability and the Poverty of Women's Representation

At present women are poorly served by existing modes of accountability linked to our political institutions.[21] At its most basic, democratic elections are supposed to ensure that our representatives represent us. Yet a single vote in an election every four or five years seems far from sufficient. As accountability mechanisms, elections must, in any case, be considered in context. An extensive political science literature illustrates how electoral systems, political geography, and party politics mediate the relationship between an individual's vote and the outcome of elections (Katz forthcoming 2020; Dalton forthcoming 2020; van der Brug et al. forthcoming 2020). The first-generation presence literature drew attention to how descriptive representation brings another layer of complexity to the relationship between representation and accountability. Women are not captured by electoral constituencies but spread across them; long-standing concerns about the lack of any simple correlation between representatives' characteristics and action remain compelling when applied to sex and gender.[22] Party identity and gendered institutions are just two key mediating factors. Bar relying on essentialism, or trust, there is no room in the concept of descriptive representation for holding women representatives to account (Voet 1992; Rao 1998). More concretely, there are usually no additional accountability mechanisms in party democracies by which descriptive representatives can be held to account by those they mirror (Phillips 1995; Voet 1992, 397).[23] While Dovi (2007) was absolutely right to argue that "any women" representatives will not do, her normative account of preferable descriptive representatives, as far as we are aware, has not been subject to empirical research. Nor has it been accompanied by a consideration of new mechanisms of accountability that might be introduced into the practices of existing representative democracies and give rise to such relationships, or of what

concrete forms relationships between the represented and good representatives might take.

It might be that in some cases women representatives from a particular party are formally or informally accountable to their party's women members through internal party organization procedures, rules and/or norms. However, this is not the same as saying that they are accountable to women voters in their constituencies, or to the women who voted for them via a party list (Phillips 1995, 189). Accountability becomes even more complicated if we hold that there should also be a representative relationship between descriptive representatives and women more generally, including, that is, individual women who did not directly vote for the descriptive representative, women voters in general, or the feminist women's movement or other organized women's interest groups. In sum, women's descriptive representation leaves us asking "which women" elected representatives should be accountable to.

The need for *institutional* reforms to strengthen accountability has been a long-standing claim. Young sought the involvement of self-organized groups voicing their analysis within an "institutionalized context" decades ago (2002, 131; 1990b, 124; Montanaro 2012; Warren 2019; Mansbridge 2019). Following her lead, we contend that the political representation of women will be better when mechanisms of accountability are recognized as a responsibility of the representative institution qua institution, when these mechanisms are formally and publicly institutionalized into the everyday life of a parliament's representative processes. In being concerned with providing greater accountability mechanisms, we are not alone (Lovenduski 2019). Lisa Disch (2011, 2012),[24] argues that a representative process can be judged to be more or less democratic insofar as it is reflexive and seeks "structured ways of taking objections into account" and the "provision of formal response that at least registers (if not necessarily incorporates) popular challenges" (2011, 111). Like us, there is then an expectation that representative processes are characterized by contestation and dissent (Severs 2010; Celis 2012, 2006). In her use of the terms formal and structured, and her consideration of interlocking assemblies, Disch (2011), too, looks to representative processes, and within this to political institutions (drawing on Urbinati 2006).[25] Even so, there is very

much more to be done in terms of thinking through how her conception of democratic representation might be operationalized, and much more to be said about what goes on within parliaments.

Incentivizing Elected Representatives' Behavior

Our second augmentation specifically seeks to influence the behavior of elected representatives when they deliberate and make decisions. There is an important temporal dimension. As elected representatives engage in these debates and decisions, they should reflect upon the advocacy they have heard cognizant of the requirement to answer directly to the affected representatives and to do so in a substantive fashion. Account giving is a formal, public, and routine part of the representative process. Herein lies the enhanced likelihood of better representative acts.

To maximize the anticipatory effects of accountability (Bovens 2007), we require an institutionalized process that by design involves fulsome deliberation between elected representatives and the judgment of their decisions, and for this to take place within our parliaments. We conceive of account giving as a parliamentary "reading-back" moment (following Saward 2006), the formalization of recursive communication (following Mansbridge 2019), and reflexivity in representative institutions (following Disch 2011). This should involve the comprehensive and serious consideration of the interests of the differently affected (as we suggested in Chapter 4; Williams 1998, 142; Young 2002). As those who receive the account, the affected representatives of women are positioned in an exchange with elected representatives. They interact as equals of sorts, and as such their efficacy is enhanced because their judgment is required for the legitimate process of representation to have taken place; they are central to the parliament's accountability procedure. However, as we discuss in this chapter, this does not extend to the right to veto elected representatives' decisions (Young 1990b), rendering them akin to decision-makers, an exclusive role we leave to elected representatives. That said, account giving is an institutionalized moment that provides for Disch's (2012, 219; 2011, 107) "disidentification" or a "not in our name" judgment (drawing on

her reading of Pitkin, 1967), or Dovi's (2015) "naysaying."[26] With these possibilities in play, the elected representatives, because of the wider publicity associated with their decisions and the response to these decisions by the affected representatives, will be encouraged to do their best by women.

When our parliaments are less the aggregation of elected interests, but more their deliberation, elected representatives cannot be bound by prior mandates, whether they are party, electoral, or some other ones; they must be freed, as Phillips put it, from "stricter notions of accountability" (Phillips 1995, 156, 159). Knowing that their decisions will be subject to a parliamentary assessment by affected representatives of women, as well as through extra-parliamentary evaluation by women, elected representatives should be encouraged to act as good representatives. They will also be better informed—note that advocacy by affected representatives ensures that elected representatives can engage in parliamentary debate over what is in the best interests of women in light of the diversity of views on a particular issue. Ultimately, the elected representatives' deliberations will have to make a decision, a process that may in the absence of consensus include decision-making by parliamentary votes on the basis of a majority (Mansbridge 1999).[27]

Importantly, account giving is not a voluntary act undertaken by only some elected representatives, it is a new and institutionalized parliamentary moment required of *all* elected representatives.[28] Scholars, and arguably the media and the public, too often slip into thinking that it is only descriptive representatives who should be held to account for what they have done or not done "for" women. This is one of the mistaken assumptions linked to the acclaimed relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation. Such assumptions have, in practice, given rise to criticism of women representatives for failing women, while simultaneously implying that non-descriptive elected representatives ought not be held to the same standard. In other words, it implies that non-descriptive representatives are not responsible for whether women are well represented or not (Phillips 1991, 166). As we have made clear already, we have no truck with such views. Women's representation should be considered a responsibility of all representatives and, in turn, a responsibility of the representative processes and institution overall. The women voters might still ask

whether women representatives are delivering good—fair and just—representation because of the strength of their personal assumptions about women politicians' roles in representing women. Additionally, it might be the case in practice that women elected representatives do more of the gendered representational work, but neither possibility should detract from the overall institutional responsibility for elected representatives to engage in deliberation that reflects the voices of diverse women and for them to make just and fair decisions.

In involving all elected representatives, account giving recognizes not only that these representatives are collectively engaged in deliberation and decision-making, but also that in so doing that they will no doubt have to broker, negotiate, and compromise with each other during their discussions (Warren 2019, 57). At least some of them will almost certainly be compelled to moderate or revise their initial positions in light of representations made by affected representatives at the group advocacy stage. Moreover, in practice the deliberation and decision-making stage will also likely be characterized by all sorts of ideological cleavages and differences of opinion about what is in the interests of women and what, therefore, should be done. Account giving provides a platform for elected representatives to give voice to these opinions and undertake more deliberative representation even in institutions that we historically think of as aggregative and adversarial. Distinct from seeking to exclude elected representatives who at the outset are not predisposed to representing women, our second augmentation requires that representatives collectively, as well as individually, are "in the room" defending their decisions. In this way, the possibility for the "political re-education" of elected representatives regarding women's interests arises.[29]

Account giving can be thought of as a collective endeavor in which elected representatives *as a group of legislators* defend their actions. With affected representatives empowered to engage in discussions with the elected representatives over the decisions made, the accounts rendered by elected representatives cannot be slight or partial. Or, put another way, any individual representative tempted to engage in such behavior will likely find themselves not only challenged by the affected representatives of women, but may also be subject to horizontal accountability from other elected representatives (Dovi 2007,

140). In other words, their peers may query the accuracy, fullness, and veracity of their account by offering their own "take" on what came to pass during the deliberation and decision-making phase (where only elected representatives are in play). In assessing elected representatives' actions, the affected representatives of women will be able to compare competing accounts given by different representatives. Accordingly, elected representatives who might have once preferred not to engage in questions of women's political representation or who managed to avoid any existing accountability pressures (perhaps by being male and being "let off," or simply by absenting themselves from discussions of women's issues within parliamentary debates) will, via the possibility of other elected representatives and affected representatives holding them to account in this institutional moment, recognize the necessity of participating in the account giving moment.

The Standard: Just and Fair Decisions

Any process of accountability implies that there is a standard against which particular actors, in our case elected political representatives, are to be held (Rubenstein 2007; Grant and Keohane 2005). Following Young (2002), we ask whether elected representatives have deliberated and decided in a fair and just manner. What counts as fair and just is not pre-defined. We have rejected the standard substantive representation, defined as policy congruence with organized women's movements or feminists, because of the creative work undertaken by elected representatives during the formal representation process (Disch 2011). Elected representatives must have some autonomy to revise their initial preferences[30] without which they cannot engage in the more deliberative form of politics desired by contemporary advocates of representative democracy (Mansbridge et al. 2010; Urbinati 2006). The constitution of women's interests is central to what it is that affected representatives consider as they engage with the account given to them by elected representatives. Indeed, it is precisely this new deliberative work in the stage between our twin augmentations that must be subject to our new accountability standard. It is in this respect that we added and, indeed, emphasize the second part to our standard: the

"quality of the deliberative process" that gives rise to particular outcomes (Severs 2010, 417). Conceived as an interactive rather than a top-down moment, account giving empowers women's affected representatives to call out unfair parliamentary processes.

In more concrete language, we would expect in the account giving moment affected representatives to be asking of elected representatives the following broad questions: What is the nature of their response to the claims of the affected representatives as voiced in the group advocacy moment? What was taken into account during parliamentary deliberation? What, and whose, values or interests were considered, and which prevailed? To what extent were the deliberations among elected representatives, as they prepared to make a decision, inclusive of the representations made by the differently affected? In what ways, and for what reasons, did elected representatives make their decisions, and how did they come to their final position? Was there a shift by individual elected representatives, and collectively, in their understanding of what is in the interests of women? If so, on what basis? The affected representatives ask whether they privileged some women's interests for unjustifable reasons, thereby treating the affected representatives of women unequally. In hearing the elected representatives' account, affected representatives will be preparing to probe the answers provided by questioning if they reflect the fairest and most just outcome for women, and the premises upon which their conclusions were drawn.

In order for decisions to be interrogated by the affected representatives of women, there has to be some attention to the content of decisions (Urbinati 2006, 133). To do otherwise is to risk rendering what women perceive as in their interests totally irrelevant to the quality of women's good representation.[31] We fully agree with Severs that there is a danger of eliding elected representatives' claims to represent women with representing women, and of the represented erroneously "feeling represented" (Severs 2010, 411; see also Disch 2011, 2012).[32] Extending her argument further, and in the light of our commitment to judge representatives' acts that include but are both more than, and indivisible from, substantive ones, any assessment of the quality of the representative process most go beyond "identifying patterns of congruence." Similarly, while she explores the "when" of accountability (talking of the locus of judgment, *ex fundo* and *ex alto*),

we attend to questions of where accountability takes place, namely, its institutional site.

At stake in the account giving moment is whether elected representatives succeed in persuading the affected representatives of women (and indirectly through them, women in society) of the fairness and justice of their deliberations and decisions. Account giving incentivizes an appeal by elected representatives to "higher principles" than self-interest: the desire to be recognized for having adjudicated fairly (Dovi 2007), to be able to justify one's position (Williams 1998, 145, 222, 227; Young 2002, 115).[33] Cognizant of power inequalities between the represented and elected representatives, our second augmentation is advanced in full recognition that accountability is harder to secure for "weak groups" (Williams 1998, 149–50; and Rubenstein 2007).[34] Reference to Pitkinian fears about symbolic representation once again informs our thinking. Severs is unconvinced, for example, that Saward can differentiate instances of "feeling represented" and "having one's interests represented" (Severs 2010, 416).[35] How might our augmentation fare? We posit that account giving gives more weight to existing power inequalities in society. In the first instance, the presence of affected representatives in parliament qua representatives affords them the status of peers relative to those who are elected. We referred to this previously as an "equality of sorts." Moreover, in both group advocacy and account giving, elected representatives are physically made present alongside affected representatives of women within the parliament and are, thus, unable to avoid (at least without consequences) being held to account. The affected representatives are also institutionally rendered active interrogators of the elected representatives. With these conditions in place, if a "provisional acceptance" by the affected representatives arises (see Young 2002, 44; Warren 2019), we would be inclined to conclude that the second augmentation has been successful.

Subjecting elected representatives' actions and decisions to the questioning of the affected representatives makes transparent parliamentary deliberation and decision-making that are traditionally hidden (one of the infamous "black boxes" of politics). In so doing, it acts as an incentive to attitudinal and behavioral change on behalf of elected representatives. The meaning of incentives is important here.

The elected representatives are not forced to change their attitudes and behavior, as they would were our affected representatives of women wielding Young's veto, but they are encouraged to do so in order to meet the representational needs of those they represent, because there are consequences for elected representatives who are not considered to have acted in a just and fair manner. Most significantly, because it takes place within parliaments, our second augmentation is characterized by its formal status, a high degree of legitimacy and extra-parliamentary visibility. For these reasons we consider the consequences significantly stronger than that currently realized in representative institutions. We suggest, too, that account giving meets Dovi's (2015) concern that "vulnerable citizens' voices" are "received" and not just heard without an explicit sanctioning mechanism.[36]

In account giving, elected representatives' attentions are not only directed to the particular, but also to the live audience of the affected representatives of women alongside them within parliament. Through the reactions and responses of affected representatives—judged by how they give their account of the quality of representation provided by their elected peers—the represented are indirectly "brought into" parliament. In such a high-profile, public moment, media coverage should enable women beyond parliament to see and learn about what is going on within it. It creates the condition for citizens to make autonomous, considered, reflective, and robust judgments (Warren 2019, 40, 45; Mansbridge 2009, 391; Runciman 2007). In these ways, new and more substantive accountability mechanisms are put in place for women in society to better hold elected representatives to account thereafter. In an immediate sense, the represented are able to sanction directly via their affected representatives, and indirectly via public comment and civil society mobilization, those elected representatives whom they consider poor in light of the decisions that have just been made, as well as the process that surrounded them. Their judgment will also be of the institution qua representative institution.

Critically, account giving and the opportunities it offers are prior to any subsequent formal sanction via elections that could significantly be many years away. More concretely, the affected representatives of women, and the women they seek to represent, might: call out the elected representatives as unjust and partial in their deliberations, acting too much in

the style of the adversarial or aggregative democrat, for example; mobilize and protest the elected representatives' decisions as unjustifiably partial and unfair, privileging for no good reason one group over another; and, working via their affected representatives, urgently demand that the elected reconsider their decision, thus signaling a new phase of the iterative process of representation. In these ways account giving then holds out the potential of closing what Warren (2019, 58) terms "the loop" between discursive accountability based on reason giving within the institution and sanction-based accountability based on elections. It institutionalizes Young's goal that the represented and the representatives "each carry traces of the history of [representative] relationships" and anticipate "future relationships" so that the representative relationship is "maintained over time" (Young 2002, 127; see also Urbinati 2006, 22).

An Initial Defense of Affected Representatives and Our Twin Practices

Critics will no doubt pose searching questions as to why the presence of affected representatives of women and our new practices might be preferable to other possible ways of redressing women's poverty of representation. We have already ruled out extending the role of spokespersons for women in our parliaments. We could have called for a fixed presence for women elected representatives, as another possibility.[37] *Reserved seats*, sometimes considered a type of sex quota in politics, would guarantee a set percentage of women in parliament and, if designed specifically to ensure the presence of particular subgroups of women, would recognize women's heterogeneity. Elected women representatives brought into a parliament via reserved seats would be formally equal to other elected representatives, and in principle positioned within the legislature to fully participate in all parliamentary business. Reserved seats are a particularly good means of establishing a direct electoral accountability mechanism between women representatives and the women they represent, at least in cases where electoral seats are filled via a women's electorate. Yet, we resist this call. For one thing, reserved seats are neither popular in theory, nor a widely employed means of sex quota for women politics in practice.[38] They are most frequently associated with non-, or weaker,

democracies.[39] More importantly, we reject reserved seats because they are accompanied by a high risk of essentialism and fragmentation, and as identified by first-generation scholars they fail to acknowledge women's multiple identities and risk (re)constructing silos between women (Phillips 1995). We do not consider that they meet our commitment to an intersectional approach to women's representation. Reserved seats are also a "permanent solution," electing a group of women for the parliamentary term. This stands in tension with our commitment to the differently affected principle, which calls for a more flexible solution as political issues come onto the political agenda. Reserved seats, moreover, risk creating (or giving rise to the perception of) different classes among elected representatives that can and, indeed, have proven to be problematic in practice (Zetterberg 2008b). Reserved seats may very well enhance the risk of women representatives' secondary marginalization and associated lesser effectiveness within legislatures.

Random lot might be regarded as a better alternative (Allen 2018). As noted in Chapter 1, we have our doubts. First, it relies (to all intents and purposes) upon a simple division between women and men. Second, it does not address the political reality that issues affect some groups more than others and in different ways (Mansbridge 2002, 193). Third, random lot does not necessarily guarantee the "good" representative, simply because who becomes present could, by definition, just as easily be randomly bad or mediocre. Furthermore, we query whether lottery really results in "representation"—those being represented have no say over who stands and acts for them. There is very little in lottery that would suggest that the interests of the differently affected will be voiced. Nor does it say anything about the ability of those selected to transform their preferences, so that just and fair decisions can be made.

Then there is Young's aforementioned *veto*. Given the renewed emphasis placed on accountability by our second practice, her suggestion made back in the 1990s could be revived. This would give women the institutional means to block a particular women's policy or legislative intervention that directly affects them (Young 1990b, 124).[40] While we recall our younger selves being rather tempted by this, we now reject it. If Young came to consider her institutional innovation problematic nearly two decades ago (Young 2002, 144, fn. 27; Dovi 2002, 732; Williams 1998, 224–25), a commitment to an explicitly intersectional

approach to gender and politics magnifies just how problematic it always was. When ideological and intersectional differences among women are at the base of considerations of women's political representation, the question of who gets to wield the "women's veto," how to decide between groups of women in the face of competing claims to use it, is even more difficult to answer (Williams 1998, 225).[41] In short, contemporary arguments about women's heterogeneity levied against women's group representation, in principle, render the practice of a women's veto even more suspect.

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Feminist Democratic Representation holds that women's group representation should be reimagined and designed for. The way in which we seek to design today's parliaments takes the form of calling for the formal and institutionalized political presence of affected representatives of women. These play distinct roles within our parliaments, provided for by two new practices to the representation parliamentary process. Our first provides for group advocacy in the "input phase." Its twin, account giving, provides for judgment in the "output phase." Complementing each other, they together work to make the "throughput phase"—the deliberation and decisions by elected representatives—better meet the representational needs of women. Both practices are designed specifically to make elected representatives reflect upon women's diverse conceptions of what is in their interests: group advocacy "brings into" parliament differently affected women through the presence of affected representatives; similarly, these affected representatives of women *themselves* pass judgment on the quality of representation offered by elected representatives on behalf of the women they represent. In the cyclical process of advocacy, deliberation and decision-making, and account giving, the affected representatives' judgment of whether elected representatives have deliberated and decided in a just and fair manner feeds into subsequent consideration of the concrete women's issue decided upon (and other closely associated issues) by elected representatives. Over time, our practices work in an iterative fashion to create conducive contexts for elected representatives to better meet the representative interests of women.

6
The Promise of Feminist Democratic Representation

In July 2018, Dr. Christine Blasey Ford accused President Trump's Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh of serious sexual assault.[1] Among other things related to this disclosure, we were viscerally struck by the "lift moment," the occasion when, in the wake of senate hearings into Kavanaugh's nomination, Senator Jeff Flake was confronted by two women. Ana Maria Archila and Maria Gallagher, both of whom were survivors of sexual assault, demanded the senator explain his support for Kavanaugh. This was undoubtedly great TV: a man in power rendered mute and immobile, even if only momentarily so. In the encounter, Flake was face to face with the differently affected. "Look at me when I speak," Archila decried. The senator

was physically trapped; the lift's entrance was blocked by the women and accompanying camera crews. If he had pressed the button to close the doors, Flake would have looked like he was fleeing. It would have been terrible optics. The Senator was thus *forced* to hear what he otherwise would have chosen to avoid. The women stated their interest on camera, "what you are doing is allowing someone who actually violated a woman to sit on the Supreme Court." They demanded to know why Flake backed Kavanaugh. There were cameras everywhere; the footage is on the Internet for posterity.[2] The senator could not pretend he was not witness to what they had said.

This gendered encounter has all the hallmarks of an inversion of traditional power relations between a male politician and women who will be affected by his decisions. Subsequent to what *The Guardian* called "one of the most important elevator pitches in memory," Flake later "stunned the room by saying that he would only support Kavanaugh if there was a delay of up to a week for a further FBI investigation into Ford's allegations."[3] Be that as it may, the lift moment must ultimately be considered a failure of women's political representation. Most obviously, Kavanaugh was appointed to the Supreme Court. Descriptive representation had not been enough: Ford's testimony before 17 male and 4 women senators was symbolic of male-dominated and masculinized politics. For Archila and Gallagher, the substantive outcome was negative.

If the encounter was a failure, why draw attention to it? We do so because it captures the essence of what we consider to be at the heart of women's good representation in politics, namely, the direct engagement by elected representatives with the political interests of women; at its very core, a moment of advocacy and accountability. It exemplifies the feminist accusation that when elected representatives lack information, unfairly adopt partial positions, and/or prioritize other interests, women's poverty of representation is almost certain. Archila and Gallagher wanted a gender-just outcome in the face of what they considered gender injustice. They challenged the senator's knowledge base and demanded that he reconsider his opinion in light of their experiences as survivors of sexual violence. Flake could be under no illusions that he would be making a decision in the full knowledge that these and other women would subject him to public

scrutiny. It mattered immensely to us that here were women directly affected by the nomination of the Supreme Court judge—against whom allegations of sexual violence had been made—putting their experiences and interests directly to an elected representative.

What *Feminist Democratic Representation* does better than this chance encounter is the establishment of routine and regular interactions between affected and elected representatives in our parliaments. It is through detailing the representational effects of our feminist institutional design and showing how group advocacy and account giving engender women's good political representation that we make a substantive defense of our design. This chapter describes *ideal* outcomes: *Feminist Democratic Representation* imagined. Rejecting a disaggregated conception of representation, we still speak to women's descriptive and substantive representation as part of ideal representation effects. However, we conceive of them fully interlaced with symbolic and affective representation. As we have argued, in contexts of contestation over what is in the interests of women, not all women can have their interests met when this is narrowly defined in terms of a single dimension of representation. Nonetheless, under our design women can be in receipt of "good" representation because our approach evaluates how the represented experience the quality of the representative process, and in terms of representation defined in the round. The ideal representational effects are broader, then, than simply descriptive and substantive: they include effects relating to affinity, trust, legitimacy, symbolism, emotions, and affect. They manifest in stronger representative relationships among women in society, greater support for the procedures, institutions, and substantive outputs of representative politics on the ground, and at a higher level, to the idea of representative democracy.

To determine more specifically the nature of these representational effects, we ask a series of new questions. In what ways have the "what," "by whom," and "how" of political representation changed? How do the represented experience and feel about the quality of political representation under feminist, democratic representative processes, and their attendant institutional contexts? Do new forms of representation reframe relationships between the represented and their representative institutions, and among the represented? If so, in what ways, and

with what outcomes? Do both the represented and the elected representatives now consider parliaments as a critical site, and do they think in new ways about what makes for a good representative process therein? In answering these questions, we first consider ideal representational effects on elected representatives, whose parliamentary and representative behavior our interventions are designed to transform, and second, the represented, who we wish to experience (objectively and subjectively) better representation.

Feminist Democratic Representation and the Elected Representatives

The failure of elected representatives to stand and act for women as they go about their parliamentary business is the defining characteristic of what we have termed *women's poverty of representation*. Their failure has multiple causes: denial that women merit political representation as a group, little acknowledgment of women's gendered political interests, and a tendency to resist systemic responsibility to represent women. If these are, albeit crudely, the long-standing criticisms leveled at male-dominated and masculinized political institutions, contemporary attention to women's differences extends this criticism to parliaments even when they are composed of a greater percentage of women elected representatives. As we have made clear, descriptive representatives of women might not consider themselves sharing an obligation to represent women for ideological or other electoral reasons. And those elected representatives with good intentions—whether descriptively representative or not—may find that their good intensions are not enough because they inhabit highly partisan and masculinized institutions.

The necessity of transforming elected representatives' attitudes and behavior is clear. Repeatedly, we have spoken of the importance of elected representatives engaging in greater deliberation over women's issues and making just and fair decisions for women. To transform the institutional contexts within which they act, our twin augmentations of group advocacy and account giving enable and incentivize elected representatives to both know and care more about the representational

issues and interests of women. Additional representation benefits flow from these critical changes in elected representatives' attitudes and behavior: a better connection is established with women in society not only in terms of the changed content of elected representatives' deliberations but also regarding how they deliberate within and communicate beyond the institution. In engaging in these new representational activities, and undertaking them in different ways, elected representatives, moreover, come to see and appreciate the importance of women's meaningful political presence and, within this, how diverse women and their interests are central to political institutions.

Knowledgeable and Caring Representatives

Our augmentations maximize available knowledge, knowledge that is necessary for elected representatives to engage in an exploratory, recursive, and reflexive politics about what is just and fair for women (Phillips 1995; Mansbridge 2019; Disch 2011). The acquisition of knowledge about women's issues and interests occurs as affected representatives advocate prior to elected representatives' deliberations and decision-making. But it also continues post deliberation, as elected representatives account for their decisions and, in turn, receive judgment from the affected representatives. The identity of those who merit elected representatives' attention expands in light of the institutional requirement to hear and answer to the representatives of the differently affected. Affected representatives who advocate within political institutions are no longer limited to the well-organized, the well-resourced, or most vocal. The new parliamentary encounters between elected and affected representatives capture to a much greater extent the diversity of views regarding a particular women's issue, policy, or legislative intervention. Multiple claims will inevitably and by design be aired. Like Senator Flake, elected representatives can no longer turn the other cheek and pretend otherwise. Parliaments will bear witness to—and give recognition to—the observation that there is rarely a universal representative claim for women.

Elected representatives should better appreciate the deep role that gender plays as an organizing structure of society, and that far from

marginal, gender is central to mainstream political debate. They will have gained intersectional insights; differential power relations create positions of relative privilege and marginalization among women. Elected representatives have, thus, become more knowledgeable about alternative perspectives. But they have also become more cognizant of how the differently affected feel about the issues under discussion. When elected representatives deliberate following affected representative's advocacy, and in future moments of group advocacy and account giving, they will both be better appraised of attendant political debates, be more aware of women's different viewpoints, and appreciate why particular issues or interests are advanced.

Our augmentations not only educate, but they also stimulate elected representatives to do something with that new knowledge, to care about the represented and to act accordingly. This promises to bring about the kind of attitudinal and behavioral change on behalf of elected representatives that is widely acknowledged as one of the biggest barriers to representing women well: the tendency of men not to act for women. Five features of our design engender such a transformation: (i) exposure to the direct and lived experiences of the represented via affected representatives; (ii) the constitution of affected representatives *as* representatives, equal of sorts with elected representatives; (iii) the formal and public character of account giving; (iv) the institutionalization of our augmentations as part of the routine and iterative practices of our parliaments; and (v) the collective responsibility of elected representatives.

Group advocacy and account giving are "close encounters" between elected and affected representatives—they are in the same room, face to face.[4] The unrestrained advocacy and judgment of affected representatives brings the representational interests of differently affected women to elected representatives in ways distinct from abstract, detached, and dry knowledge acquisition. In their direct exposure to affected representatives, they face an embodied, "concrete other" (Benhabib 1992), speaking with emotion and passion (Young 2002), and accompanied by affective gestures (Kantola 2018). Such interactions encourage elected representatives to open their hearts and minds to the factual and affective knowledge that affected representatives bring to parliamentary discussions. The differently affected are

made "conversationally" and "imaginatively present" in the minds of the elected representatives when they deliberate; they come to populate the "imaginary internal universe" of elected representatives (Goodin 2000, 83, 98).[5] This contact makes the interests of differently affected women more immediate and tangible and, thus, less easily ignored or rubbished. Elected representatives might well sympathize or feel compassion for the women whose interests are brought before them. Their sensibilities are expanded (Goodin 2000, 95). Elected representatives might, of course, find some group's affected representatives and concerns less than compelling, misdirected, perhaps, or even repellent. They will at times push back on some claims. Yet, even if not persuaded of a perspective or interest, the affected representatives and their claims are, nonetheless, formally recognized and given air within the parliament. Indeed, affective encounters make it harder for elected representatives to summarily ignore or dismiss claims, or depict affected representatives and those they represent as unworthy of representation (as shown by Kantola 2018;[6] Disch 2011).

The likelihood of elected representatives fully engaging with the affected representatives of women in the ways just described is, in part, consequent upon the latter being formally constituted as political representatives; our augmentations are designed to create a more level institutional playing field. This was an important reason not to go down the spokeswoman route to redress women's political representation, as discussed in Chapter 5.[7] Participating as peers ensures that the affected representatives of women are rendered legitimate and effective political actors, with a critical democratic role to play that is interdependent with elected representatives (Dovi 2007, 89). In sum, their shared status as representatives encourages elected representatives to acknowledge the affected representatives' legitimate role, and to really hear what is being said by them, alongside a more positive commitment on behalf of the elected to do good by women because the new "carriers" of women's interests have been made legitimate.

The more skeptical reader might be concerned that elected representatives are less open than our ideal suggests. Based on what we know about their behavior today, it is not hard to imagine that some might unfairly resist or discredit the claims, or even the legitimacy, of affected representatives. Importantly, our augmentations are designed

to work together, with account giving specifically conceived to be formal and public, to compound the earlier effects of group advocacy. Account giving is less as top-down presentation by elected representatives to grateful, affected representatives of women, and more an occasion when elected representatives' reasons for their decision are scrutinized. Knowing that one will be subject to the judgment of the affected representatives of women—and that this will take place in the full glare of institutional and media publicity—strengthens the institutional incentives for elected representatives to engage with views that might be strange to them, and that they might previously have wanted to ignore, write off, or exclude. Account giving, then, is not only able to change elected representatives' attitudes and behavior because it is integral to normal parliamentary procedure, but also because of its high intra- and extra-institutional visibility.

The fourth feature of our augmentations that fosters attitudinal and behavioral change among elected representatives is that they are not one-off parliamentary interventions, but repeated ones.[8] A single practice of group advocacy and account giving would make it easy for elected representatives to ignore our new set of actors, especially when they talk in terms that may make little or no sense to elected representatives, that take a form of words that impugn their motives, or that are explicitly hostile toward their political goals or ideology. Even with the greater likelihood of publicity, if account giving is a singular moment, there would likely be too few consequences for politicians, and they would, we suspect, not especially care about how they are judged by women in society. However, our design provides for routinized, regular, repeated, and public everyday parliamentary practices to redress the poverty of women's representation. With group advocacy and account giving institutionalized as a normalized part of the parliamentary process, elected representatives are greatly incentivized to listen to, and take into consideration, what has been said by the affected representatives of women. In short, they simply cannot afford to be exposed as failing each and every time.

Moreover, representing women has stopped being the (assumed) preserve of the descriptive representative or, indeed, any other individual representative who happens to care about women's political

representation. Instead, it has become an institution-wide imperative. All elected representatives have reasons to care more about engaging in deliberations that are informed by the group advocacy moment, and getting their decisions right procedurally, as well as substantively; it has become a collective responsibility. At best, elected representatives feel this is a positive, shared responsibility to the affected representatives of women, and indirectly through them, the represented. More instrumentally, elected representatives should want to avoid looking bad relative to their colleagues. Horizontal accountability encourages individual elected representatives to show that they are representing women, that they have done justice to the representative claims made by women's affected representatives by being responsive to them, addressing their concerns when they deliberate, and showing that their decision-making occurred in a just and fair manner. In a virtuous circle, elected representatives should come to realize that to fulfill their formal representative duties, they must engage with the affected representatives of women in an inclusive, egalitarian, and responsive manner.

In the changed parliamentary contexts, and having acquired new knowledge, elected representatives will ideally engage with the voiced concerns because they can see and feel how others experience a particular issue. Although strategic reasons may also be in play, elected representatives will reflect upon their previously held opinions, including considering how they had earlier regarded an issue in terms of its effect on women. As alternative and competing voices are raised, elected representatives can "cross-check" the views they attribute to others against the ones they hold themselves (Goodin 2000, 98). They may become less certain of their own views and recognize that theirs are not the only legitimate take on an issue, policy, or legislation. In drawing attention to the partiality of elected representatives' initial positions and goals, powerful and privileged masculinized interests may become less secure. This has the potential to transform what elected representatives believe parliaments should be discussing. There might then be a spontaneous take up of women's issues and interests by elected representatives. Greater familiarity with how an issue impacts upon differently affected

women, knowing how one outcome may harm, while another brings benefits, might engender a sense of responsibility to think through and deliver political representation to different groups of women. This should be especially so for those groups on the margins of society, groups less likely to have been hitherto on the radar of most elected representatives. Rather than thinking of women as holding views that are irrelevant, partial, divisive, disruptive, or complicating the "normal business" of formal politics, consideration of women's political interests would become regarded as not just a "good" thing, but a necessary one, something that deepens and strengthens political institutions and, more widely, the health of our democracies.

Better informed by affected representatives' impassioned advocacy, elected representatives should become more confident in their deliberations, emboldened in making their decisions, and trust more in their individual and collective judgment. They should feel greater legitimacy both in respect to the outcomes they produce, and in how well they have represented, procedurally speaking. As an elected representative recalled, reflecting on feeling frustrated about a vote that he later considered an instance of misrepresentation:

> Very frankly, *if I had a chance to sit down* with all of my constituents for 15 minutes and talk to them, I'd have voted against the whole thing. *But I didn't have that chance*. (Mansbridge 2019, 306, emphasis added)

There can be personal benefits: when individual elected representatives consider that they have done a good job by women, they will feel better about themselves as representatives; warm feelings toward addressing the representational needs of sections of the public they previously had not noticed or had chosen to ignore or downplay could develop. Personal job satisfaction should in such cases increase. Less constrained by mandate understandings of representation, the process of representation becomes more creative still, endowing elected representatives with the confidence and pride to act in these ways. In all these ways elected representatives may experience positive feelings about being better representatives.

More Connected to Women

Transforming the attitudes and behavior of elected representatives brings about broader representational effects that connect the institutional and extra-institutional. In engaging with, and responding to, women's interests, elected representatives act in ways that create new direct and indirect representative relationships with women. These are underpinned, not merely by the changed substance of political deliberations and decisions, but significantly by the style and form of political engagement and communication practiced by elected representatives. Speaking in ways recognized by, and resonating with, women in society, the connection established by elected representatives at the level of content does not get lost in translation by political and policy jargon. Over time, the language and style of communication between elected and affected representatives and beyond the institution should evolve more generally, becoming a less masculinized, big "P" style of politics, and one closer to the language and political discussions spoken in wider society.

The elected representatives' incentive to talk and communicate in new ways reflects a self-interest in receiving positive judgments from affected representatives. In group advocacy, affected representatives, as already noted, do not have to speak in ways that are typical of elitist, masculinized, and professionalized political institutions. During account giving, elected representatives are themselves encouraged to change the ways in which they talk.[9] If only to make themselves understood by those whose judgment they await, elected representatives reflect upon the style, tone, and register of what they say. Representatives might even spontaneously choose their words "to respond to what the people for and to whom they are speaking want them to say" (Mansbridge 2019, 315). Whether strategic or spontaneous, they will look to use words that connect with the affected representatives, because if they do not, they risk their representational acts being judged as failing. The successful defense of elected representatives' deliberations and decisions constitutes an indirect but no less formal recognition of affected representatives' political language (and that of the represented), and adds to the legitimacy and validity of women's diverse interests. By communicating with the affected representatives

of women in an inclusive, responsive, and egalitarian fashion, and through them to women in society, elected representatives' account giving serves to close the gap between elected representatives and the institution, and the represented.

Valuing Women's Political Presence

In knowing and caring more about representing women well, elected representatives' transformed attitudes and behavior signal a more expansive understanding of who is properly part of a polity. There is in this a much more profound appreciation that the political underrepresentation of women is a problem for our democracies and not just a problem for women. The contrast in the make-up of elected and affected representatives should bring renewed attention to the problematic homogeneity of the political class, and of representative institutions. Moreover, in contexts where assumptions about both the capacity and the will of elite, majority-male institutions to do good by women are institutionally queried, attitudes toward the homogeneity of elected representatives should change; that these are male dominated and privileged should become visible to those who previously might not have noticed or did not care enough to do anything about it.

Accepting the value of having affected representatives of women participate within elected political institutions should engender greater diversity among elected representatives. This dynamic affects elected representatives, political parties as the gatekeepers to political office, and women in society more generally. Just as the first-generation presence literature suggested that women working for women parliamentarians could have politically mobilizing effects (Phillips 1995), the experience gained by affected representatives might have a direct impact on an individual woman's ambition and resources, prompting her to seek selection and election as a member of parliament. Indirectly, it might have a more diffuse and collective role model effect; when women see "women like them" participating in politics, it increases the numbers of women wishing to participate in formal politics, whether as elected or affected representatives.

Feminist Democratic Representation and the Represented

The success of our parliamentary design in the redress of the poverty of women's political representation lies centrally in the transformation of the attitudes and behavior of elected representatives. Yet it is the views of the represented—what they think about the quality of the political representation they are now in receipt of—that we value most. What are the representation effects of our parliamentary augmentations on the represented? We answer this question by looking directly at the experiences and perceptions of the represented, and by focusing indirectly on effects brought about by the experiences and perceptions of their affected representatives in parliament. Holding onto our indivisible conception of representation and our commitment to women's ideological and intersectional diversity, the presence of affected representatives and the transformed attitudes and behavior of the elected representatives must generate positive representational effects for diverse women before any conclusion that women are now better represented can be made. We are particularly interested in the effects that come from parliaments and political institutions as meeting points for the affected representatives of differently affected women.

Recognized and Legitimized

In the first instance, the presence of affected representatives of women supports the more meaningful political inclusion of women in electoral politics. The representational effect is better simply in numerical terms. Even though affected representatives do not have to be women, there will certainly be many more women participating in parliamentary politics as a consequence of our institutional design. It is qualitatively better, too, in terms of reflecting women's heterogeneity. This is because affected representatives' presence is specifically designed to acknowledge the intersectional limitations of descriptive representation among elected representatives. They are made present precisely to ensure the political participation and representation of the differently affected.

Different groups of women, moreover, see themselves reflected in the affected representatives (Dovi 2007, 155–56); they are formally included as active participants in the "public speech for the nation" (Urbinati 2006, 35). Because our design is built around concrete political issues, it is highly likely that over time a wide variety of subgroups of women will engage with the representative process. Diverse women will see that electoral politics is "for," "about," and, perhaps most importantly, "open" to their interests. This is a key reason for preferring political inclusion rather than exclusion, even when self-exclusion is considered a form of resistance (Dovi 2009; Emejulu and van der Scheer forthcoming), or when this brings in affected representatives of women holding "problematic" views of what is in the interests of women.[10]

When women see their affected representatives advocating for them and holding elected representatives to account, they should come to acknowledge that the long indifference to women's political interests is ending. Their interests are now being better represented in the sense of being formally aired, publicly acknowledged, and rendered legitimate because they are part of the institutional agenda. In this way parliaments and elected assemblies come to be regarded by women in society, including the most poorly represented and marginalized, as key sites for women's representation, and critically ones that are conducive to their representation. The likelihood that group advocacy and account giving gain media coverage gives us the confidence that women (and once again, especially subgroups of women) will regard parliaments and, indeed, wider society as places for and about them. As elected representatives collectively respond to women, and both affected and elected representatives adopt new styles of language and tone in their interactions, parliamentary politics will become less exclusive and elitist, undergirding women's positive feelings about representative politics.

A lot of this has to do with the affected representatives' status as representatives, and how they have become integral parliamentary actors. This has already been identified as fundamental to the formal recognition of the principle and practice of women's political equality. The affected representatives of women are not merely "parliamentary guests," temporary interlopers who can be turned away. Knowing one

has the right to be present and sharing a status with elected representatives can only embolden the affected representatives of women to act in the interests of those they represent. More efficacious, their ability to effect parliament's representational outcomes, transforming what is articulated and aired within the legislature, is enhanced. This is the case notwithstanding whatever else may or may not happen to their claims after the group advocacy moment.

As peers, elected and affected representatives mutually recognize the others' role in the institutional processes of making just and fair decisions for women. Both are aware how each is a fundamental part of the representative process; the elected might have always felt this—they are elected, after all—but through their newly required presence and interactions, the affected representatives experience the same. In these contexts, it will be much less likely that elected representatives can successfully render affected representatives' views on specific policies or legislation as the outpourings of the politically irrelevant or naive. Accordingly, affected representatives experience their encounters with individual elected representatives and collectively as authoritative and legitimate political actors.[11] And if this does not take place, affected representatives now have powerful means to denounce such treatment by elected representatives. The new norm is that both sets of representatives see it as their democratic responsibility to work together to represent the represented.

Through interactions between elected and affected representatives, a message is sent to the differently affected women, and to women and society at large, that women are both representable and merit political representation. The represented see that their issues and interests are acknowledged as legitimate and critical to the effective functioning of the formal representative process. This is not only about changes to the "what" of representation once again but, more significantly, also about the "how." When the interests of the differently affected are articulated in the language and registers of the represented, and when elected representatives give account in ways that similarly reflect and resonate with women outside of parliament, symbolic recognition is given. A public political discourse that incorporates alternative and not just elite modes of speech and communication constitutes women as an important and legitimate part of the represented.

More Knowledgeable and Open to Interest Reformation

In line with creative theories of representation, *Feminist Democratic Representation* does not accept the fiction of a universal set of women's interests. Our design encourages an openness to alternate claims about what is in the interests of women and provides for the possibility of preference transformation, and for the constitution of women's interests during parliamentary processes of representation. How does this improve the representation of women, especially the most poorly represented women, critics might ask, if some long-standing and heartfelt women's interests are thereby challenged, rejected, or overturned?

Our first response is that our design generates the possibility for an improved understanding of what one perceives as one's own interests, which may, in turn, give rise to interest or preference transformation. In such scenarios, the rejection or overturning of initial positions would not be regarded as problematic. The represented and their affected representatives may reflect upon the particularity of their own views (Young 2002, 113, 116), "recalibrate" their own thoughts and emotions (Mansbridge 2019, 316), "transcend the immediacy of their biographical experience and social and cultural belongings and interests" (Urbinati 2006, 5), and better appreciate "how my situation looks" to others (Young 2002, 116).

Our second response is that there is neither a requirement that the represented give up their original perspective or position, nor for women to accept the imposition of a singular definition of women's interests. Original conceptions held by the represented and articulated by their affected representatives may very well be reconfirmed in the face of alternative and competing views. There may be explicit confrontation between affected representatives of women. Some will put forward views about what is in the interests of women that others will reject precisely because group advocacy gives a platform to the differently affected, and because *Feminist Democratic Representation* (mostly) opts not to exclude. Through consecutive encounters between elected and affected representatives during the group advocacy moment, and among affected representatives during account giving, women in society will become more aware of views different from and

at times oppositional to their own. The intention, and, indeed, representational effect of our twin augmentations is to better reveal the structure of conflict among the affected representatives of women and among the women they represent.

Group advocacy plays an especially important role in challenging notions of a women's common good (Young 1990a, 2002; Williams 1998, 6, 30). It is worth recalling Young's cautionary observation (2002, 108): "under circumstances of structural social and economic inequality, the relative power of some groups often allows them to dominate the definition of the common good in ways compatible with their experience, perspective and priorities." Group advocacy may furthermore put into practice Young's "speaking across difference in a context of public accountability" (Young 2002, 118; Urbinati 2000, 761). Diverse affected representatives of women taking part in parliamentary politics—hearing what each other have to say—and, indeed, likely "meeting" each other in person as they voice their representative claims within the institution—in parliamentary corridors or cafes, for example—generate additional and likely new interactions among affected representatives whose paths might not otherwise have crossed. In these interactions lies the potential for mutual appreciation and recognition that they are part of something bigger than their own group of women. This potential is reinforced in the account giving stage if the affected representatives of women were to find their own views and considerations challenged by the decisions and explanations put forward by elected representatives.

Positioned to Judge

Account giving is designed to formally position the affected representatives to judge the quality of the representation undertaken in parliament by elected representatives. The represented, in turn, judge both affected and elected representatives. In the case of the former, women judge what was put before the elected representatives, ultimately deciding whether their affected representatives advocated well or not. Given that they are in close contact with their affected representatives, women have the means to pass their judgment directly to them.

If they are unhappy, they can choose other affected representatives in the future. How they do this would reflect the process of authorization specific to subgroups of women. Women maintain "ownership" (Dovi 2007) not only over who speaks for them regarding specific topics, but also over who *represents* them. This is what prevents misrepresentation by affected representatives.

Women judge how well elected representatives listened to, debated with, and explained themselves to their affected representatives. In this they rely both on information from their affected representatives and wider media commentary.[12] How the represented assess elected representatives should then matter more to elected representatives. If unsatisfied, women voters are better positioned to hold them to account, not least because elected representatives have had to take stances on women's issues. This marks a state of affairs hitherto unknown for women. As discussed in the opening chapter, when it comes to women's issues and gender equality, our current electoral politics grants women the most meager of means to exert influence over who represents them and how (Lovenduski 2019). Account giving is explicitly designed to meet this concern, adding accountability moments *in between* elections. In this way there is, for the first time, system-level gendered accountability. By voting for or against sitting elected representatives, women are not only able to judge outcomes knowing their elected representative's positions and actions vis à vis women's issues and interests, but they are also able to continuously make judgments on the quality of representation they receive as elected representatives deliberate and decide on women's issues.

Interested and Mobilized

In seeing their affected representatives face-to-face with elected representatives, and witnessing a different style of politics, women will begin to think of the world of electoral politics as inclusive of them as political actors and hospitable to their interests. When it becomes acceptable to speak in ways that draw on women's everyday experiences and in registers that are rarely heard in formal politics, there will be a greater desire to engage with representative politics. Women can

now imagine themselves participating as political actors, not merely as onlookers. They should feel content that their affected representatives have contributed to better understandings of the issue at hand; feel pride that their interests have been acknowledged and responded to; and hold a positive sense that they have contributed to the education of representatives and, hence, improved the quality of the representative process overall. Such substantive inclusion should, in turn, generate greater feelings of worth, efficacy, and affinity with the actors and institutions of representative democracy. All of this should encourage previously politically non-active women (in the formal political sphere) to take a greater general interest in the workings of electoral politics and for some to seek out direct participation. More—and more diverse—women will be encouraged to self-organize, constitute themselves as representational constituencies, and put forward claims-makers as affected representatives.

The institutional and societal recognition given to affected representatives, especially the imperative that they can play a full and equal role in electoral politics, should further problematize women's underrepresentation. The long-standing feminist claim that parliaments as spaces, and politics as a process, require women's inclusion will resonate widely and loudly alongside the demand that women's presence includes women in all their diversity. The illegitimacy of parliaments dominated by male representatives, and the anomaly of the descriptive representatives of women being overwhelmingly white, elite women, will be called out with greater frequency and more volume. The fact that affected representatives can put particular interests on the parliamentary table, are treated responsively and in an egalitarian fashion, and get to hold the elected representatives to account reinforces women's motivation to participate.

More women participating in electoral politics as both affected and elected representatives would finally make parliamentary politics an everyday practice of ordinary women. There would be common appreciation that much is to be gained from being inside rather than outside of parliament, from participating in electoral politics. The "affected representative route" to women's political presence might be particularly attractive for women who have witnessed, or are familiar with, discriminatory party candidate selection processes, although the

"elected representative route" into politics should become more appealing, too. When the representational effects on elected representatives were discussed previously, a greater openness on their behalf to admit both the ability of women to "do" politics as affected representatives was noted. The conclusion drawn was that the tendency for men to dominate reveals itself as having little to do with merit, and everything to do with how politics was traditionally defined. Disabused of elite, masculinized assumptions regarding what constitutes politics and who constitutes the represented, elected representatives—and their political parties—should recognize women's merit as candidates for elected political office.

New, and more explicit, acknowledgments of women's different representational interests being formally registered within our parliaments affects relationships among women both inside and outside of parliament. It turns parliaments into more agonistic democratic spaces where women can express conflict, obtain an improved understanding of others, and distinguish between friends, adversaries, and enemies.[13] Dominant views about the representational interests of women, whether made by descriptive or non-descriptive claims-makers, become more readily contestable. Differently situated women, because of what they hear, may better conceive of, imagine, and empathize with others' experiences and views. New light, consequently, shines on the ways in which conceptions of women's interests reflect differential positions in social, economic, and cultural structures. In such situations, the political representation of women becomes regarded as complex, one that requires mutual respect between groups of women. This may have a spillover effect on women, both privileged and marginalized. The former may not have recognized that their interests differ from those of other women, and indeed, are partial. The latter may not yet have felt sufficiently able to voice their interests to and against more privileged women.

By increasing the understanding and appreciation of differences among women, opportunities to explore and understand each other's representational needs and wants expands. Cognizance of the nature of conflicts over what is in women's interests supports the idea that the political representation of women is an ongoing process. Put differently, women come to appreciate the necessity to act on behalf of,

and have an impact upon, their representable interests, even when there are disagreements over what those interests are. As differently affected women hear from a range of affected representatives during group advocacy, and when they learn about how elected representatives reached decisions in account giving, the possibility of renewed opinion formation by different groups of women outside of parliament is enhanced. Gaining greater understanding of how and why different groups of women define their interests as they do can generate feelings of solidarity among women within civil society. If women "reach out" to other groups of differently positioned or ideologically different women, spaces open for women to come together to talk about their differences. This, in turn, raises the opportunity to discuss the possibility of mobilization around some issues, goals, and, indeed, interests. If a sense is created—and nurtured—that women can and should work together to ensure that parliaments address women's issues, then an agreed, albeit limited, "women's agenda" might emerge. Even when differences remain and strategic alliances do not materialize, women's politics is, nonetheless, reinvigorated; a diverse, vibrant women's civil society should at the very least encourage additional claims-makers to come forward and to seek participation as affected representatives of women in parliament.

None of what we have just said should be interpreted as an unthinking return to the terrain of universality. Rather, it should be understood as the widening, in a more agonistic fashion, of the possibility for a shared women's project of re-gendering civil society and electoral politics. Our institutional design, and the dynamics they set in train, create the potential for women in society to better relate to, and work with, each other in contexts of difference and conflict (see Urbinati 2006, 760). Cooperation might be limited to the exchange of views—a good in itself—but it might form the basis for future coordinated and collaborative political action based on new and shifting alliances. A perception that an issue was partial or limited to discrete groups of women might come to be regarded as affecting larger numbers and groups of women, for example. In this way greater political and personal commitment to the interests of other women might well emerge. This could give rise to the subsequent identification and mobilization of women around a common political project, in a specific location

and time, although this is best thought of as a secondary, rather than a necessary or guaranteed, benefit.

If our reasoning appears too strong, we might instead speak of the recognition of a diverse agenda of women's issues in which the structure of conflict between women is out in the open. Supportive and conducive relationships between groups of women, even when they hold alternate or, indeed, opposing views, can still arise. For what matters in these circumstances is a shared sense once again that women should be active in electoral politics because they are part of, and integral to, the polity and have political interests that deserve to be considered; alternatively, without this, politics will just carry on as usual. To make elected representatives take seriously the concerns of women might require mobilization of women holding different views on an issue to nevertheless collaborate to get that issue onto the parliamentary agenda. In the context of our design, when women in civil society work together to raise the political profile of a particular issue, or to bring a set of viewpoints before elected representatives, it would not be feasible for elected representatives to either engage with them in bad faith, or to dismiss their views.

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Feminist Democratic Representation makes the good representation of women integral rather than additional to democracy. The representation of women's interests must be at the center of debate as a parliament discusses and legislates on political issues of especial concern to women. Without this, democracy would be seen to publicly fail. Political agendas are, in the broadest sense, reconfigured to reflect the ways in which gender difference and gender inequality are structural features of society, and they do so in ways that recognize women's heterogeneity. At the level of the elected representatives, the partiality of their initial positions is likely to be challenged by the affected representatives of women, as they voice the interests of the differently affected. As these new representatives interact with elected representatives, the latter should recognize that theirs is no longer the "only" legitimate take on an issue, policy, or legislation. The defense of their deliberations and decisions must refer to the advocacy they have just witnessed because, without this, elected representatives

will struggle with the claim that they have made good decisions. This is the case even though elected representatives cannot satisfy all affected representatives of women in a substantive sense. More broadly, what parliaments discuss—the "what" of political representation—is transformed and redefined by *Feminist Democratic Representation*. Dominant, privileged, and masculinized political interests should be rendered less secure. This sends out a powerful signal to women and men in society: women's rightful place in the national political conversations that take place within our legislatures is neither optional nor secondary. The incorporation of women's interests, especially the interests of marginalized subgroups of women, cannot be outside of, or marginal to, representative politics. Rather, it is a core task of what parliaments should be debating and deciding upon, the normal work of political representation in democratic politics.

Even as affected representatives of women are made present in our group advocacy and account giving moments, to influence the behavior of elected representatives, our institutional design is intended to do more—as befits our conception of representation in the round. The presence of affected representatives of women not only adds to the legitimacy associated with our parliaments in the eyes of women—as they see the institution taking women's interests into account, and then accounting for its acts vis à vis women's issues—but there is also the potential for better representational relationships on the ground between individual representatives and women, and between women more generally. It elicits more frequent interactions between parliaments and women in their diversity. In short, women see that they have a greater stake in electoral politics. Moreover, the fomenting of such broader representational relationships and feelings about parliamentary politics has the potential at the higher level to protect our democracies. That claim is, however, for our Conclusion.

Conclusion

A Return to the Vignettes

In designing for feminist representative democracy, we set our eyes on the prize of redressing the poverty of women's political representation. Readers were invited to consider four vignettes. These spoke of the kind of political issues that many women face in their daily lives in Western liberal democracies. The vignettes came from real life. The prostitution YouTube clip was sent from a colleague in Sweden. There was a burkini-clad swimmer in the gym changing room. In the run up to the Irish Referendum, a relative out jogging took photos of the abortion posters he saw in Dublin. Last, and despite us residing in Brussels and London, neither of us could avoid coverage of Marine Le Pen during the European elections in 2019.

The vignettes functioned, in the first instance, as a heuristic device to reveal the poverty of women's political representation. Our democracies would be failing women if this could not be better addressed. We deployed the vignettes next as a lens through which to reconsider how well contemporary democratic theory speaks to women's misrepresentation. We found much ill-suited to our project. Rarely taking structural inequalities in society as their starting point, and without gender equality as a normative goal, attendant reforms mostly replicate practices that underpin the very inequality that concerns us. The recent representative turn in democratic theory initially looked promising, only to mostly stop short of proposing concrete reforms, and oftentimes failing to center gender. Yet, by bringing this literature into conversation with contemporary gender and politics research and emergent scholarship on democratic design, we became emboldened in our contention that feminist democratic design could rise to the representational challenges women face.

Using our vignettes for a third time, we embarked on a re-reading of the classic 1990s feminist theories on political representation. The claim for women's group representation remains for us as compelling as it was thirty years ago. Moreover, the temporal distance between 1990s literature and today proved invaluable as we turned to thinking about the political institutions, actors, and practices of representative democracy. Translating women's group representation into contemporary form must address two transformative developments that postdate early presence literature, namely, greater attention to women's ideological and intersectional diversity, and a more sophisticated conception of democratic representation. We explicitly reject the traditional dimensional approach to political representation in favor of an indivisible conception. Women's political representation is, thus, no longer understood in the dominant terms of particular feminist content carried into our political institutions by descriptive representatives. While it is never okay to have a homogeneous legislature, or for some women to always be denied substantive representation, it is inevitable that some women will, on occasion, find neither their descriptive representatives present, nor their interests and preferences met in ways that they want. With a representation process that is feminist and democratic in place, they might still be considered—and critically, consider themselves—in receipt of good representation. Returning to our discussion of the yellow dress, we posited that the quality of representation is not wholly dependent upon whether the shopper had delivered substantively by bringing back a "little black dress." If the recipient believed that the shopping trip was well executed, was confident that her stated preferences and interests had been taken into consideration, and trusted that the shopper really cared about how she would feel, then notwithstanding its color, she would be compelled to say "yes" to the dress. We would adjudge this to be a successful instance of representation.

In substantially rethinking and designing the representative process, we held onto the three key feminist principles we had advanced earlier in respect to women's substantive representation. These reflected contemporary feminist scholarship and spoke directly to women's ideological and intersectional diversity: *inclusiveness* refers to the presence of women's heterogeneous interests among representative claims "for

women," *responsiveness* is met when claims about and for women reflect and connect with women in society, and *egalitarianism* points to the relative power status of diverse voices and different women's interests. We infused ideal representative practices advanced in contemporary democratic theory with these principles. Our institutional design enacts inclusiveness, egalitarianism, and responsiveness during parliamentary advocacy, deliberation, and accountability. In women's representation *as it should be*, the institutions, norms, practices, and outcomes of representative politics generate affinity, trust, legitimacy, and positive symbolism; incite learning and opinion formation among citizens and politicians alike; create stronger relationships among women in society, furthering contestation and political mobilization; and engender greater yet critical support among women for the procedures, institutions, and substantive outputs of representative politics and, at a higher level, for the idea of representative democracy.

To realize these representational effects there must be a reconfiguration of institutional processes and practices and accompanying norms; a transformation in the attitudes and behavior of existing parliamentary actors, as well as by the represented; and the institutionalization of new intra and extra-parliamentary representative relationships. To bring *Feminist Democratic Representation* to life, we introduced a new set of political actors—the affected representatives of women—and designed two new parliamentary practices—group advocacy and account giving. Affected representatives ensure the representation of those who are differently affected by a political issue. They are epistemologically, experientially, and affectively close to those they represent and, thus, most knowledgeable and best suited to advocate and judge on behalf of the represented. In group advocacy, all elected representatives are forced to listen to the interests and preferences of the differently affected via their affected representatives, increasing the collective store of knowledge, both factual and affective. In account giving, elected representatives explain the course of their deliberations and seek to persuade affected representatives, and through them they convince extra-parliamentary audiences of the justness and fairness of their decisions. Informed by the advocacy work of affected representatives and anticipating their judgment, elected representatives are enabled and incentivized to deliberate and make decisions in ways that

fulfill our three feminist principles: in short, to know and care more about representing *all* women.

Returning to our vignettes for the final time, we now explore how the representational problematics experienced by women might fare were our feminist democratic process of representation in place. The most unambiguous effect of our design is an overhaul in the composition of elected political institutions: supplementing descriptive representation, the affected representatives of women transform the membership of our legislatures, rebalancing them in women's favor. But it is not just about the numbers of women now present, it is also about reflecting the diversity of women. If today, the headscarf-wearing woman is rarely present in formal politics, our design would surely suggest her greater participation, both as affected and elected representatives. Her—and other marginalized women's—political presence would become unremarkable. The activity that produced the book *It's Not about the Burqa*, together with the civil society and societal discussions that it prompted, illustrates one way in which more diverse women can participate. Under our new conditions, the authors might themselves become affected representatives, having made claims to be, and been identified as, best placed to represent the views of our burkini-wearing swimmer, for example. Affected representatives might also emerge from among the hitherto and seemingly non-mobilized groups of women who, nonetheless, can be shown to hold strong views on issues related to their experiences. These are often the aforementioned "hard-to-reach groups," which on further investigation are merely those that are "easy to ignore," as if they have nothing to say to political questions.

If the "affected route" is the most likely one for currently underrepresented women to participate in, in representative politics, the "elected route" should also bring into our parliaments more diverse women, in part, at least as a consequence of the direct experience gained by affected representatives. Newly practiced in formal politics, might they now think of themselves as viable candidates for elected office? Greater numbers of elected women should also emerge because of a larger supply of women, as women reflect on the new style and substance of politics, because women are more connected with parliamentary politics, and because of the enhanced demand by political parties for women candidates, as parties see electoral gain in their

recruitment. Again, greater identification with and ambition to participate in representative politics should be less skewed to elite women. While we cannot guarantee, for example, that the most marginalized prostitutes—those without papers or who lack proficiency in the dominant language, for example—will become affected representatives, and are unlikelier still to become elected representatives (given we presume that prejudice against such women by party gatekeepers will not dissipate any time soon), our design remains enabling, nonetheless. Because it is for the differently affected to determine who participates as affected representatives, we can at the very least, imagine former, if not current, prostitutes making claims to be, and being accepted as, affected representatives.

With larger and greater diversity among women representatives—affected and elected—the narrowness of the extant elected political class is problematized, and long-standing stereotypes about who constitutes an agentic, authoritative, and legitimate political actor are likely to be robustly challenged. Women like Salma Haidrani, who, following the Nice episode, stated that she had "never felt more terrified . . . or more visible" or "hopeless(ly) out of control," will be participants in the public political conversation. In speaking up and claiming democratic platforms, women's participation challenges stereotypes about who is allowed to speak or who has relevant and important things to say. Political participation is experienced, observed, and recognized no longer as the preserve of privileged men and women; all women are seen and see themselves as political animals. If electoral politics has finally come good on—realized—women's formal political equality, there is a more substantive rebalancing of political power between women and men. Institutionally required to open up to affected representatives, women in society observe representatives who share with them experiences, voicing their interests and being listened to. The represented should also see elected representatives, only some of whom will be their descriptive representatives, making decisions in ways that are responsive and accountable to them. Moreover, in holding elected representatives collectively to account, women become judges of both the former's actions and the quality of the democratic process more broadly.

Under our design, affected representatives' presence means that elected representatives listen to women, distinct from high-profile, vocal, well-resourced ones, those liable to the critique, qua Bono, of being self-appointed and unaccountable. Even as we do not claim that any one group of women's interests should be privileged a priori, the differently affected principle is especially concerned with consideration of the interests of the most marginalized. Malia Bouattia (2019, 216), for example, draws critical attention to the "model Muslim woman"—"non-hijab wearing, right-wing Muslim woman who demonizes both critical and left-wing Muslims, and Muslims who seem too religious"—usually included in the public sphere. Or consider again the participants in the prostitution vignette: we read the YouTube Swedish debate as skewed in ways that gave air to the privileged—the high-class sex worker and academic critic—while silencing by their absence the most marginalized—the pimped, trafficked, or drug-dependent prostitute. The single tweet at the end of the show was not, in our view, a sufficient voice for the range of women working in prostitution. Under *Feminist Democratic Representation* these diverse women's voices could not be left outside parliament but would be made present in group advocacy and acknowledged in account giving.

Political institutions will become places and drivers of gendered learning; new issues and interests are accepted as meriting representation, resulting in a recalibration of the parliamentary and wider political agenda. Gender as an organizing structure of society is revealed. The "what" of representation is hereafter no longer in the gift of elected representatives and political parties, nor is it dependent upon strategic reaction to (gendered) events. While we cannot rewrite the history of abortion in the Irish Republic, or offer any guarantees, we have some confidence that our representative process would have seen successful moves to repeal the 8th Amendment earlier, and that women's voices would have been both central and amplified. Instead of this fundamental women's issue being "kept off" the political agenda through the prioritization of men's (and the State/Catholic Church's) political interests, Ireland's disproportionately male politicians would have been trapped in the metaphorical Kavanaugh lift, forced to listen *and* to act.

Directly exposed to the concrete and lived experiences of the differently affected, the close encounters between affected and elected representatives confront the latter with knowledge previously unknown to them or, less kindly, knowledge they may have previously dismissed as inadmissible or irrelevant. Did not Irish politicians actively refuse to acknowledge the numbers of women traveling to Great Britain to obtain an abortion? Women's interests may look especially different from the accepted terms of debate when they are advanced in women's own voices. During the referendum campaign, the stories of women who boarded planes and ferries were affectively powerful. Having now been made to listen, elected representatives are better placed to examine and test the strength of competing arguments and experiences. They will do so knowing that affected representatives (and those they represent) can question their foci, argumentation, and decisions.

The certainty of new issues and interests meriting representation is a very good reason to include representatives, affected and elected, who reflect the diversity of women. This is the case even if they are not necessarily to one's (feminist) taste. Here, we might refer to Le Pen, and her 2019 contention that the material interests of single mothers and marginalized and Muslim women have been given insufficient attention compared with the interests of middle-class women or the issue of abortion. Le Pen's critics might well be suspicious of her motives, dispute the grounds upon which she identifies marginalized French women, and query her interpretation of the interests of these "vulnerable" women. Some of her critics—and affected representatives—will almost certainly be the Muslims, white working class, or single mothers that she explicitly claims to represent. They can directly contest her claims and challenge her to address political issues that they consider more salient. The removal of a particular women's issue or purported interest may, indeed, be one lesser acknowledged outcome of our new representative process. For example, women might demand to know why issues they consider more important are not those on her agenda: the sexual harassment of "modestly" dressed Muslim women, rendered invisible by white feminism (Khan 2019, 112). Be that as it may, affected representatives of women might still ask elected representatives to reconsider the significance of the issues Le Pen highlights, even as they dispute her wider framing of politics. As we

have maintained throughout the book, in contexts of women's ideological and intersectional differences, competing representative claims should be brought into the open. The alternative is to rely, as is currently the practice, upon a few claims-makers, an approach that fails to admit diversity and power differences among women, or to recognize that women's issues and interests are not fixed but constituted during political processes of representation.

Critics may still argue that in including the affected representatives of women, we will be opening the doors to anti-feminist voices. To this we reply, first: representatives of, for example, populist radical right (PRR) women are not given a platform at the expense of other representatives under our design. If anything, given current inequalities of access to public platforms and democratic institutions, providing the means to bring in the currently underrepresented and marginalized women is likely to constitute a rebalancing in their favor. Second, there are, in any case, "kitchen rules" operating alongside our three principles to stop any representatives armed with arsenic. If, for example, elected representatives deny women the right to act politically—to speak or vote—they have become, and can only ever be considered, anti-democratic. The absolutist claim that "you cannot trust women" enabled us to envisage how to draw a feminist red line between inclusion and exclusion, per our discussion with Dovi. Imagine for a moment an affected representative of women putting forth the reasoning for an abortion provision in the face of elected representatives saying *to her face* that she cannot be trusted to speak on this issue, that whatever her rationale and whatever women's situations, the elected representative rejects her (read: any and all women's) *very* right to be listened to. Such an encounter would surely reveal the elected representative for what he or she is: a patriarchal, misogynist *anti-democrat*. In so being, such an elected representative has broken the rules of the parliamentary kitchen.

As our design recalibrates the political agenda toward women, and in ways that recognize women's different, and at times, conflicting interests, it may have the additional benefit of revealing the "structure of conflict" between women and men, something that is often not noted in political debate, as men's interests "pass" as non-gendered political interests. On prostitution, we suggested that our

twin augmentations might generate new discussions of claims that the legalization, or minimal regulation, of prostitution is in the interests of men. Men are overwhelmingly the buyers, and women the sellers of sex. If affected representatives of women engaged in prostitution or those affected by it addressed the economic, social, and political power differences between women and men, strong criticism of the fairness of the transactions that characterize prostitution might well emerge. Such discussion could, in turn, trigger differences among men to be more explicitly voiced. Some disabled rights activists claim men's right to access the sexual services of women, as to men with sexual dysfunction or atypical sexual preferences and those who do not wish or cannot engage in non-paid for sexual relations with women—#NotAllMen[1] agree with these arguments.

Better informed and attuned to the different and competing interests among women (and, indeed, among men), elected representatives are now better placed to deliberate deeply and make just and fair decisions. Some elected representatives will defend their initial position, despite what they might have heard during group advocacy. In this case, and during account giving, they can offer a more compelling argument for their ongoing stance. Others will revise their previously held position. On prostitution, there might be greater reflection on the quotidian violence prostitutes experience or the societal stigma and economic insecurity they face. Elected representatives will, we suggest, have heard from prostitutes about how they experience their lives. Such deliberations might give rise to new policy solutions, or old policy solutions hitherto not prioritized might gain greater support. Proponents of decriminalization or legalization of prostitution might—speculatively—come to appreciate, emotionally and not just rationally, the importance of financial and other support to some of the poorest and most marginalized women who perceive no other means to secure their livelihood. Similarly, elected representatives suspicious of choice in Muslim dress might reflect in new ways on the ignorance and/or partiality of their views (meant here objectively, i.e., their limited knowledge). When they have listened to diverse views, arguments over women's ability to exercise wearing whatever clothing they choose, or to relax on a beach without risking a confrontation with

authorities, might come to count for more than principled positions. An empirical question for sure, but one very much worth asking.

Changing one's mind should now be recognized as less costly for elected representatives: doing good by women is experienced as more important than sticking to one's stated personal or party position. Elected representatives can justify and defend any shift during account giving and do so by making reference—showing responsiveness—to representative claims articulated during group advocacy by affected representatives. The publicity given to our twin augmentations reinforces the more conducive parliamentary context: within wider society there will have been a similar gendered re-education taking place. Knowing that one can make representative appeals to affected representatives suspicious of, for example, those who wish to ban the burkini or who wish to decriminalize prostitution (or the other way around, for that matter), new parliamentary—and extra-parliamentary—coalitions of support may emerge.

Greater connections between elected representatives, formal political institutions, and women will develop over time, as a consequence of the inclusion of affected representatives, the attendant changed political agenda, and when elected representatives "talk women's language" as they justify parliamentary outcomes. Elected representatives are incentivized to adopt a discourse, lexicon, and rhetoric that connect with affected representatives as a means of persuading them that they have deliberated and decided in a just and fair manner. The new political style and tone that comes to characterize parliamentary encounters between elected and affected representatives will create new connections, especially with women who might otherwise have felt at some distance or excluded from formal politics. Critics might suggest, however, that there is a risk here of instrumental "misrepresentation," akin to Pitkinian concerns regarding symbolic representation. Let's return again to Le Pen's 2019 election pamphlet where she "speaks" directly to women, making it clear that *as a woman* she will listen to what they have to say. Relaxed, with her reading glasses in her hand, she presents herself as highly approachable—on women's side—rather than scary or fascist-looking (whatever that looks like). Is this not the "bad" representative "made good"?

In defense of our design, we hold that the account giving moment in particular provides for affected representatives—and, indeed, elected representatives—to call out those they consider peddlers of something other than women's good representation. They might, we suggest, examine Le Pen's claim to be a defender of women's rights by auditing her record or raise concerns about her divisive politics notwithstanding what she says and does for women. The scholarly accusation that the PRR is Janus-faced would get a proper, public interrogation. That this happens within elected political institutions might prove to be an especially powerful mechanism for critics of populist and racist politics. Might not the dominant representation of Muslim women as peculiarly vulnerable and passive, or more generalized anti-immigrant/Muslim representations (such as the Cologne incident),[2] be directly contested amid high publicity, precisely because the reappraisal takes place within the key institutions of formal politics?

Our design should offer some reassurance: rather than women being easily misled, it enables the represented to see what is going on, as their affected representatives hold elected ones to account. More than this, such anticipated encounters might bring about a shift in the wider political agenda away from a politics that is harmful to women, as such representatives, including but not limited to the PRR, foresee their agenda explicitly and directly challenged (even as others might applaud their agenda). Those who turn their backs on women will not go unnoticed, because elected representatives are by design institutionally incentivized to care about representing women well. Although we acknowledge the possibility that some might relish criticism, during account giving elected representatives should wish to avoid being called out as poor representatives by affected representatives (their "equal of sorts"), or by their peers (horizontal accountability). At best, they will want to be judged as good representatives, because the enormity of the current gendered democratic deficit has been revealed to them in all its "glory" and enabled them to develop greater compassion for, and solidarity with, women and girls.

Women who are currently marginalized, or in a minority, gain power relative to those whose issues and interests might hitherto have dominated in both women's movements and public discourses more generally. A revitalized women's civil society may very well change the

saliency of individual women's issues; new alliances, perhaps even the temporary identification of a collective women's agenda, are possible. This is not because all women will necessarily agree. Rather, with additional knowledge, and more imaginative narratives available, new solutions will present themselves, rendering initial preferences limited and partial. Even if the exchange of different or competing views of women's interests among women does not have such strong effects, we might still witness women's mobilization in ways that engender more substantial representative claims being made on elected representatives and political parties. Much of this follows directly from women in civil society choosing their affected representatives, through the creation of new and expanded constituencies "to be represented" in formal politics, and the previously noted new connections between women and the institutions and actors of representative democracy, created via the presence of affected representatives within our parliaments.

Reflecting on the burkini episode was a stark reminder of the partiality of experience and privilege among women. It illustrated how some women's issues have become rendered so politically fraught that women do not always want to talk about them. Whether for honorable reasons or dishonorable ones, we may not know how to ask or have not been prepared to undertake the necessary work to learn, so that we do not have to (Eddo-Lodge 2017). Asking the burkini-wearing swimmer "our" questions might have opened a Pandora's box. At best we would have cost her leisure time and the right to privacy and at worst risked an oppressive, Islamophobic, or racist conversation. We had not wanted our fellow swimmer to feel compelled to defend what she wore while our choice of swimming costume went unremarked. Against the backdrop of the changing room wallpaper adorned with high-heeled shoes, we were further challenged to reconsider dominant narratives about the "liberated woman of the West." Of course, we know that she is herself constrained in what she wears and held responsible if anything untoward happens to her.

When women are in receipt of good political representation, issues that divide women will be discussed in civil society and in formal politics on the basis of new conversations across women's differences, and between women and their representatives. It might be said that our reading of the burkini vignette, with its positive implications for better

civil society conversations among women, is overly optimistic, based at least in part upon the relative newness and less informed nature of public debate. Skeptics might suggest that silos associated with the long-standing issue of abortion are considerably more impenetrable. To be clear, it is not our expectation that opposing camps will necessarily change their fundamental conception of what is in the interests of women. Instead, we point to its possibility, and where this does not happen to the potential for smaller "gains." Some women, we accept, will always be anti-abortion in principle. We do not expect them to change. However, there is greater plausibility in suggesting that in the face of greater, and qualitatively better, discussions they might albeit reluctantly agree to abortion's legal provision. Did not the new, emotional, and public debate surrounding Savita Halappanavar's death illustrate the mortal cost to women of not allowing safe and legal abortion? Is this not part of the story of change in Ireland in 2018? Similarly, it might be that those who are fundamentally against the veil nevertheless find themselves persuadable to the argument that we "bracket off" the debate over Muslim women's dress because of a greater commitment to the act of swimming. A feminist politics of swimming, perhaps? Even if still opposed to the burqa, the reality of armed police disrobing a woman on the beach "in the name of empowerment" painfully illustrates that the cost of banning the burkini might simply be too high (Haidrani 2019).

By spelling out the ways in which our feminist democratic design redresses women's misrepresentation, we look to a future in which the good representation of women becomes a definitional indicator of democracy—recognition among elected representatives, elected institution qua institution, and among citizens—and there is a democratic cost to misrepresenting women and democratic gains to be won from representing women well. A new shared understanding of what constitutes democracy comes to bear: that the good representation of women is integral to, rather than an adjunct of, representative democracy; that women's heterogeneity does not undermine but is a reason for their political representation; that women's issues and interests are central to the formal political agenda, and not something marginal, for the good times only, or for when men decide it is in their political interests to address them; that new representative relationships

between elected representatives and parliaments and women are critical to their identity as good political representatives; and there is widespread appreciation that without representing women well, representative democracy itself is rendered illegitimate and fragile.

The extent to which *Feminist Democratic Representation* is realized must remain an empirical question. Institutional building and the blueprints pertaining to any specific polity or institution always lay beyond our ambition. Our intention was to offer design thinking and the articulation of design principles and practices: to wit, revisiting the representational problematics women experience in contemporary politics and reconsidering the feminist and democratic principles that are to guide us in reimagining representative institutions, processes, and practices. While we have not sought to investigate how we might best make our design implementable, we aspire to engage in such activity in the future. We are under few illusions about the difficulty of the building phase, and the capacity of those who benefit from existing institutional arrangements to co-opt, absorb, or deflect institutional change they regard, perhaps rightly, as hostile to their interests.[3] In the move from design to building, we look to the development of design coalitions: institutional entrepreneurs and citizens (following Saward 2020) engaging in feminist and democratic activities that make the case for and further specify, in particular, societal, political and institutional, contexts.

While ours is a solution-driven response specific to the poverty of women's political representation, we see no reason why other underrepresented groups might not explore the extent to which our institutional design might redress the political misrepresentation they experience. If so, our project might be a more ambitious one than first imagined. There is some reason to think that building *Feminist Democratic Representation* is timely, and not just for women. When there is much talk of the decline if not the demise of democracy, there is a heightened institutional and systemic risk. Much contemporary criticism of democratic politics is tied to parties (Deschouwer 2019), but it also resides in negative assessments of the effectiveness of our political institutions, and of the political class at a whole. In such contexts, elite political actors might come to see something for them in institutional design that strengthens representative democracy. With

de-democratizing forces exploiting anti-feminist and anti-equality sentiments to further authoritarian and populist goals, impactful feminist political science is exactly what is required (Kantola and Lombardo 2019; Verloo 2018; Campbell and Childs 2013). *Feminist Democratic Representation* enables meaningful political participation, stronger representative relationships, and systematic accountability—in sum, it re-connects formal politics with the represented. These are precisely the attributes that can counter feelings of apathy, alienation, resentment, and indignation, sentiment that is exploited by critics of representative democracy. Parliaments may well have become the "public face of disengagement" (Leston-Bandeira 2013; Norton 2017), but we maintain that they are at the core of the required systemic change. Strong democracies and (women's) good political representation go together. Against the more fashionable tide of post-representative politics, we argue for more and better representation.

VOILÀ

Notes

Introduction

1. Inspired by https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=75a8lBKZ0_U. *Sex work* is mostly used by proponents of decriminalization of prostitution, *prostitution* by proponents of criminalization. We use terms interchangingly to indicate our neutrality on the issue.
2. Reference to #metoo, in France also known as #balancetonporc.
3. This understanding reflects Carole Pateman's classic 1988 book *The Sexual Contract*.
4. As we edited this chapter, we heard on the BBC's World Service the Democratic male Governor of Illinois declare *he did trust women* as he spoke of abortion as a human right. We found it striking that a politician in 2019 felt it necessary to say this, as if women's political rights remain up for debate.
5. As the title of Sylvia Bashevkin's classic 1998 book *Women on the Defensive: Living through Conservative Times* suggests.
6. To these male-dominated and masculinized political institutions, we add, of course, the Church, which plays a highly influential role on representative politics regarding abortion.
7. We foreground this idea based on our reading of Mariam Khan's 2018 edited collection *It's Not about the Burkha*. Ahmed states (2018, 76): "If you truly believe it is not about the burqa, prove it and stop talking about it." See also Salma Haidrani (August 24, 2016) "British Muslim Women Talk about How It Feels to Be Constantly Spoken for." https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/mvkgp3/how-british-muslim-women-feel-about-constantly-being-spoken-for
8. Humaira, aged 21, in Haidrani, "British Muslim Women Talk."
9. This statement has become widely accepted among gender and politics scholars, reflecting Jane Mansbridge's key 1999 intervention, "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent Yes." We also suggest that this has become part of more everyday discussions of whether women should vote for women because they share sex/gender.

10. We fully explicate this in Chapters 2 and 3.
11. In Chapters 2 and 3 we explore whether we can even ask this question.
12. Fauzi, aged 22, in Salma Haidrani, "British Muslim Women Talk."
13. Vandecandelaere, Hans (2019). "En vraag niet waarom: sekswerk in België. Epo." Interview with the author. *Knack*, March 27, 2019, 21–25.
14. There might be said we acknowledge a "middle position," where one is privately critical of some form of clothing but, nonetheless, might not advocate its criminalization. We suspect, however, that this is based on a particular reading of what wearing a burkini or other Islamic dress "means" to the woman who is wearing it and to those who witness it.
15. https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/apr/23/nigella-lawson-burkini-bikini-swimming; https://www.buzzfeed.com/aishagani/muslim-women-burkini; https://metro.co.uk/2016/08/24/when-is-a-burkini-not-a-burkini-6087839/
16. See Chapters 3 and 4.
17. *Citizens* refers here, following Disch (2019, 164), "in its broadest sense to mean democratic actors, not passport carrying nationals."
18. This claim underpins our argument that representative institutions need to be designed to ensure the inclusion of these diverse views, about which we say much more in Chapters 1 and 3.
19. As we discuss in more detail in Chapter 1 and show in Chapters 5 and 6.
20. This is a contentious claim, and one that we return to in Chapters 4–6.
21. Our reasoning follows in the tradition of Dahl's (1989) critique of guardianship.
22. Our brief contemplation of the idea of a feminist guardian is more than a rhetorical flourish on our part. Echoes of the guardianship argument find themselves permeating, in various ways, contemporary narratives surrounding representation and exclusion in Chapters 3 and 4. Arguments about technocracy, monitory democracy, or epistocracy (Allen 2018) should get short shrift, too—these systems would likely fail to meet women's needs, over and above their inability to provide sufficient accountability.
23. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-20321741
24. "A revolution 35 years in the making," her death turned Irish women into 8th Amendment "revolutionaries." https://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/how-the-death-of-savita-halappanavar-revolutionised-ireland-1.3510387; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/23/ireland-abortion-referendum-savita-father-galway

25. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/how-the-death-of-savita-halappanavar-revolutionised-ireland-1.3510387; https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/27/world/europe/savita-halappanavar-ireland-abortion.html
26. We acknowledge the role of the Citizen's Assembly in the successful referendum campaign in Chapter 1.
27. https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/books/repealing-the-eighth-abortion-referendum-was-won-by-narrative-1.3909909; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/26/ireland-has-changed-utterly-the-cruel-eighth-amendment-is-history
28. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ireland-abortion-referendum-eighth-amendment-travel-london-video-a8347221.html
29. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/24/ireland-abortion-debate-pro-choice-uk-laws-referendum
30. The amplification of voices we might disapprove of are discussed further in this chapter with regard to Marine Le Pen.
31. As Reni Eddo-Lodge puts it in her 2017 book, *Why I'm No Longer Talking to White People about Race.*
32. https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b007qlvb
33. Are we being too generous and accommodating here? Dovi (2015) certainly has her suspicions, as we discuss in Chapter 3.

Chapter 1

1. We use these terms interchangeably.
2. In the play *Emilia*, Emilia is identified as the "Dark Lady" of Shakespeare's sonnets and decries in her "seismic" last speech: "If they try to burn you," she warns, "you can burn the whole f—house down." https://www.theguardian.com/stage/2018/aug/16/emilia-review-speculative-history-of-shakespeares-lover-brims-with-wit-and-rage
3. We elaborate on what we mean by institutional design thinking and how our approach speaks to the literature on democratic design in Chapter 4; here note that design also refers to redesign.
4. See for example, Clarke et al. (2018), Norris and Inglehart (2019), Runciman (2018), Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018), and Gamble and Wright (2019). See also Hay (2007), Stoker (2009), Flinders (2015), and Vines and Marsh (2018) for discussions of "demand and supply" criticisms of democracy's ability to meet citizen expectations.

5. Assessment of the wider political system strongly determines how well parliaments are regarded (Leston-Bandeira 2013, 258). Citizens' assessments are today predominantly negative and lead to declining satisfaction and trust (Norton 2017) with, for example, Eurobarometer data between 2004 and 2014 showing a downward trend in trust in national parliaments (Norton 2017, 191).
6. Our full defense of representative democracy informed by the recent representative and institutional turn in democratic theory is made in Chapter 4.
7. In this we cannot provide a comprehensive assessment of democratic theory in its entirety of ideas and possibilities; that would be an Amazonian task. We do not rehearse the extensive debates about the qualities of a deliberative *model* of democracy (Saward 2003, 175; emphasis added). In being necessarily selective, we acknowledge that some may take issue with how we have summarized core features. Inevitably, those who know more about one or other model or democratic principle or practice might find our analysis too crude.
8. See Budge (2008) for an overview.
9. This hides how the "will of the people" is often deployed to "silence dissent" and empowers the populist leader/executive, undermining constitutional democracy (Weale 2019, xii).
10. For an overview see Bächtiger et al. (2018). See also Saward (2003).
11. We return to these issues in Chapter 4. We accept that not all deliberative democrats assume a common good, although many argue that if there is a common good, deliberation is best placed to locate it.
12. Of course, this is an empirical question. We do not include consideration of their analysis of enclaves nor advocate them for our parliaments. We want all elected representatives, male and female, to take decisions informed by the views of women (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014, 354–55). Lacking authority, unanimous decision-making rules benefit women only *when women are in the minority* (as unanimity signals the need to include everyone). Majority decision rules are best only when women are *in a supermajority* (because majority rules produce more competitive dynamics) (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014, 18–19, 359).
13. Again, it is an empirical question whether the greater use of deliberation outside parliaments influences what happens inside them. In the Irish case, the Citizen Assembly is credited in transforming the landscape and tenor of the referendum on repealing the 8th Amendment to the Constitution (Suiter 2018).

14. This distinction between creative and traditional Pitkinian (1967) notions of interests is addressed in Chapter 2. It is the case that Allen briefly discusses whether institutions of random lot should be advisory and work on a single issue or issue area or address all areas, although little time is devoted to how these bodies relate to parliaments. See also Weldon (2002) and Phillips (1991, 142, 162; 1995, 45; 1992, 76).
15. Karpowitz and Mendelberg (2014, 351–53) provide a long list of reforms, revealing just how much intervention is required.
16. See footnote 13 regarding the Irish Referendum.
17. It is an empirical question whether the greater use of deliberation outside parliaments influences what happens inside them.
18. We leave aside here questions of who constitutes the citizenry (see Young 2002).
19. Atwood's dystopian novel describes a totalitarian society in what used to be part of the United States. Gilead is a fundamentalist regime that treats women as property of the state and forces the few remaining fertile women, the Handmaids, into sexual servitude in an attempt to repopulate a devastated world. On the centenary of women's suffrage in Iceland, Childs gave a keynote in Iceland that included consideration of the loss of women's access to their bank accounts presented in *The Handmaid's Tale*; this was prior to the television series that became hugely significant from 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/books/review/margaret-atwood-handmaids-tale-age-of-trump.html
20. Such accounts need to acknowledge the distribution of resources that enable some and not others to mobilize effectively (Williams 1998, 76).
21. Crudely, this is the basic theory of interest group pluralism, one that offers women opportunities for political participation, albeit one that ultimately falls short of ensuring that they are politically well represented.
22. Such unjust outcomes can only be explained by the way in which society in general, and politics in particular, is gendered in unequal and discriminatory ways (see Norris and Lovenduski [1995]; Paxton and Hughes [forthcoming 2020]; Allen [2018, 8]). More recently, and as we discuss in Chapter 4, Urbinati uses the traditional terminology of *iségoria*, the equal right to speak and be heard (voice), and *isonomia*, the equal right to participate (vote) (Urbinati 2006; Celis and Mügge 2018).
23. The obstacle is an epistemological one: men lack the experience that women have, and, consequently, women's perceptions, concerns, and needs are inaccessible to them (Williams 1998). We do not debate here

whether the necessity of women's group representation is a permanent feature of democracy.

24. For a recent U.S. study, see Dittmar et al. (2018). It might be that any failure to represent women is due to the fact that we currently have the wrong women elected in our parliaments, but we argue in Chapter 2 that there is more to it than this.
25. Women experience structural and systemic inequalities (Young 2002, 94–95).
26. Williams (1998, 25) is suspicious of those who do not see how all systems of representation "need to aggregate citizens for the purpose of assigning a representative to them."
27. The experiences and, hence, the necessity of reforming how legislators interact within parliaments are addressed in Chapters 5 and 6.
28. See Fukuyama (2018) for an identity politics critique.
29. "No defensible claim for group representation can rest on assertions of the essential identity of women or minorities; such assertions do violence to the empirical facts of diversity, as well as to the agency of individuals to define the meaning of their social and biological facts. Yet these groups do have a social significance. . . . They define the contours of important patterns of social, political, and economic inequality and, thus, help to determine the life prospects and to constrain the life choices of most of their members" (Williams 1998, 6). See Hamilton (2014, 135): ". . . even if it is true that groups don't have the same kind of agency as individuals, their representatives often give it to them (they *stand for* them), and thus freedom and representation normally do not depend upon consensus or a common good. So not only are these ideals not necessary for collective action, but the assumption that they are leads to a tendency to ignore the contesting needs, interests, voices and opinions of unrepresented or under-represented groups, classes and perspectives."
30. See Davis (2008, 71), Crenshaw (1989, 1993), Smooth (2011), Hill Collins and Bilge (2016), Hancock (2016).
31. For an introduction, see Childs and Lovenduski (2013).

Chapter 2

1. www.ipu.org, accessed July 2019.
2. In this, class is not rejected in the same way; it is something not associated with identity politics. In the United Kingdom, see work by Campbell and Cowley (2014), Evans and Heath (2017), Kenny (2017).

3. This chapter should not be read as an exhaustive annotated literature review. It is a critical reading of select conceptual and associated empirical research that we reconsider in light of our concern with the quality of women's political representation. We cite foundational and agenda-setting gender politics and research that speak to this, alongside work that we have separately co-authored with other colleagues to ensure that their contribution is fully recognized. We acknowledge that situated in the north of Europe our research reflects predominantly Anglo-American scholarly contributions.
4. In some countries like the United States there are long-standing and well-documented gender gaps in voting with women to the left of men. Even though this leftist gender gap is not universal, even across established democracies, and notwithstanding other differences in vote choice among women being linked to gender generation gaps (Campbell 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2000) and race, ideology matters, too. Race played a key role in the 2016 American presidential vote with African American women overwhelmingly voting for Hilary Clinton, whereas the majority of white American women plumped for Trump (Tien 2017).
5. This is akin to debates over transwomen's rights that some feminists find problematic, as they consider shifts in language away from "women" to individuals who have particular experiences a denial of the category "woman."
6. It has the clear advantage of reminding scholars that findings "cannot be extrapolated to the entire group" (Celis and Mügge 2018, 201). Celis and Mügge highlight work on the intersections of gender and religion (Hughes 2016; Murray 2016), age (Randall 2016), generation (Mügge 2016), ability, and sexuality (Evans 2016).
7. The relative overrepresentation of women ethnic/racial-minority representatives in comparison with ethnic/racial-minority men representatives was reported in the United States, New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Germany, and Spain (Celis and Mügge 2018; Celis, Erzeel, et al. 2014; Mügge et al. 2019; Hardy-Fanta 2013; Orey and Brown 2014; Smooth 2006; Barker and Coffé 2017; Fernandes et al. 2016; Freidenvall 2016; Mügge 2016; Mügge and Damstra 2013; Fraga et al. 2008; Bejarano 2013; Mügge and Erzeel 2016). In Canada and the United Kingdom, in contrast, the integrating of ethnic minorities has primarily occurred through the integration of ethnic-minority men (Black 2000; Hughes 2016)

8. Even the presentation of data on dual-axes descriptive representation is not always easy, with reviewers finding it overly "complicated," requiring a number of graphs (gender differences; race differences; differences between white men, white women, racialized women, and racialized men). This results in a tendency to compare ethnic-majority and -minority women (private correspondence with Canadian race and gender politics expert, Dr. Erin Tolley).
9. See also Dhamoon's (2011) swirling image.
10. In contrast with today's widely shared understanding of descriptive representation as passive, as "something that is," Pitkin's understanding of descriptive representation involves a certain level of activity. Descriptive representation is "something that is done": "*making* representations about"; "*giving* information" (Pitkin 1967, 83). The information-giving aspect gives rise to a different operationalization of women's descriptive representation. Women's descriptive representatives not only share sociodemographic characteristics but also supply politically relevant and accurate information in a public manner; their information giving is intentional, visible, and (can be) heard (Celis and Erzeel forthcoming 2020).
11. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2150755/Baroness-Warsi-expenses-Hand-picked-Camerons-A-list-job.html
12. Childs and Lovenduski (2013), citing Celis et al. (2008); Lovenduski and Gaudagnini (2010); Dovi (2007, 2010).
13. Phillips (1995); Mansbridge (1999); Williams (1998); Young (1990a/b, 2002).
14. Some feminist scholars (Childs and Dahlerup 2018; Campbell and Childs 2013) would advocate beyond the academy for women's greater political presence on these grounds, accepting as absolutely salient the sex of elected representatives.
15. See, among others: Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2014); Weeks (2009, 2019); Lovenduski (2005); Mackay (2004); Reingold (2008, 2000); Swers (2013, 2002); Dittmar et al. (2018); Celis (2006); O'Regan (2000); Wängnerud (2000); Mateo Diaz (2005); Goetz and Hassim (2003); Walsh (2011).
16. See among others: Franceschet et al. (2012); Franceschet (2011); Celis and Childs (2014); Walsh (2011); Mackay and Kenny (2007); Mackay (2006); Swers (2002a, 2018b); Celis and Lovenduski (2018).
17. See, among others: Mackay (2004, 2006); Krook and Mackay (2011); Chappell (2006); Kenny (2007); Mackay and Meier (2003); Wängnerud

(2015); Childs (2016, 2008); Duerst-Lahti and Kelly (1996); Barnes (2018); Waylen (2014).

18. Childs and Webb (2014); Campbell and Childs (2015a); Wiliarty (2010); Curtin (2014); Guerinna (2014); Kantola and Saari (2014); Piscopo (2014); Murray and Sénac (2014); Och and Shames (2018); Barnes (2018).
19. Campbell and Childs (2015a); Campbell and Erzeel (2018); Campbell and Childs (2014); Xydias (2013); Hinojosa et al. (2018).
20. Celis, Erzeel, et al. (2014); Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson (2011); Reingold and Swers (2011); Baldez (2011).
21. It is a moot point whether Smooth's approach is top down, given that her interviewees were legislators.
22. We will return to and discuss in more detail in Chapter 4 creative theories of democracy. Here we only pull out those aspects that speak directly to questions of women's substantive representation.
23. In Laurel Weldon's landmark study, the representation of women's interests derived more from women's movement activism than women as elected representatives (Weldon 2002). Academics have systematically studied what conceptions of sex, gender, and gender relations are articulated in legislative debates, political party manifestos, or media copy, for example (see, among others, Childs et al. 2013; Childs and Webb 2012; Dittmar et al. 2018; Barnes 2016; Hinojosa et al. 2018).
24. Severs et al. (2016, 348), citing Smooth (2011); Strolovitch (2006); Weldon (2011); see also Crenshaw (1991).
25. In social psychology, prototypicality is defined as the extent to which individuals are perceived as "core" members of a particular group. Prototypical members are fully and immediately recognized as being members of their constituent groups; non-prototypical members are not. Ethnic/racial-minority women differ from ethnic/racial-majority women and ethic/racial-minority men as to how well they "fit" the prototypes of their constituent identity groups. Majority women and minority men are more likely to be perceived as prototypical members of their respective gender and ethnic groups because they belong to the dominant ethnic or gender group, respectively (Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach 2008).
26. See van der Haar and Verloo (2016); Verloo (2007); Lombardo and Kantola (2017); see also Erikson (2017).
27. Ladam et al. (2018); Sweet-Cushman (2019); Campbell and Wolbrecht (2006); Wolbrecht and Campbell (2007); Zetterberg (2008a, 2008b); Childs and Webb (2012); Carroll (2001).

28. Haraldsson and Wägnerud (2018); Bonneau and Kanthak (2018); Lawless (2009); see also Pruysers et al. (forthcoming).
29. See, for example, Falk (2008); Goodyear-Grant (2013); Haraldsson and Wägnerud (2019); Lawless (2009); Lombardo and Meier (2014); Miller et al. (2010); Smith (2018); Thomas et al. (2018); Trimble (2017, 2018); Verge and Pastor (2018); Wasburn and Wasburn (2011); Pruysers et al. (forthcoming).
30. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-39853360
31. https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/special-meaning-behind-new-zealands-pregnant-prime-minister-jacinda-arderns-buckingham-palace-look-171207375.html
32. The visual example they give in the opening to their book is that of the Spanish Defense Minister, which garnered worldwide coverage as she inspected the troops while visibly pregnant: "The principals of this latter agent could be women (or even all citizens) and, depending on different perspectives, its representational meaning can change from being a symbol of equality to being a symbol of incompetence" (Lombardo and Meier 2014, 9). The book's focus is, however, on discursive symbolic representation: how men and women are constructed in policy discourses, what symbolic representation of gender this generates, and what this means for women in their everyday lives (Lombardo and Meier 2014, 15).
33. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/republican-kevin-cramer-poorly-dressed-democrat-women-wear-white-suffragettes-a7608616.html
34. https://www.aol.com/article/news/2017/03/02/republican-congressman-says-women-who-wore-white-to-trumps-addr/21872266/
35. https://uk.style.yahoo.com/hillary-clinton-wears-white-to-trumps-inauguration-a-nod-to-the-womens-movement-160643210.html?guccounter=1
36. https://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/28/politics/democratic-women-wear-white-donald-trump-speech/index.html
37. https://www.glamour.com/story/hillary-clinton-inauguration-white-pantsuit; https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/women-democrats-are-wearing-white-to-trumps-congressional-address_us_58b5afd9e4b060480e0c3882; https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/trumps-address-to-congress/why-are-democratic-women-being-asked-wear-white-trump-s-n726761
38. Schreiber makes the argument that conservative women deploy gendered identities to counter feminist claims to represent women and that this

also gives them legitimacy to make what are basically anti-feminist claims (2008).

39. We also use affect and emotions as synonyms.
40. Ahmed (2010, 2014); Hemmings (2005); Skeggs and Wood (2012); Bacchi (2012); Suski (2012).

Chapter 3

1. In a statement that comes early in *Inclusion and Democracy*, Iris Marion Young captures our shift from a content to a process account of representation illustrated by the yellow dress: " . . . even though one side in the debate may have 'won,' few question the legitimacy of the outcome because the process was relatively, public, inclusive, and procedurally regular" (Young 2002, 3).
2. For an overview, see Kantola (2006).
3. Claims for women are those framed as directly important to, or only affecting, women and/or relate to gender difference and equality between women and men. This definition was developed with Johanna Kantola and Mona Lena Krook (Celis, Childs, et al. 2014).
4. Disch (2011) suggests that such a reading can be made of Pitkin, too.
5. Yvonne Galligan (2012, 3) similarly writes of inclusion, accountability, and recognition as the requisites for a gender democracy. The identification of these "dimensions" is based on a reading of democratic theory aided by feminist conceptions of democracy that pointed at the importance of a substantive conception of democracy, an expansive interpretation of the equality principle, and attention to the accountability dimension (Galligan 2012, 3, referring to Galligan and Clavero 2008, 5–6). Denise Walsh (2011) refers to access, voice, and contestation capacity. Galligan's and Walsh's principles were unbeknown to us at the time of the development of our initial thinking, but they marry well with our ideas and, in reflecting developments in the gender and politics scholarship, reinforce our claim that these constitute feminist democratic principles. We foresee, and welcome, scholarly discussions of various feminist principles to assess democratic processes.
6. Allen (2018, 88) writes: "Although a pure form of proceduralism might be guilty of this, it seems to me that this is a caricature of the position held by many who write on this question. An obvious response . . . is simply to assert that a minimal framework for assessing outcomes could be constructed using the same values that inform the development of the procedure."

7. We would like to thank Suzanne for allowing us to recreate our interactions based on draft papers.
8. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linda_McCartney_Foods
9. Note here, also, that Dovi (2009) turns away from formal exclusions—what she terms *categorical exclusions*—which are not democratically acceptable, to marginalization, which is democratically acceptable. This shift in her argument begs some important, additional questions about how marginalization is to be achieved, how it is manifest, and who gets to decide which representatives are marginalized, when, and in what spaces within the institution. It raises questions, too, of whether by downgrading exclusion to marginalization, the potency of her critique is more limited.
10. We are clear—even if we were not explicitly so in our earlier work—that we assume a certain minimal level of democracy within which a process of women's substantive representation is to operate. Thus, representatives, whether elected or not, must subscribe to minimal principles of democracy. See Young (2002, 5) on rule of law; civil and political liberties; and free and fair elections.
11. Dovi's (2009) exclusions are determined by the oppression principle by which she means those who oppose political equality, who benefit from oppression, and whose interests and status are favored by the status quo.
12. The core cleavage for the PRR is the "pure people" versus the "corrupt elite"; national populism focuses primarily on cultural, ethnic, and religious inequalities, and neo-liberal populism on economic inequalities (De Lange and Mügge 2015, 64). If there is a populist view on gender, it is secondary to the primary anti-elite struggle (Mudde and Katwasser 2015, 18). Feminism, which allegedly creates discord and a war between the sexes, or feminist-sponsored public policy, which distorts gender in unnatural ways and discriminates against men, undermines the very foundation of the nation. Sexual difference is foundational in the reproduction of national culture (Towns et al. 2014, 243).
13. *Neo-traditionalists* aim to provide a favorable climate for women to become mothers and housewives; they do not support policies that encourage women to work and, in contrast, make it more difficult through taxation that favors large families. *Modern traditionalists* combine traditional values with modern elements such as promoting a combination of work and raising children, and advocating equal pay for equal work (De Lange and Mügge 2015, 86, citing Mudde). Both neo-traditionalists and modern traditionalists believe in different gender roles, with women being mainly responsible for home and family based on their natural

reproductive ability (Akkerman 2015, 38; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015, 26–27).

14. This flexibility results from populism being a "thin ideology" that allies with other ideologies (like nationalism or neo-liberalism, but also socialism in Latin America) and is highly influenced by national culture, including its gender regime (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2015; De Lange and Mügge 2015).
15. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2015, 29); Akkerman and Hagelund (2007, 200); Towns et al. (2014, 238–39); Akkerman (2015, 56).
16. See also Coffé (2018) for discussion of gender personality traits, gender identity, and vote choice for the PRR.
17. This reproduces part of Celis and Childs's work (2018b), where we argued that these qualities are more realizable at the collective level.

Chapter 4

1. The description of the *Handmaids' Tale*–dressed protest is based on journal articles published in 2017 and 2018 in *The Guardian, The Telegraph*, and *The New York Times* (accessed on March 8, 2019): https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/03/how-the-handmaids-tale-dressed-protests-across-the-world; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/politics/handmaids-tale-protests-taking-place-across-world/; https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/us/handmaids-protests-abortion.html
2. Another recent example of feminist protest against the state is the "El Violador eres tú" performance. Originating in Chile in November 2019 on the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, they come together shouting against the state, decrying: "the oppressive state is a rapist." https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/world/2019/12/the-rapist-is-you-the-chilling-feminist-battle-cry-echoing-around-the-world.html
3. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/03/how-the-handmaids-tale-dressed-protests-across-the-world
4. Ibid.
5. Campbell and Childs (2013); Childs (2016); Childs and Dahlerup (2018).
6. In the presence of economic and political inequalities, "meaningful control over political representatives" is about realizing institutions that "take seriously the partisan nature of needs, interests and states of domination" (Hamilton 2014, 2–3, 12).
7. Newton (2012, 4) defines a democratic innovation as "the successful implementation of a new idea that is intended to change the structures

or processes of democratic government and politics in order to improve them."

8. Practices enact principles (Saward forthcoming 2020, Chapter 3). Practices are to be distinguished from rules and narratives. They are (i) demonstrated through conduct, for instance, how elected representatives conduct themselves in parliaments; (ii) enacted by the consistent rehearsal of "the ways in which we do things around here"; (iii) impact on actors through observing the routinized actions of members of the group and seeking to recreate those actions (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 52).
9. As mentioned previously, we designate our interventions *second generation*.
10. The focus of the designer is on practices rather than on (more conventionally) institutions. Yet what makes an institution is precisely the constant practice that defines and sustains it (Saward forthcoming 2020, Chapter 3).
11. This is not a question of naivety on our behalf. We are very much aware of the political and other inequalities that characterize civil society in *actualité*. Studies by the Research Network on Gender and the State (RNGS) have extensively shown that women's movements, importantly, vary in terms of their access to policymaking, which is explained by both intrinsic features, movement, and actor capacities, and the quality of opportunity structures and access states provide to them (McBride and Mazur 2010).
12. Note that in Chapter 1 we discussed the effects of our design on political parties.
13. Hamilton (2014, 201) states that the additions to existing institutions of representative democracy in South Africa he suggests—i.e., district assemblies, a revitalized consular system, and decennial plebiscites regarding the constitution—"would need to be modified and tweaked in practice and dependent upon context . . ." See also Saward (2016, 2, emphasis in the original), who writes that there neither is nor can be a "magic bullet" or "*ready* response," and Stoker (2013, 179), who claims that the political scientist undertaking design thinking is "oriented towards drawing lessons rather than precision and exactness in conceptualization."
14. For this reason, we also believe that devices should be defined in specific contexts. Devices are defined by Saward (forthcoming 2020, Chapter 3) as "the instruments, mechanisms or rules deployed or intended to direct, incentivize, induce or channel certain desired practices. Devices are deployed within or between institutionalized practices to enable them to do their work, to oil the wheels of practice (so to speak)."

Training to ensure effective participation, codes of conduct, facilitators, or moderators might be key devices (Mansbridge 2002). In the localized designing phase, also "recombination" can be considered (Mansbridge 2002, 176), i.e., the establishment of facilitative regulation, monitoring for quality, and sanctioning when standards of quality are not met.

15. As Saward (forthcoming 2020, Chapter 1) explains: "translation" of practices across contexts are more complex and problematic than "transfer" of a practice from one context to another. We should think of applying a design in a specific context more as translation than as a transfer because problems of democracy hardly ever manifest themselves according to sufficiently common and predictable patterns. See also Saward (2014), citing Beetham (1999) and Saward (1998).
16. Such an approach (i) seeks the participation of citizens and reflects a deep pluralism, and diverse actors express perspectives that need to be recognized rather than reconciled; (ii) involves citizens for the crafting and adaptation of institutional arrangements, and citizens hold politicians to account for their decisions on institutional design; (iii) invites contestation of existing institutions and challenging of new arrangements; (iv) rejects an endpoint to the designing project, and this incompleteness is not only inevitable but, importantly, also productive (Lowndes and Paxton 2018, 705–707).
17. Establishing connections with other democratic innovations—the "joined up thinking" about democratic innovation (Saward forthcoming 2020, Chapter 1)—should be part of the bricolage design taking place in specific contexts.
18. Lowndes and Roberts (2013), 187; Hood (1998), 69; and Goodin (1996).
19. Although we share Young's critique of aggregative democracy, we acknowledge that advocates of deliberative democracy can at times create something of a straw man (Saward forthcoming 2020, Chapter 1).
20. In recursive representation the representative is an interlocutor, a discursive intermediary between the representatives' constituents and constituents in other districts, administration, groups, and their lobbyists. In this way, the interlocutor representative links the representative system together, by making all parts of the system understand each other (Mansbridge 2019, 299). Mansbridge (2019, 309) goes as far as to claim that the representative's main job is communicating rather than policymaking.
21. In later work Disch (2019, 173) states that "the concern with manipulation is overblown": "citizens are not easily induced to change the beliefs that underlie their attitudes." Rather than seek to distinguish between

education and manipulation for defining legitimate representation—what agonistic democrats discard as mirroring an authoritarian representational mode—Disch adopts a citizen's standpoint that confronts theorists not with a problem of legitimacy but with a problem of hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Political communication should, in the agonistic ideal, "sustain the battle over the meaning of the social world, the common language, the identities, and what can and cannot be the object of the decision" (Hayat 2013, 2).

22. Political debate that embraces differences and conflict has the capacity to improve the "coordination processes" through which individuals develop a "common sense" of group membership based on shared views on "what an issue is and is not about" (Disch 2019, 175). As Disch (2019, 176) explains, the concept of "coordination process" captures how, through political speech and acts, frames of reference come to be held in common, how cue-giving elites and citizens converge on issue interpretation as those interpretations prove to be successful in mobilizing collective action. Coordination happens without a coordinator; elites cannot control it, but they can exploit it to their own benefit.
23. The claim that acknowledging difference and conflict is a prerequisite in the search for political solutions that might benefit all builds from the long-standing debate on the role of groups and group conflict for defining the "common good." Both group representation theorists and recent democratic representation theorists (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Urbinati 2006; Dovi 2007; Disch 2011; Saward 2010) adhere to the expressive stance in that debate which takes differences and conflict as the starting point for defining the "common good," for determining what is in the advantage of all. In contrast to the suppressive theory that understands group interests as always opposed to the general interest and group conflict, thus, as destructive, the expressive theory understands the common good as comprised of the well-being of different groups in society. Defining the common good, hence, requires the expression, and not the suppression, of groups' interests and group conflicts are, thus, potentially valuable.
24. In contrast to the classic deliberative theories that rejected self-interest as part of the larger rejection of aggregation and interest group pluralism, newer theories came to accept self-interests and conflict among interests as compatible with deliberative democracy (Mansbridge et al. 2010; Young 2002).
25. Notwithstanding deliberative democracy's reconsideration of the norms of deliberation, theorists of agonistic democracy remain unpersuaded

that it is sufficiently inclusive and open to passion and conflict in ways that will transform democratic politics (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). We take their claim that the prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions from the sphere of the public, and that passions play an important role in underpinning the connection between citizens and their political institutions.

26. These principles were first introduced in respect to substantive representation in the previous chapter.

Chapter 5

1. We do not blame the girl for "throwing like a girl." U.K. suffragettes had to be taught how to throw stones so that they could "smash" shop windows as part of their militancy. Nor do we imply that girls should throw like boys—i.e., that girls must "do" politics like boys do, in a masculinized fashion. Rather, what needs to be achieved by women is a powerful and effective throw.
2. See Chapter 2 for discussion of women's descriptive representation. As noted in Chapter 1, we maintain our commitment to parity of women and men among our elected representatives and, indeed, support sex/gender quota.
3. This speaks to Saward's (2019) recent call to embrace representation's "liminality," i.e., representation occupying an "in-between position," traversing the boundaries between the elected and the non-elected, the formal and the informal, the institutional and the non-institutional.
4. For the same reason we do not adopt the term *self-appointed* (representatives) coined by Montanaro (2012).
5. Mansbridge's (2002) speaks of those who participate in deliberation as "informal representatives" of those who do not directly participate.
6. A greater number of hearings before legislatives committees and/or select groups of legislators, such as a parliamentary women's organization, would be two obvious ways to do this (see Chapter 3; Allen and Childs 2018; Celis et al. 2016).
7. It is likely to thereby reinforce the idea that it is women, and not men, who are responsible for delivering on women's political representation (Smooth 2011). As noted in Chapter 2, this parliamentary sexual division of labor, in turn, reinforces the representation of elite women as the proper representatives of women, given it is they who dominate among elected representatives.

8. An additional, secondary limitation of spokeswomen for our purpose is that they are constituted and constrained as information givers in hearings, and frequently in a unidirectional fashion, thereby reinstating the idea of women having fixed and pre-existing interests (as noted in Chapter 2). We are committed to a creative conception of women's interests that sees the formal institutions of politics as a key site for this.
9. In seeking to mitigate the power inequality between affected and elected representatives (and by extension between women in society and the political elite), we acknowledge that the inclusion of affected representatives will not fundamentally change institutional gendered power relations overnight. Feminist institutionalist scholarship shows how opponents of gender equality use institutionalized gendered power relations to resist challenges to the status quo (Mackay and Meier, 2003; Mackay, 2004, 2006; Chappell, 2006; Mackay and Kenny, 2007; Kenny, 2007; Krook and Mackay, 2011).
10. As previously discussed, we reject a unidirectional approach to the representation of interests in favor of a creative account. That said, the affected representatives will bring in initial conceptions of what they conceive of as the interests of those they represent, which then become part of a more dynamic and creative process of interest representation.
11. This phrase reflects the comment of a civil society actor speaking to the Scottish Parliament, observed by Childs in 2017.
12. Like Hayat we agree that there can be a representation relationship even actors explicitly reject the notion that they are acting in a representative fashion. Hayat speaks of them "embodying the represented" (Hayat 2019a, 12–13; Fossum 2019). Hayat also (2019a, 10) refers to Patricia Hill Collins' refusal to speak for African American Women. She asks herself: "How can I as one person speak for such a large and complex group as African American women?" Her answer is: "I cannot and should not because each of us must learn to speak for herself."
13. The heightened attention to the quality of the representative relationship between women and their plural affected representatives counters Williams' concerns that self-representation risks the rights of "internal minorities" (Williams 1998, 77).
14. Expert affected representatives would engage in the same form of advocacy as other affected representatives.
15. Dovi is clear that her "understanding of democratic representation applies to *all* political actors," informal and formal (Dovi 2007, 7, emphasis in the original).

16. We admit that actors rejecting the idea of representing others would differ from us here.
17. Here, Montanaro (2012, 1105) cites Dara Strolovitch's (2007) finding that disadvantaged subgroups are rarely those that are represented by those who advocate for the wider group.
18. As Saward writes: "Incentives are intended to direct practice, and there is no single way in which they may do this—they may for example take forms which are intended to mobilise (variously) values, social obligations, professional standards, or material reward" and "Considering and anticipating incentive effects" is a key aspect of institutional designing" (Saward, forthcoming 2020, Chapter 4).
19. There is a third reason that we address in Chapter 6: the form that advocacy takes is also important because speaking in ways that are different from those they represent can create a disconnect between themselves, the representative institution, and the represented. This, however, takes us onto the terrain of showing their effects on representation. Here we are focused more narrowly on describing how the practice "works" within a parliament.
20. Note, however, that it is group advocacy working with its twin, account giving, that maximizes this possibility. We discuss this further in this chapter.
21. As discussed in Chapter 1. It has been too rare that gender and politics scholars have asked directly whether women representatives are sufficiently accountable to women or whether women's better representation would have been more forthcoming with stronger accountability mechanisms in place (but see Lovenduski 2019; Severs 2010, 2017; Disch 2011, 2013). This is not, to be crystal clear, the failing of first-generation theorists who did attend to this (e.g., Phillips 1995; Young 1990a/b; Williams 1998).
22. This frequently derives from Pitkin's claim about representatives "acting in the interests of the represented, in a manner responsive to them" (1967), although see Disch's re-reading (2011, 106–107), which suggests that Pitkin offered a constructivist account of representation. See Chapter 2.
23. If the logic of linking descriptive and substantive representation is followed and assumed to be an exclusive relationship, this leaves all non-descriptive representatives out of any women's accountability equation, which has its own problems: letting men of the representational hook, so to speak.
24. See Chapter 4. Disch (2011) is critical of Mansbridge for effectively fudging whether the represented are educated or manipulated in

anticipatory representation. See also Runciman's (2007) and Warren's (2019) discussions of the non-objection criterion.

25. Disch (2011, 111) defines three democratic criteria: (i) no official or unofficial body could claim to speak to for the people absolutely and definitively; (ii) the represented would enjoy formal and informal means of communication and action to contest government and party initiatives and to protest inaction; (iii) the political communication of advocacy groups, mass media, and opinion shapers would be in competition to mitigate passive absorption of elite communications.
26. Dovi (2015) claims that in unequal societies naysaying should bring injustices to light and foster the redistribution of power. Her conception of accountability as resistance is, she acknowledges is no "magic bullet."
27. Young (2002, 118) agrees, if there was reason to believe there were opportunities to influence outcomes.
28. Warren (2019, 57, emphasis added) states that "constituting *collective agents* of a kind that can be held accountable by citizens is one of the most important functions of representative political institutions."
29. This was discussed in Chapter 4 where we engaged with ideas of exclusion. We return to the political education of elected representatives as one of the effects of feminist democratic representation in Chapter 6.
30. Any such changes should not by definition be criticized for undermining electoral accountability; see Lovenduski (2019) and Warren (2019).
31. While we agree there is no single women's interest that our elected representative can "take" from women, there has to be *a* role for the so-called "bedrock norm" of representation, albeit understood in a more creative and deliberative fashion (see Chapter 1 and Disch 2012, 207, and 2011, citing Young 2002, 132; Dovi 2015; Squires 2008). See Disch (2012) for an evaluation of Pitkin's conception of representation, which includes a constitutive conceptualization even if she ultimately steps back from this, fearful of "arbitrary" connections between how a group is represented and what it wants (Disch 2012, 213). See also the discussion in Chapter 2 on Pitkin and symbolic representation.
32. Hence her claim that "we should view responsiveness as a systemic indicator of the quality of representation and identify patterns of congruence between elected and non-elected claims-makers *within the contours of a specific representative process*" (Severs 2010, 411, emphasis added). See Chapter 2 for the discussion on congruence and responsiveness.
33. Other non-gendered reasons for the elected representatives to act in addition to self-interest include the need to stem conflict in order to avoid its

costs, and to form coalitions to advance policy agendas (Williams 1998, 222, 227).

34. Rubenstein (2007) offers a defense of surrogate accountability, where an actor substitutes for the account holder.
35. Intended constituency is those for whom the claim is intended, while the actual constituency refers to those who recognize their interests implicated in the claim in some way (Saward 2010, 147; Severs 2010, 415).
36. See also Bovens (2007, 451–452); Rubenstein (2007); Grant and Keohane (2005).
37. Note that we ruled out Peter Allen's (2018) suggestion of representation by lot in our introduction.
38. There are those who dispute its very status as a quota (Krook 2009).
39. https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas
40. Young made two other interventions: (i) the self-organization of groups, to gain a sense of collective empowerment and a reflective understanding of their collective experience and interests, and (ii) the voicing of a group's analysis in institutionalized contexts where decision-makers are obliged to show that they have taken these perspectives into consideration (Young 1990b, 124). We are less interested in this book with the first. We leave that to scholars of civil society and deliberative democracy as we admitted in Chapter 1. Her second point is precisely what we are looking at here.
41. Williams (1998, 224–25) is critical of vetoes, as they solidify difference.

Chapter 6

1. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-45664863. Ford's allegations and reputation were subject to mocking disbelief, and she faced extensive trashing by the Republican media, commentariat, and politicians (if not more widely).
2. We kindly suggest you view it, even if you have seen it before: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bshgOZ8QQxU
3. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/sep/28/jeff-flake-elevator-rape-survivors-brett-kavanaugh
4. Mansbridge's (2019, 310–311) discussion of recursive communication includes consideration of online practices and randomly selected mini-publics. As we have made clear, we favor "live" rather than online enounters, with the differently affected principle trumping random selection as the basis for our restated case for women's group representation.

5. This constitutes "deliberation within," an internal-reflective process that complements, but, importantly, also is an essential part of, the standard external collective deliberation (Goodin 2002; see also Warren's 2019, 54–55, discussion of Hannah Arendt's "representative thinking" and "enlarged mentality"). Elected representatives might come to internalize others' perspectives, and applying them might become a second nature, which, if that occurs, significantly eases the cognitive constraints of representatives attending to many others. This speaks to our assumption that the work of the affected representatives might have a long-term effect on elected representatives' increased knowledge about and caring for women.
6. As discussed in Chapter 2, Johanna Kantola has drawn attention to the differential effects of affective and expert knowledge when Finnish parliamentarians debated austerity.
7. It is also yet another unambiguous indicator that the hitherto under- or misrepresented and their interests "belong" in our parliaments.
8. See Mansbridge (2019, 305) on the importance of repeated cycles of "hearing, understanding and response."
9. When elected representatives deliberate among themselves, they may for whatever reasons switch back to their preferred mode of communication (Urbinati 2006, 43–46).
10. As discussed in Chapter 3, we hold that such interests should be brought into political debate and subject to consideration and contestation.
11. See for example, Donald Trump's response to the speech by Khizr Khan, the father of an American soldier, which makes claims about the silencing of some women: https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/donald-trump-questions-army-father-s-dnc-speech-wife-s-n620241
12. We aspire for a media more concerned with the quality of women's political representation.
13. For our brief discussion of agonism, see Chapter 4.

Conclusion

1. https://time.com/79357/not-all-men-a-brief-history-of-every-dudes-favorite-argument/
2. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/05/germany-crisis-cologne-new-years-eve-sex-attacks; https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35231046
3. Lowndes and Roberts (2013, 186); Dahlerup and Leyenaar (2013); Kenny (2007).

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